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C O G N I T I O N AND VISUALITY 
Cognition and Visuality is a theoretical introduction into the cognitive 
science related to art and its comprehension. Cognitive science is an 
interdisciplinary way of scientific thinking, which has its implications 
to the aesthetic theories. Cognitive science has its links with phi-
losophy, and deals seriously with aesthetical questions because of the 
importance of mental processes and recognition in visual perception. 
Jarmo Valkola argues that observers think, perceive, feel, interpret, 
and apply knowledge of the world when viewing and making sense of 
the works of art. This study integrates psychological and aesthetical 
approaches and concepts to understand die complex processes of 
art and its interpretation. Through different cinematic examples it 
is possible to study artistic originality, and they are cognitively inter-
esting examples of pictorial orchestration of images and sounds in a 
creative way. 
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PREFACE 
The roots of this publication lie in the longstanding collaboration 
between the author and the department of Hungarology at the Uni-
versity of Jyväskylä. This collaboration begun already before the years 
1999-2001, when the author was holding the position of professor 
of Art Education at the same University. The collaboration started 
with courses on Hungarian Cinema, and expanded into seminars and 
symposiums on the same field. The most memorable of those were 
the research project called Hungarian Contemporary History in the 
Light of Hungarian Film, which had its closing symposium in the year 
2000 at the University of Jyväskylä. This project included partners 
f rom five different European Universities. The second very memora-
ble symposium happened during the 5th World Congress of Hungarian 
Studies in Jyväskylä in the year 2001, when the author was organizing 
a specific Cinema Symposium around Hungarian cinema. Still an-
other fruit of this expanding collaboration was the Theoreme special 
issue on Hungarian cinema — Cinéma hongrois:le temps et l'histoire, sous 
la direction de Kristian Feigelson avec Jarmo Valkola, postface de 
Jean-Pierre Jancolas, Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris 2003 — with 
a seminar in Paris n June 2003. 
1 want to express my special gratitude to professor Tuomo Lahdelma 
(University of Jyväskylä) for his generous efforts in making this pub-
lication possible, and also to professors Beáta Thomka and Kristian 
Feigelson for their most valuable remarks, and to artist Minja Revon-
korpi for the wonderful cover design and layout. 
Jyväskylä, May 2004. 
Jarmo Valkola 
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THE COGNITIVE M I N D A N D PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES 
REFLECTIONS O N COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
The term cognition refers to all processes by which the sensory input 
is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It 
is concerned with these processes even when they operate in the 
absence of relevant stimulation as in images and hallucinations... it 
is apparent that cognition is involved in everything a human being 
might possibly do; that every psychological phenomenon is a cogni-
tive phenomenon.1 
The more a science is concerned with causes, the more instructive it 
will be: for an instructor is one who explains the causes of a th ing. . . 
the most knowable things are first principles and causes, for it is 
through and f rom these that other things are known, and not they 
through the particulars falling under them. The most authoritative 
science, reigning supreme over subsidiary, is that which knows for 
what purposes every act takes place, i.e. the final cause, the good in 
each particular instance, and in general summum bonum in nature as 
a whole.2 
Science is not the piecemeal accumulation of facts; rather, it is a 
struggle between competing theories. And it is not t rue that science 
arrives at one answer, although elementary science may give this kind 
of impression. As the work on the philosophy of science has shown, it 
is a profound mistake to think of science as beginning from a kind of 
theory-neutral observation.5 Rather, science is saturated with theory, 
so that the most realistic way to see the transition from one view of, 
say, gravity to another is as the replacement ot one battery ot theoret-
ical concepts by another. It is the question of paradigm shifts.4 What 
distinguishes the work of different scientists is not what they have 
done, but merely the theories they have brought to bear through their 
experiments. Especially then when the theories and observations are 
concept-mediated. One might say that hypotheses of science serve as 
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chunks for conveying large amounts of information economically, and 
that object perception is the chunking of bits of sensory information 
so that we see objects.5 
The concept of criticism is one widely used. Criticism is a kind of no-
ticing, the recognition of aesthetically relevant features of art works.6 
If criticism is a kind of noticing then it does not follow that there 
are general rules applicable across categories of works of art, or that 
there are any otherwise specifiable foundations upon which critical 
judgement is based. One notices features of aesthetic value, and one 
learns to do so because one has an appropriate background in the art. 
So, to take criticism as a kind of noticing is to reject a view of criti-
cism as somehow approaching works of art with no preconceptions, 
or with no peripheral knowledge and experience of the critic. It is a 
question of idea of criticism as a perceptual process. 
The aim of criticism is to understand or to grasp the meaning of 
the work of art.7 Criticism is, in an interesting sense, a perceptual 
process. By this is meant that criticism should not be modelled as 
an approach to works of art armed with rules or sets of criteria for 
aesthetic excellence that are then applied. Criticism should be mod-
elled as a kind of survey of both large- and small-scale features of the 
object in question. Criticism is also a matter of scrutiny. This kind of 
thinking amounts to the idea that criticism consists on scrutiny of the 
work of art. And this kind of view conceives of scrutiny as an essen-
tially perceptual process.8 Art criticism can lend support to different 
kinds of efforts to go beyond the artistically straight and na r row by 
providing evidence that creativity is a dynamic and forward moving 
process. Criticism can help to lay the groundwork for a deeper un-
derstanding of the importance of art in human life.9 
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The viewer brings in general t ruths about the work of art and knowl-
edge of some of the prevailing conventions of art. The critic brings 
with him a great deal of information external to the particular work 
under scrutiny. These levels might be general t ruths about the world, 
and art world, prevailing conventions of art, and so on. The internal 
t ruths of a single work of art must be gained from looking at the 
work. This kind of contrast between the internal and external is cen-
tral to the scrutiny view of criticism. So, the internal t ruths passing 
into critic's cognitive stock must go through perception.10 The critic 
may understand things, and the internal t ruths of the work, but he 
must acquire that understanding by looking at the work, and in no 
other way. 
That is why the need for internal processing is strong if we are to 
describe the subjective aspects of a narrative flow, including feelings, 
emotions, and aesthetic effects. These kinds of perceptions happen 
in the invisible body/mind interior, and belong to the subjectivity of 
the spectator. This is something, which the viewer has to construct 
by a series of cognitive acts.11 To whatever extent cognition, broadly 
construed, turns out to be relevant to the explanation of social be-
haviour, emotion, psychopathology, or physical skills, the cognitive 
scientist will be interested.12 
Judging reality depends on the modularity of the mind, on the poten-
tial for parallel processing by separate function centres in the brain. 
Mental representations of a fictional or real object have the same lo-
cal reality in the mind, but the global module that judge reality-status 
prevents us from mistaking the fictional for the real and also allows 
us to experience emotions evoked by the local simulations." The 
spectator's role is perceptual.14 Understanding works of art is centrally 
a perceptual process than an inferential one. There is no significant 
step between how we perceive the work, and how we understand it. 
10 
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Understanding is rooted in scrutiny of the aesthetic surface of the 
work. Perception supplies premises for an inference of the meaning 
of the work of art. A certain cognitive stock allows the construction 
of critically relevant evaluations, from which the judgement of mean-
ing can de deduced. Meaning and coherence are constructed not only 
in different ways, but also on different levels within the reception. 
Written and image-based discourses are exceptionally rich sources 
of information from which a spectator can extract meaningful and 
coherent experiences on a w ide variety of levels.15 
Cognitive science is committed to the reasonable view that the 
mind is a representational system, that is, an intentional system that 
transforms, processes, stores, and retrieves information about the 
world. This representational system is a rich one, consisting of a 
priori structures, processors, and categories, which we use to create 
an orderly picture of the world. As the picture is enriched and revised 
throughout our lives we become continually better at anticipating 
reality. Cognitive scientists perform their transcendental inferences 
by generating hypotheses about mental processes, gathering relevant 
data from human subjects, and thereby refining or rejecting the ini-
tial conjectures.16 
The arts are cognitive and a matter of active thinking. The symbol sys-
tem approach to cognition identifies the different arts as each being 
a different symbol system, and thinking in the arts as processing, or 
conducting operations on, the symbols of one of these systems. This 
establishes the arts as cognitive. It also establishes them as unique 
because each art medium is a different symbol system, and therefore 
thinking within each symbol system is a unique kind of thinking. 
Over the past 30 years cognitive science has revolutionized our un-
derstanding of mental processes. At the heart of this discipline is a 
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central dogma, which plays a role analogous to the doctrine of atom-
ism in physics, the germ theory of disease in medicine, or plate tec-
tonics in geology. This central dogma is the 'Computational Theory 
of Mind': which means that mental processes are formal manipula-
tions of symbols, or programs, consisting of sequences of elementary 
processes made available by the information-processing capabilities 
of neural tissue.1 ' Mental processes are operations by which the in-
dividual mind infuses meaningfiilness and coherence into a fragmented 
and non-meaningful objective world, generating holistic chunks of 
phenomenal entities (e.g., objects, events, intentions, and causes).18 
Understanding is the general te rm for these processes, and features an 
ongoing interaction between an organism and its environment. Un-
derstanding other people is one of the f undamental human problems. 
We know much less about our ability to understand other minds than 
about our ability to understand the physical world. One currently 
prevalent theory of the evolution of cognition suggests that the ca-
pacity to understand, and so manipulate, our conspecifics was the 
driving force behind the development of distinctively human intelli-
gence.19 Understanding is the way the world presents itself to us, and 
this is the result of the massive complex of culture, language, history, 
and bodily mechanisms that blend our world what it is.20 
Individual claims about what our representations are about are fre-
quently made in the cognitive science literature, but still we don ' t 
know enough to theorize about the semantics of our mental represen-
tation system in the sense that linguistics provides us with the formal 
semantics of natural language. We can still infer that the semantics of 
our mental representation system must have certain characteristics. 
We can talk about human cognitive capacities, which are intentional, 
and can be pragmatically evaluated, and are productive. Cognitive sci-
ence is not only interested in the content of mental representations, 
but also in where this content comes from, because for a mental 
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entity or state to be a representation, it must not only have content, 
but also it must be significant. A significant representation can pro-
duce an interpretant state or process in the subject, and this state or 
process is related to both the representation and the subject in such 
a way that, by means of the interpretant, what the representation 
represents can make a difference to the internal states and behaviour 
of the subject.21 The interpretant of a mental representation for a 
given subject consists of all the possible computational consequences, 
including both the processes and the results of these processes. 
For example, the so-called "picture theory" has a very long history, 
going back to Plato or even Democritus, and until quite recently it 
was almost universally accepted.22 All versions hold that having visual 
imagery involves having entities, in the head or in the mind, which 
are like, or functionally equivalent to inner pictures. These pictures 
are thought ot being composed of copies or remnants of earlier sense 
impressions, complexes of visual sensations, which were they picture 
like. Picture theory came under severe philosophical attack in the 
middle years of the last century for being committed to an implausi-
ble, Cartesian view of the mind. However, Kosslyn has succeeded in 
showing that his computational version of the picture theory is both 
coherent and empirically credible.23 Tye seems to have convincingly 
demonstrated that it is coherent given the assumption that compu-
tational data structures of some type are proper model for conscious 
and intentionalistic mental contents.24 Cognitive science's a t tempt 
to explain intentionality by positing mental representations creates 
a problem, because mental representations are usually taken to be 
symbols. A symbol in the traditional semantic sense involves conven-
tions, both with respect to its meaning and respect to its syntactic 
type. So, conventions themselves also involve intentionality, and that 's 
why it is not so simple to explain intentionality by positing mental 
representations or mental symbols.25 Usually, the single images and 
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scenes symbolize something larger. Basically a symbol is an everyday, 
straightforward method of expression. A word is a symbol for a thing, 
and a concept is a symbol for a process or an experience. The point of 
words, and concepts are obvious enough. They separate the response 
to a thing from the thing itself, they emphasize certain features of the 
thing, and they facilitate new analyses and new connections. The sub-
stitution of the symbol for its subject helps to emphasise certain char-
acteristics of the subject. The symbol enriches the context, but also, 
the context influences the symbol. A sign might have a fairly precise 
meaning, while symbol has a less definable meaning, and a vast wealth 
of associations. The obvious meaning of a poetic symbol is often very 
different from its associations. One has to bear in mind that every 
symbol exists only as shown, because it is heavily influenced by every 
nuance of the artist's style. A symbol is not just something which one 
adds to the story. The story itself is a symbol, and so are the various 
situations, and other elements in the narrative. 
Most discussions of cognitive theory conflate the notion of a men-
tal (intentional) content with that of a computational representa-
tion, failing to distinguish the computational mentalism dogma f rom 
the view that brain function may best be understood and simulated 
computationally. The computational theory of mind has led to rapid 
progress because it has given a precise mechanistic sense to formally 
vague terms such as 'memory ' , 'meaning', 'goal', 'perception' , and 
the like, which are indispensable to explaining intelligence. Dudley 
Andrew touches this same regard: . . . we are now witnessing Ameri-
can film theory audaciously tendering a psychological model, of ten 
set explicitly against psychoanalysis, labelled cognitive science.26 
Cognitive science is based on a non-behaviouristic, psychological 
framework of research. To understand visual phenomena, behaviour, 
or language, we need to understand the mechanisms and structures 
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by which these activities are processed by the human mind and brain. 
Aspects of cognitive research and thinking have their roots in Gestalt 
psychology and phenomenology.27 Cognitive science has several phil-
osophical implications. For example, people of ten lack knowledge of 
underlying mental processes; we are not adept at identifying causes 
of our behaviour and mental states. 
The mind is in cognitive sense a system of many different special 
purpose processors, most of which have no idea what the others are 
doing. Research in cognitive science indicates that people are prone 
to a wide variety of characteristic reasoning and judgment errors. It 
is interesting to notice that to whatever extent a person is capable of 
achieving sell-knowledge, rationality, and an accurate picture of the 
nature of the mind as a whole, it will require much more than peer-
ing inward with our mind's eve and applying natural knowledge and 
reasoning abilities. The co-operative working of the different systems 
of the brain supplies humans with information processing, and pro-
vides active and plastic adaptation to the environment. It is a complex 
of functional systems, organized according to plans and programmes 
created by the social history.28 
THE ESSENTIALITY OF MENTAL PROCESSES 
Cognitive schools have tried to describe the way in which percep-
tion and meaning are structured by human mental structures and 
mechanisms. In Gestalt thinking, for example, grouping means that 
the 'whole' is more than the sum of its parts. 'The whole' is a de-
scription of the result of the interaction of the parts. It means that 
we establish a phenomenon, a concept, or a schema, for which the 
associated features and aspects are its determiners. We can give con-
scious salience to the 'determiners ' , by asking what is unders tood 
by a given concept, or by trying to reveal the underlying network of 
15 
THE COGNITIVE M I N D A N D PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES 
associations. Psychologists have investigated the activation of network 
of associations by investigating associative priming, the way in which 
one phenomenon activates an associative network and by that facili-
tates mental operations on the items in the activated network.29 In a 
way, Gestalt psychology was an extension of Heimholte's constructiv-
ist ideas. Where the behaviorists insisted that psychology was simply 
the study of how objective stimuli come to elicit objective responses, 
the Gestaltists pointed to simple demonstrations casting doubt on 
the idea that objective stimuli even exist. Although many of the idea 
were in the area of perception, they were also extended to memory, 
and problem solving.30 
The essentiality of mental processes is typical for cognitive approach. 
Mental structures are involved in the process of perception itself, 
and this idea can be found in many cognitive theories, which take 
the testing of mental structures as central to the perceptual process. 
Top-down and bo t tom-up processes are used by many constructive 
theories. Gestalt psychology is interested in perceptual organization, 
which means how we unite things and elements into patterns or ob-
jects. Gestalt psychology wants to determine the concepts through 
which we organize parts into a whole, and make conclusions like a 
shape is more elementary and easier to remember than background. 
A shape is seen in front of a background, and a shape is like formless 
material, which seems to stress behind the background. The contours 
that seem to differentiate the shape from the background seem to 
belong to the shape. All gestalt solutions are not generally accepted 
but many of the problems proposed by Gestalt psychology have still 
current value. Perception is an active and constructive process. Per-
ception does not come straight f rom sensory information but is more 
likely a combination of the interaction between sensory information, 
internal hypotheses, expectations, and knowledge. So, the sensory 
information forms a basis for larger processes. 
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There is a long-standing tradition in philosophy that perception 
(especially touch and vision) gives undeniably t rue knowledge. Phi-
losophers have generally sought certainty and have of ten claimed it, 
whereas scientists are more used to modify their theories bv new data, 
have been more flexible. Still, many scientific instruments have been 
developed because of the limitations of the senses and the unreliabil-
ity of perception. It is worth asking why we have both perceptions and 
conceptions of the world. Why is perception separate and in many ways 
different f rom our conceptual understanding? It is because percep-
tion works very quickly whereas conceptual thinking is much slower 
because it might take years to form adequate concepts. Knowledge 
and ideas are in a way timeless, and it does not seem possible to think 
that perception could use all of our previous knowledge because it 
works so fast. Still, there is a special intelligence in perception. It can 
be argued that the development of distance perception freed organ-
isms from the tyranny of reflexes, and was the necessary precursor of 
all intelligence. The special intelligence of perception has been widely 
discussed. An earlier account portrayed sensory perception differ-
ently as a passive un-distorting view through which the mind accepts 
sensations which were considered to be sense-data of perception. On 
this kind of account sense-data may be selected according to need or 
attention; for vision the brain (or mind) has little to do except select 
and pick up features of the ambient array of light. 
R. L. Gregory thinks that perception is not determined only through 
sensory information. Perception is a dynamic process, which includes 
a search for interpretation based on sensory information, and the 
usable knowledge concerning the properties of objects in question. 
This knowledge is maintained by earlier experiences, which are b o r n 
through sight and through the information gained by senses. In Gre-
gory's thinking objects have past and future, because an object t ran-
scends experience and becomes an embodiment of knowledge and 
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expectation.31 It is very difficult to give an answer to that how we 
perceive the reality. One must learn to differentiate between different 
reactions, born and learned. The behaviourist model is too restric-
tive to study perception, because perception is experience based on 
worldly objects.32 The senses cannot produce direct perception of 
the world, but instead they offer proofs of testing hypotheses of what 
lies in front of us. A perceived object is a hypothesis, suggested and 
tested by sensory data.33 
THE IMMEDIACY OF PERCEPTION 
Perceiving objects is a kind of problem solution. Sometimes eye and 
brain can make false conclusions, and then we see a hallucination or 
an illusion. Perception and thinking are not totally different process-
es, because especially many sided figures and images will proof that 
perception includes delicate processes even in the basic level.34 It has 
been long known that in perception there is a likelihood principle, 
and in perception there are also unconscious inferences. Perception 
includes unconscious conclusions, and the whole perceptual process-
ing includes many complicated mental processes, which we are not 
aware of.35 Julian Hochberg thinks that perception includes uncon-
scious conclusions as well, and through that it is possible to explain, 
for example, illusions.36 
When a person watches a view he or she gains information through 
fixations and eye movements. Eye movements are necessary for de-
tails, because we can clearly see only those details that are very near 
to the point we are looking at. Eye movements are also important, 
because the impression of depth comes through certain features that 
function as local depth cues. Eye movements are not arbitrary, but 
instead every eye movement seems to be in forehand decided. Eye 
movements are guided by the expectations, and those expectations 
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will arouse on the basis of what we have learned to expect in certain 
situations, and what we have learned about the regularities of forms 
and shapes. This is also underlined by Neisser, and he thinks that eye 
movements are guided by received information, and that we are not 
totally aware of the order of eye movements and fixations.37 
A person gathers visual information through eye movements, which 
he or she then fits into a schematic map to produce a unified percep-
tion. A schematic map is the program of possible samplings of an ex-
tended scene, and of contingent expectancies of what will be seen as a 
result of those samplings.38 A schematic map is a matrix of the mind's 
time and space expectations, which integrates different glances into 
one perceptual structure. When we are watching a view, most of it is 
not in the retina, but in the mind's eve. The view has been stored in 
' J 
encoded form, and not as a mental mirror image. A sudden glance 
can be a sensation, a schematic map can be an image, and perceptual 
structure can function as perception.39 A schematic map is not just 
a visual storage or passive afterimage, but an active director of the 
whole perceptual process. Eyes are directed to what may be needed 
next, and to checking current perceptions. 
According to Neisser, not just reading, but also listening and watch-
ing are skilled functions that happen through time. They are all de-
pendent of earlier structures, which are called schemes. They are 
internal parts belonging to a perceivers perceptual cycle. Those parts 
can be changed by experience connected with the perceptual mate-
rial. Schemes direct perception, and at the same time they can be 
changed during the perceptual process.411 Because we see what we 
are looking at, the schemes together with the valid information con-
trol the perceptual process. Perception is a building process, where 
the perceiver actively explores the surroundings by moving the eyes, 
head, and body, so, that one can gain all the possible information. In 
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every moment the perceiver forms expectations, and tests it. New 
information can change the original scheme, and a new scheme can 
guide future perceptions. Schemes are expectations or anticipations 
through which the past influences the future. This whole percep-
tual process is a perceptual cycle.41 The theoretical foundation of the 
cognitive approach lies in schema theory. "Schemas (or schemes) 
are complex types of cognitive structures representing generic so-
cial experiences and cultural knowledge. They contain the common 
and characteristic features of similar phenomena, for example similar 
objects, events, situations or discourses. . . they exist in the minds of 
individual subjects as psychic structure, but they are linked to the 
socio-cultural and historical realities. Schemas are developed f rom 
daily life experiences which in their turn reflect socio-cultural cir-
cumstances at a certain point of history."42 
Perception is not just a recognition of previous assumes, but it pro-
duces new knowledge for the organism, and although a perceiver might 
have some expectations when he or she gains information, these ex-
pectation can be fixed and modified during the perceptual process. 
The difference between a skilled and unskilled perceiver is not that 
the former would ad something into the stimulus, but in this that 
a skilled perceiver can gain more information about the object. A 
skilled perceiver can realize features and higher structures that are 
not noticed by others. I n a way the schemes of a skilled perceiver are 
more developed, so, they can receive broader information, and they 
can handle more complicated information. Learning through percep-
tion can affect a schematic map, so, a perceptual learning can affect 
what we are looking at, and how we remember what we see. Neisser 
uses the concept a cognitive map, which means a kind of space and 
orienting schema, and he thinks that perception is a process where 
there are many different perceptions. These perceptions change orig-
inal schemes and every person has his or her own schemes due to a 
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personal life. It is a testing of hypotheses, but these hypotheses are 
strictly bordered, very general and not very specific by nature.43 Two 
different criteria are often used to attribute to people map-like or-
ganization of spatial knowledge. One is when spatial inferences about 
the direction and distances among locations can be made without 
direct experience. The other is when it is possible to take mentally 
a different perspective on an entire spatial layout. This can be done 
by imagining oneself in a different position with respect to a layout.44 
It is possible to think of cognitive maps as databases, and the te rm 
cognitive map is of ten being used more and more metaphorically. 
Nowadays also art scholars are beginning to acknowledge the cog-
nitive dimension of art and are questioning what should be taught. 
What can we learn about works of art and how can we make con-
nections between information, one's own life and the world we are 
living in? For example, discipline-based approach in art education 
has emphasized the point, that works of art present us with intricate 
meanings, and to understand such meanings requires abilities to ex-
plain them. Therefore, one aim of a discipline-based art education is 
to develop students' ability to interpret works of art on a more chal-
lenging and sophisticated level. Still the current ideology and practice 
in art education are embedded in contradictions and of ten appear to 
vacillate between modernist and postmodernist theories of art. Many 
art educators continue to use modernist works of art f rom which to 
teach. It is due to the easiness to use modernist theories as a founda-
tion and understanding of the work of art.45 o 
FROM PERCEPTION TO RECOGNITION 
When we view a scene, the world seems to be filled with objects that 
have particular shapes, colours, and material properties. The pr imary 
source of information that we use to acquire information about our 
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world is visual, which relies on the light reflected off of object sur-
faces to a point of observation. Our knowledge of object structure, 
and aspects of our visual world, is determined by the structure of the 
surfaces of objects, since it is there that light interacts with objects. 
Compositional features like centres of interest may be graphic rather 
than scenic, in a sense like abstract paintings can have them. The 
spectator 's attention is easily pre-empted by focal points, like a con-
figuration of strongly contrasted colours, or a nexus where many line 
converge at sharp angles. Colour and composition can compete, and 
graphic structures are always vulnerable to non-pictorial priorities, 
such as literary content.46 Movement is a primary graphic feature, 
because it is so conspicuously concrete. It is somehow assumed to 
be more realistic than the static spaces within which it occurs. The 
movement in an image is real, but only in the sense that everything 
else in the image is real. As a representation of another movement, it 
is not of ten realistic, and when it happens to be realistic, no special 
consequences flow. The human mind is biologically pre-programmed 
to accord a high priority to movement. Pictorial organisation can in-
tensify effects palpable in real-life vision. Although movement in itself 
is completely abstract, different factors can give movement a kind of 
character, which interacts with other elements. Movement resembles 
all the elements of concrete form in suggesting a range of dynamics, 
and it is highly responsive to dramatic or semantic elements. 
It is said that perception is usually dependent of concepts. When we 
perceive something, we also perceive it as some one. Perceiving relies 
on knowledge of the world around us. It might be difficult to separate 
knowledge of the world, knowledge of semiotic form, and knowledge 
of meanings, because far f rom being separate levels, zones, or disci-
plines each implies the others. Knowledge of semiotic form is part of 
our wider knowledge, which can only be a knot of all these things. If 
one replaces paradigms like separate levels by models like interacting 
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subsystems, then coherence and correspondence will stand revealed 
as synonyms for the same co-ordination. Certain knowledge is not 
always necessary, and it is surprising how well probabilistic infer-
ence can repair deficiencies in knowledge. The majority of traditional 
psychological theories investigate perception as recognition of some-
thing, and there are also methods through which we can observe the 
different phases of perception. Nowadays there is also talk about di-
rect perception. We observe other things more than others, and what 
is in the centre of the focus, is usually seen clearer. This relates to 
the function of the eyes. For example, Ulric Neisser suggested some 
years ago that there are three different ways of perception: direct 
perception, recognition and interpersonal perception.4 ' We perceive 
objects through different phases. In the first pre-attentive stage of 
processing, stimulus will be divided into primitives. In the second 
focused attention stage of processing these primitives are united into 
a whole.48 For example, Bela Julesz thinks that the differentiation of 
textures depends on local features, primitives that he calls textons. 
These textons will form textures, and they don' t have to be totally 
identical to form groups.49 The different parts of perception will be 
differentiated through different textures. In the pre-attentive stage 
of processing the textons will be united into textures quickly and 
automatically. After this there will be a recognition of patterns and 
objects The process will happen in the bot tom-up style during the 
first phase, and later on also from top-down. Also Anne Treisman 
thinks that in the pre-attentive stage of processing there will be per-
ceptual organization and differentiation of the textures. She thinks 
that different perceptual laws organize visual views into homogenic 
areas and elements. This phase is a beginning one, f rom which we are 
not aware of.50 
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Also Michael Tarr believes that a perceptual organization will happen 
in the early stages of visual processing, and it is needed for the devel-
opment of more complex representations.51 Perceptual organizing has 
two ways of processing, the grouping of and separation of features. 
The different perceptual laws will describe more thoroughly this or-
ganization, and they function although all the possible information 
concerning the view in question is not available. Treisman thinks that 
essential grouping of features will happen during the slower, focused 
attention stage of processing. This stage selects and integrates fea-
tures into certain positions. Focused attention stage of processing is 
also needed to form a temporary object representation or object file 
f rom a certain object, and it will be fulfilled constantly, for example, 
when the object changes through movement. 
Attention can be intentional, even prefigured. If some things draw 
our attention, this can be unintentional. Attention is an aspect of 
consciousness., but not a synonym with it. If the attention is divided, 
then a temporary representation includes those features that char-
acterize the whole structure of different elements as a group. There 
might be two ways of looking: one for the perception of local forms, 
and the other for larger perception. Selective attention is the factor 
that leads to the perception of details, and one can consider the larg-
er, global perception as a very general process, which includes even 
then perception of all those things that are beyond our attention.52 
The recognition of objects will happen then, when temporary repre-
sentation will be measured with the patterns in the memory or with 
the descriptions that have taken place with the previous objects in 
mind. Sometimes during active perception the representation that is 
all the time fulfilling itself will change into something else. Then the 
recognisable object might change into another that is more appro-
priate.53 The perception and recognition of objects takes normally 
more than just the right selection and listing of features. 
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Normal perception takes place between earlier knowledge, and sen-
sory information gained through perception. The most significant 
consequence that deals with the grouping of features and parts is that 
there will be emergent features, which are directly perceived. One 
can perceive directly the parts or groups formed by them, and these 
are the emergent features." Also other tests have proven that a target 
may be recognized based on very little information. They show that 
a spectator in front of an image with a previously unseen view can 
through one fixation extract enough information to understand it.55 
This is very essential for the viewing of art, and its objects. 
Irving Biederman's theory recognition by components is a constructive 
one, because he says that in the first phase of perception the objects 
are divided into basic elements that are then unified, and the gath-
ered wholes are then recognized by comparing them with the rep-
resentations in memory. Three-dimensional objects are recognized 
through volumetric elements that are called geons}6 Geons are basic 
materials of perception, and by combining them it is possible to build 
up many thousand objects. Geons can be perceived at least f rom five 
easily recognisable properties of object line: collinearity, curvilinear-
ity, symmetry, parallelism, and cotermination of segments. Our vis-
ual system differentiates those properties from the two-dimensional 
retina image, and they are strong proofs that the three-dimensional 
world has the same properties.57 
The perceptual laws (like the Prägnanz law) have a significant role in 
the formation of geons. If the basic elements can be perceived, and 
the perception of objects is based on basic elements, then the object 
can be recognized. The recognition can happen very easy when there 
is enough information to recognize the geons of the object. W h e n 
geons are found the ordering of them are compared with the rep-
resentation in memory.58 The crucial thing is that all the geons are 
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perceivable, because they can be recognized quickly through some ot 
them. Of course, the whole object will offer a more optimal possibil-
ity to recognize geons, and the object. This is important because if 
object recognition would happen with a large amount of information, 
the process would slow ready for mistakes. Through practical expe-
rience we know that object recognition is a very quick and precise 
process. On can also assume that the recognition of very complex 
objects last longer than the recognition of simple ones, but because 
the recognition of objects happens through simple basic elements, 
the complex objects will be as quickly recognized.5V Because object 
recognition is based on geons from different perspectives, the whole 
object is quickly recognized nevertheless what the perspective would 
be. 
There is also point of views that object recognition is bound with 
the perspective. The recognition of an object through a new point of 
view or perspective is more easier because in the mind exists already 
a storage of representations with different point of views. When we 
have seen an object through many perspectives, the recognition of it is 
not bound to a certain perspective 60 In David Marr 's computational 
theory the process of seeing includes different phases through which 
the retinal image will change into three-dimensional representation. 
The first phase leads into a primal sketch where visual system's main 
function is to recognize the properties of two-dimensional image. 
The recognition includes the changes of light sources and highlights, 
and the primary analysis of local, geometric structures. At the same 
time, a group of basic elements is identified, and many perceptual 
laws are being adapted. 
The second phase leads into a 2 Vi D sketch, the visual system proc-
esses information, which was included in the primal sketch. The goal 
is to reach a representation concerning the depth and direction of 
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surfaces. 2 Vi D sketch is an internal representation of the physical 
world, and it is reached through top-down process. After this the 
2 'A D sketch in formation will be changed into a 3 -D model rep-
resentation, which is a three-dimensional vision of the world. The 
recognition of objects will happen when 3-D model representation 
is compared with a list in memory of 3 -D model descriptions. When 
an appropriate model is picked up from the list, it is possible to make 
a better analysis concerning the representation.61 The importance 
of the theory lies in the assumption that perception is born out of 
analysing the information of the retinal image. Relatively simple sen-
sations are affected top-down by the prevailing perception, or hy-
potheses, of the objects before eyes. Top-down knowledge of specific 
classes of objects also has clear perceptual effects. 
Knowledge can work downwards to parcel signals and data into ob-
jects. As knowledge changes, the parcelling into objects may change, 
both for science and perception. For example, the criteria for rec-
ognizing and naming the various features of a machine as separate 
depend very much on our knowledge of functions. It is a question of 
the importance of upward and downward processing in perception 
and science, the complex interplay of signals, data, and hypotheses. 
Unravelling this is essential for understanding the strategies and pro-
cedures of perception and science. 
A profound difference between perceptual and conceptual objects is 
that perceptual objects are always concrete ones, while conceptual 
objects of science may be abstract ones. The perceived objects have 
spatial extension, and they may change in time, while conceptual ob-
jects cannot be sensed, may be unchanging and spaceless, and yet 
have the status of objects in that they are public. Although concrete 
objects may have features that are abstract, as we believe especially 
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from scientific knowledge.62 According to Gregory, there are differ-
ences between perceptual and scientific hypotheses.63 
Firstly, perceptions are f rom one vantage-point, and run in real time, 
but science is not based on a particular viewpoint. That is why percep-
tion differs f rom conceptions by being related to events in real t ime 
from a local region of space, while conceptions have no locale and are 
essentially timeless. So perception is far more limited in range and 
application than conception. The basis of empiricism is that all con-
ception depends upon perception, but conception can break away 
from perception, and create a new world. Secondly, perceptions are 
of instances, and science is of generalizations. We perceive individual 
objects, but we can conceive generalizations and abstractions. Third-
ly, perceptions are limited to concrete objects, while science also has 
abstract objects. The contribution of inferences and assumptions to 
sensing even simple makes the distinction between concrete and ab-
stract objects difficult and perhaps impossible. Fourthly, perceptions 
are not explanations, but concepts can be explanatory. Scientific hy-
potheses are closely linked to explanation. Perceptions have tar less 
explanatory power, but might have some. Fifthly, perception includes 
awareness, and the physical sciences exclude it. 
This is striking difference between hypotheses of science and percep-
tion. Sensations are involved in perception, but awareness, or con-
sciousness has no place in the hypotheses of physics. Much of human 
behaviour controlled by perception can occur without awareness: 
consciousness is seldom it ever necessary. There are marked simi-
larities and important identities between hypotheses of science and 
perceptions, however the differences are extremely interesting. It 
may be that developments in artificial intelligence might provide new 
conceptions. In a way, perceptions are like hypotheses, conclusions 
of unconscious, and inductive inferences, so, the concept of the nor-
28 
THE COGNITIVE M IND A N D PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES 
mal meaning of frequently repeated perceptions can come about with 
immutable certainty, lightning speed and without any meditation. By 
frequent repetition of similar experiences one can attain continually 
recurring connections between very different perceptions. Meanings 
can be built up inductively, f rom many different sources, and both 
for language, and for perceptions. In this process, our ideas of the 
physical form of objects happen inductively, by combining visual ex-
periences from different viewpoints. At any given moment on sees 
the world f rom one viewpoint, and from one angle. In that sense 
each shot on the screen corresponds to a glance, but the succession 
of shots is very unlike a succession of glances. The human eye oper-
ates on very different mental principles like a camera, and our glances 
shift to focuses of attention within a vaster field of peripheral vision, 
and this field constantly interrelates the glances within it at the same 
time as our short- term memory co-ordinates the series of glances in 
a serial, and on-going way. 
The perception as a whole is based on manv different systems, which 
are partly independent modular systems. As mentioned before, per-
ception includes three basic forms and systems: direct perception, 
interpersonal perception, and representation. There exists also many 
other modular systems like memory system, motoric control system, 
and the system of writing, which are in collaboration with each oth-
ers, and that's why quite hard to separate. For example, direct per-
ception is only one form or system of perception, and it is innately 
prepared, and concerned with pariental pathway.64 In direct percep-
tion the spectator is active, and can get the kinetic depth effect. In 
visual experience, depth effects are created by the nervous system 
and the mind.1,5 Many cognitive functions are dependable on mental 
representations: we have to identify targets through the information 
stored in our memory. This kind ot recognition might change f rom 
very simple cases into very complex ones. In art one example ot a 
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complex one would be like recognition of a Rembrandt painting. 
Recognition is always determined by the past: to recognize some-
thing we have to notice the similarities between the actual informa-
tion, and the information of some earlier moments. The effect ot the 
past into cognitive processes is a very complicated issue, which can't 
be explained just through information storage. In learning there is 
an interaction between experience and earlier understanding. The 
recognition of single objects depends usually on the perception of 
certain characteristics, and textures. In everyday experience, all these 
three forms and systems of perception will function smoothly to-
PERCEIVING OBJECTS AND ART 
The different theories, and scientific approaches to perception have 
open up horizons in this field. A broader view of perception can see 
these different approaches as complements of each other, and help 
us with a better understanding of the whole process. The perceptual 
laws and other gestalt psychological principles can help and guide 
us how to organize perceptions into unified patterns and objects. 
The perceptual laws describe the effects of certain innate, and very 
early learned schemes into the organization of perception. Gestalt 
psychologist thought that these organizing principles have a physi-
ological basis, and so they would be innate ways of organizing percep-
tion. If we think that there are innate and learned schemes, we can 
see the unification of many perceptions, although our experiences 
and interpretations of them might be very different, but still in the 
background there is a common information, which has been picked 
from the same targets. 
The innate psychological schemes seem to be sometimes flexible. In 
the studies concerning many sided and complex image interpreta-
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tions, there is a perspective according to which the primary organi-
zation of perception might happen in several ways. So, the innate 
schemes are not always stiff but can produce different shapes on the 
same material basis. Different perceptions are consequences of dif-
ferent schemes that will change during lifetime, and in the percep-
tion of art this seems that the same work of art looks different w hile 
to be watched during different periods of life. Perception functions 
remarkably fast, because unexpected events do happen. We have per-
ceptual hypotheses and conceptual hypotheses of the world, and they 
are different, and might work on different time-scales. 
Different visual models, descriptions, and representations are partly 
learned, because they are based on earlier experiences. All learned 
schemes are not models or representations, because they can deal 
with the ways and principles of perception. The different visual mod-
els, descriptions, and representations are linked with the basic system 
of perception, recognition. Very brief glances are relatively immune 
to the effect of learning, but learning can affect the schematic map, 
which is a learned model or representation of an object. Perception 
is related to conception by perceptually guided activities requiring 
understanding. The reality is made by private hypotheses of percep-
tion, and shared hypotheses of conception. 
A learned perceiver of art has developed better schemes, models, 
and representations, and can take in more information, and can find 
out more complex connections between elements and things like an 
unskilled perceiver. Because learned schemes can be models and rep-
resentations of objects, they can be endlessly formed. Learned and 
innate schemes might have different roles in different situations, and 
they function in different phases of perception by completing each 
other. 
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The innate schemes do not lead straight into the recognition of an 
object. They work more as organizers ot perception. The learned 
schemes have a role in recognition. They are models, descriptions, 
and representations. The learned schemes can be guiding models of 
action. It is possible that the differentiation between learned and in-
nate schemes is purely theoretical, and actually it is a question of 
combining the two. The perceptual laws itself do not bring in the de-
sired effect, it is produced by learned models, descriptions, and rep-
resentations. Because of the learned representations, certain shapes 
can gain more meanings than others, and can be based on previous 
knowledge of the world it is possible to fo rm expectations that will 
guide to a proper interpretation. 
The different models and representations are kind ot hypotheses, and 
not of ten very accurate representations of the views in front. The hy-
potheses of representation have formed through experience, which 
brings in new expectations guiding our perceptions. While observ-
ing complex images the existence of learned representations is more 
clear, because in front of them it is possible to gain different inter-
pretations and meanings. While recognizing targets inside the images 
one has to deal with more interpretational processes than in perceiv-
ing the reality. Through associations one can link unseen features into 
familiar objects.66 
For example, in face recognition one can quickly perceive the es-
sential and structural features of a face. The recognition of a familiar 
face happens through the distinctiveness of a face.67 Face recogni-
tion requires holistic recognition, which has its advantages also in 
object recognition. Instead, the recognition of letters is more like 
part-based recognition, useful in object recognition but not in face 
recognition. There is also a perspective according to which it is not 
possible to recognize objects without the cultural context surround-
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ing them. One can think that the influence of the past into human 
beings cognitive processes is much more complicated process than 
just a hint some processes, which store information. We learn to 
perceive things through human communication, and the produced 
knowledge will move on to new situations as models, ways, and prin-
ciples of action. 
Perception is, in a sense, pattern recognition but not in the sense of 
recognising a simple template, like the visual equivalent of a para-
digm. It is more like the ability to compare and contrast similarities 
and differences, and co-ordinate them as variations. Such a co-or-
dination is not conscious in the sense that one spells it out in his 
or her mind, nor even in the looser sense that it is under voluntary 
' J 
control, or that one can easily become conscious of it. Rather it is 
' J 
in the pre-conscious area, a zone of mental operations, which are 
sometimes easy, sometimes difficult, and often impossible to render 
conscious. The mind has many levels and sub-systems of which some 
are low-level reflexes, or sequences of motoric instructions. Others 
are perceptible but normally they interest us very little. Much of our 
complex, higher-level thinking is preconscious too. One rarely can 
spell out every stage in an associative chain. Most reconstructions of 
associative chains are done by retrospective hypothesis, and they nev-
er explain the omission of equally available alternatives, and they can 
hardly cover more than one aspect of such search procedures. The 
mind sets out f rom several aspects of a task in situation simultane-
ously, and what it offers as a solution to these multiple requirements 
is the product of convergence f rom every feature of context, content , 
function, and goal. The model of multiple, simultaneous operations 
allows one to understand the brain's remarkably efficient compromise 
between speed and heterogeneity. Rather than following old associa-
tion chains, the brain must have far more efficient systems for cross-
indexing and excluding information. For most of these operations, 
33 
THE COGNITIVE M IND A N D PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES 
consciousness is unnecessary, and full articulation in consciousness 
would consist of impossible slowness. Most of the conscious thinking 
takes the form of vague awareness, where the vagueness stands lor a 
pre-conscious knowledge, which can of ten be so quickly retrieved, 
that one thinks of it as having been conscious all the time. 
THE NATURE OF VISUAL THINKING 
According to Rudolf Arnheim perception itself is cognitive, to see is 
to per form operations on visual materials. The cognitive operations 
called thinking are not the privilege of mental processes above and 
beyond perception but the essential ingredients of perception itself 
It is a question of active exploration, selection, grasping of essentials, 
simplification, abstraction, analysis and synthesis, completion, cor-
rection, comparison and problem solving. These are the ways that 
the mind treats cognitive material at different levels.68 Each of these 
operations is a component of intelligence and of perception. Take, 
for example, the fundamental operation of selection. If one is to se-
lect some aspect of a visual situation for attention, and for further 
processing, then one must select a particular shape, colour, patch, 
or line. The same is t rue of all such operations, which are thereby 
shown to be indisputably both cognitive and conducted from the very 
beginning in visual terms. That is why Arnheim called them visual 
thinking. 
A difference between passive reception and active perceiving is con-
tained in elementary visual experience. Arnheim insists that although 
a retinal projection is given, it is not the essence of perception. That 
given world is only the scene on which most characteristic aspect of 
perception takes place. The perception takes place through glances, 
directed by attention, and focusing the narrow range of sharpest vi-
sion on different aspects.69 It is an active concern of the mind. Per-
ception also consists in the formation of perceptual concepts. Vision 
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deals with the raw material of experience bv creating a corresponding 
pattern of general forms, w hich are applicable not only to the indi-
vidual case at hand but to an indeterminate number of similar cases. 
Arnheim does not want to point out that perceiving is an intellectual 
operation. What lie wants to say is that there are striking similarities 
between the elementary activities of the senses and the higher ones 
of thinking and reasoning. The same mechanisms operate on both 
the perceptual and the intellectual level so that we need terms like 
concept, judgment, logic, abstraction, conclusion, computation, to 
describe the work of the senses.70 
Perceiving accomplishes at the sensory level what in the realm of rea-
soning is known as understanding. Much of human inference depends 
not on deduction, but on inductive probabilistic reasoning under 
conditions ot uncertainty. Everyday inductive reasoning and decision 
making is often based on simple judgment heuristics related to ease 
of memory retrieval and degree of similarity.'1 Gregory has the same 
kind of concept on perception. He thinks that perception can't be 
deductive thinking, because perceiving things is not only a human 
operation. That 's why it is more inductive thinking, and for this rea-
son we can, lor example, experience perceptual paradoxes. '2 Think-
ing can be inductive, and it presupposes selection and choosing. The 
visual concept ol the object derived f rom perceptual experiences has 
three properties. It conceives in itself the image, where the object can 
be seen as three-dimensional, of constant shape, and not limited to 
any particular projective aspect. 
That is why a person's visual concept of the object is based on the to-
tality of observations from any number of angles. It is still a visual con-
cept, and not a verbal definition obtained by intellectual abstraction. 
Sometimes intellectual knowledge helps to fo rm a visual concept. 
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Object 's certain and essential feature will appear best f rom different 
angles. Visual concepts must be distinguished f rom so-called eidetic 
memory images, which make it possible for some people to project 
upon an empty surface an exact replica of a scene they have perceived 
before. We can compare them with afterimages, although they can be 
scanned by eye movements, and this is not possible with afterimages. 
According to Arnheim, eidetic images are substitute percepts and as 
such mere raw material for active vision. For example, the problem of 
surface perception is difficult because the visual system is confronted 
with the problem of untangling the different physical causes of the 
images on our retinas, and filling in missing information when only 
portions of a surface are visible. Much progress has been made in 
understanding how the visual system infers surface structure in some 
simplified images, but still much remains to be done before we have 
a full understanding of how our visual system works.73 
SCHEMES OF THE MIND 
Eidetic images are not constructs of the formative mind like visual 
concepts.74 The visual concept of anything that has volume can be 
represented only in three-dimensional medium, such as sculpture 
and architecture. If we want to make pictures on a plane surface, all 
we can hope to do is to produce a translation, to present some struc-
tural essentials ol the visual concept by two-dimensional means.75 
Also Gombrich point out that an image is translation or transforma-
tion but this transformation has to be reversed to obtain the required 
information.76 In talking about visual concept and perception, it is 
not only a question of image perception but of perception in general. 
For example David Marr and Irving Biederman think that represen-
tations and descriptions of the mind are object-centred. So, a visual 
concept is not just a reflection of some aspect. 
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One can call Arnheim's visual concept a representation or scheme of 
the mind, which is a three-dimensional model composed through ex-
perience, and not a scheme related to the organization of perceptions 
and of principles concerning with the perception. Arnheim believes 
that by investigating the drawings of children, we can find out what 
and how they will perceive things? The early drawings of children 
show neither the predicted conformity to realistic appearance nor 
the expected spatial projections." So, children actually draw visual 
concepts. Earlier it was suggested that children are technically unable 
to reproduce what they perceive. 
The nature of cognition is adaptive, because perception, memory, and 
reasoning do not operate simply for their own sake. Much of our cog-
nitive apparatus evolved to serve basic functions of life, and human 
cognition involves intricate systems for motor control, and learning. 
Arnheim thinks that the drawings of young children show incomplete 
motor control.78 The lines are yet accurate enough to indicate what 
the drawing is supposed to be like. Other theorists have maintained 
that children aim at making straight lines, circles, and ovals because 
these simple shapes are relatively easy to draw. This might be t rue but 
does not indicate what mental process induces children to identify 
complex objects with geometric patterns. We cannot interpret them 
as simplified projective images.79 
The mental life of children is intimately bound up with their sensory 
experience, and if the child's mind contains any non-perceptual con-
cepts of roundness, straightness, or symmetry, how would they be 
translated into visual shape?80 If they are derived from visual experi-
ences, should we believe that the primarily raw material is processed 
into non-visual 'abstraction', to be translated back into visual shape 
for the purpose of image making. Because visual perception is based 
on optical projection, the sense of sight was deemed incapable of 
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conveying a truthful image of what three-dimensional things really 
look like. Nevertheless if we realize that to apprehend a shape of an 
object by touch is in no way simpler or more direct than apprehen-
sion by vision. For example, to experience space kinaesthetically, the 
brain must create that experience from sensory messages that are not 
spatial, and kinaesthesia involves the same kind of task as vision.81 
A grown up person selects visual interpretations concerning differ-
ent objects on the basis of visual information at hand. Other senses, 
like touch, will affect our perceptions, but they do not determine the 
perception.82 Perception does not consist of photographically t rue 
recording of something, but more like reaching out for the structural 
features of something. In perceiving an image one perceives actively 
the structural features of an image. The human mind can be forced 
to produce replicas of things, but it is not naturally geared to it. Since 
perception is concerned with the grasping of significant form, the 
mind finds it hard to produce images devoid of that formal virtue.8 ' 
An artist may start his or her work based on an idea, which is then 
worked out through some vague scheme, and then gradually fixed 
with new ideas. If an artist tries to reach out something, which cor-
responds to real perception, then what kind of scheme or mental 
representation is there to be fixed? One can think that the concept 
of a scheme might be different when applied to perception of reality 
than to representation of it. 
Perception depends on active, psychologically based processes. It is 
accepted that stored knowledge and assumptions actively affect all 
kind of perception. Perception consists of forming visual concepts, 
and mental representations, and making an image is like produc-
ing representational concepts on the basis of visual concepts. These 
concepts and representations are structures consisting of essential 
and special features. This means that although a mental representa-
tion of a mind or a visual concept contains more information about 
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an object than what we can perceive from one perspective, it still is 
a simplification of the object.84 Phenomena of this kind find their 
explanation in what gestalt psychology describes as the basic law of 
visual perception: Any stimulus pattern tends to be seen in such a way 
that the resulting structure is as simple as the given conditions per-
mit.85 Simplicity can be defined by means of information theory: The 
smaller the amount of information needed to define a given organi-
zation as compared to other alternatives, the more likely the figure 
will be so perceived. Both a psychologist and an artist must come to 
realize that the perceptual experience of looking at a figure cannot be 
described as the sum of the perceived components.8 6 Objective and 
subjective simplicity do not always run parallel. A perceiver may find 
a sculpture simple because he or she is unaware of its intricacy, or 
find it confusingly complex, because he or she has little acquaintance 
with even moderately elaborate structures.87 
It appears that we have a tendency to see things as wholes. What is 
seen in a particular area of the visual field depends strongly on its 
place and function in the total context. Of course, the structure ot 
the whole may be modified by local changes. This interplay between 
whole and part is not automatic and universal. A part may or may not 
be influenced by a change in the total structure. This illustrates just 
that any visual field behaves as a gestalt.88 If attention is focused, we 
can see details, but when attention is split, we perceive more about 
whole than its parts. So, the quality of attention reflects the nature of 
perception. Even though well-organized figures cling to their integrity 
and complete themselves when distorted, we should not assume that 
such figures are always perceived as undivided, compact masses.84 
Shape is not the only factor determining the splitting of visual field. 
Similarities and differences in brightness and colour can be even more 
decisive. The appearance of any part depends, to a greater or lesser 
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extent, on the structure of the whole, and the whole is influenced by 
the nature of its parts. Arnheim thinks that no portion of a work of 
art is ever quite self-sufficient.90 Picasso, after experimenting with 
sketches of rather complex hands and figures for his mural Guernica, 
made them much simpler in the final work. Every painting, sculpture 
or film carries meanings. Whether they are representational or ab-
stract, they are about something. An image can present a visual state-
ment , and the simplicity of art objects involves not only their visual 
appearance in and by itself, but also the relation between the image 
seen and the statement it is intended to convey. For example, sim-
plicity requires a correspondence in structure between meaning and 
tangible pattern. Gestalt psychologists call this isomorphism, a require-
ment for design in the applied arts as well.91 A visual concept is some-
thing that comes through visual, and not verbal thinking. Generally, 
the models, descriptions, and representations stored in memory are 
usually visual. 
COGNITIVE VARIATIONS IN PERCEPTION 
There are two kinds of perceptual thinking, which Arnheim distin-
guishes as intuitive and intellectual cognition.91 Intuitive cognition takes 
place in a perceptual field of freely interacting forces., through which 
the perception of an image is born. This interaction is very complex 
field process, of which very little reaches consciousness. An exam-
ple would be, how one apprehends a work of art like painting. The 
observer perceives the various components of an image, the shapes 
and colours and relations between them. The final outcome becomes 
conscious as the perception of a painting. A great deal of thinking 
and problem solving goes on in intuitive cognition. Through intellec-
tual cognition an observer isolates items and relations among items 
from the perceptual field in order to establish the particular nature 
of each. Intellectual processes follow each other in linear succession. 
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By gradually solidifying the perceptual concepts gained from direct 
experience, the mind acquires the stable shapes. 
Our perceptual movements, whether obviously physical, like eye-
movements and re-focussing, or more elusively mental, like move-
ments of attention, are physiological by nature. As co-ordinations of 
mental and physical operations they involve physical tensions, which 
scientific psychology has so well described, and which mainstream 
aesthetic theory has treated in terms of tension, balance, rhythm, 
and all the other elements of pictorial composition, and its abstract 
and concrete significations. Images seem to provoke these factors 
in which real life viewing does not, partly through the image's tight 
unity, partly through the relative restriction of eye movements, or 
partly through contradictions between the pattern and its implied 
scene. Looking at images uncouples perceptual processes f rom most 
being there reflexes, leaving them available instead for sensitised sig-
nificance. 
The recognition of images can be compared with previously un-ex-
perienced targets or views with insufficient information, which both 
require more specific perception than a familiar view. The perception 
of images requires some kind of thinking, comparison, knowledge, 
experience, and attention. Through experience an observer works 
toward solution that is highly appropriate, and this process leads into 
interpretation. Partly the process is unconscious, and that is why an 
observer sees through image perception the target, and does not con-
sciously think all of his or her choices.93 If we think of image percep-
tion as visual thinking, we can realize that there is a lot of informa-
tion in the image, which we don ' t use. Another thing is that we can 
identify different targets based on quite little information. Perception 
is not just recognition, but more or less it is perception and under-
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standing of spatial structures, and understanding of different objects 
and parts and their relations in visual field through visual thinking. 
The normal function of the rules and conventions of pictorial com-
position is to encourage maximally efficient internal relationships as 
related to context, content, and assumed purpose. Much of interest-
ing discourse involves some shift of alteration to conventions, and 
special purposes may require that normal procedures be bent, twist-
ed, reversed, or broken, for example, a filmmaker may think that it 
is important to draw the spectator 's attention to facts and features of 
the frame, not only as a condition of pictorial representation, but as 
a contradiction of the represented items. This guidance of pictorial 
glances might then reverse normal procedures. One reads the shot 
as an especially integrated whole, but incompletely integrated with 
competition for the attention between sub-configurations. This com-
petition constitutes a fo rm of structure resulting in tension, balance, 
and dynamics. The interpretative attention bestows special signifi-
cance on some features ot pure graphic form, while overriding others 
in its pursuit of significance. 
An image is relatively closely structured, yet internally unstable. Its 
configurations recombine as the spectator's eye patrols over the im-
age. The shot presents a logical oddity in being both a composition, 
and a mere surround for a set of clues to something in itself as invis-
ible as most associations, meanings, and references are. The shots 
of a film have a pictorial relationship with one another. For example, 
the juxtaposition of two strong compositions can create a shock, a 
collision, a sensation of optical clash or contradiction, or a kinetic dy-
namic. The spectator's eye can de-prioritise the change of shot, and 
concentrate instead upon elements that link different shots together. 
Thus one can recognise a second shape as the same thing from an-
other angle, and prioritise the continuity. The juxtaposition of shots 
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is only a prelude to the semantic interaction between shots. Editing 
practice is dominated by this dialectic of contrast and continuity, dif-
ference and similarity. The spectator's mind must handle all this very 
fast with relating different shots, and overlooking the cuts. 
When observing an image, one single and special feature can already 
activate representations ot the mind, and lead to the recognition 
of objects. So, the testing of different hypotheses is not every time 
necessary. On the other hand, the perception of images is also con-
nected with the understanding of spatial structures and relations, and 
this kind of understanding requires visual thinking. When an image 
is very complicated, and offers lot of information, one might need 
more conscious deductive processes to fulfil the task of understand-
ing, and sometimes when there is not enough information to select 
the right object, the mind cannot decide how to see the object. Com-
plex images test the idea that the interpretations include experimen-
tal reflection.94 Complex stimulus impulses inside an image create a 
situation where the schemes as mental representation of memory are 
gradually more and more focused toward the final solution. 
Perception is not only the gathering of information or activating 
the mind and its representations, but it is also foreboding of future 
perceptions, because visual experience is dynamic, and deals with 
psychological forces. In a psychological framework image-based dis-
course functions on many cognitive-emotional levels, and the specta-
tor uses a wide set of dispositions to make sense of the various levels 
of image-based discourse.95 Perceptual inductions differ f rom logical 
inferences, because inferences are thought operations that add some-
thing to the given visual facts by interpreting them. Instead, percep-
tual inductions might be based on previously acquired knowledge of 
the world. So, in this sense perception is an experience that is born 
out of the information and the forebodings connected with it. Fore-
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bodings are important for survival, and in this meaning very natural 
ways of behaving and thinking. It is also possible that forebodings are 
connected with image perception and interpretation. An image leaves 
always holes, which are there for the observer to be fulfilled. What 
we see depends on the previous knowledge of what we know. Fore-
bodings create illusions, and an observer can fulfil the holes, if there 
is no doubt how to do it. Through our experiences it is possible to do 
the fulfilling, to reflect life and ideas into the image. 
The human mind works as an interplay ot tension-heightening and 
tension-reducing strivings. The same twofold dynamics is reflected in 
every work of visual design.96 In a work of art might be a structural 
theme, suggested by the subject matter, but constituted first of all 
by a configuration of perceived forces. The theme is given a sim-
plest form compatible with the character of the statement. According 
to Arnheim, visual perception consists in the experiencing of visual 
forces.9 ' Of ten natural objects possess strong visual dynamics because 
their shapes are the traces of the physical forces that created the ob-
jects. Works of art are seldom produced physically by the forces we 
perceive in their shapes. All the dynamic qualities in the works of art 
are not created by physical forces, and even if all visual dynamics were 
due to the direct manifestation of physical forces, this would not ac-
count for the perceptual effect of the final product on the mind of the 
observer.98 This effect is not due to the observer 's knowledge of its 
cause. We must look for the visual properties of the percept that are 
responsible for the phenomenon. 
MENTALITY AND CO-ORDINATION 
An intelligent organism operates in a perception-action cycle, taking 
in sensory information from the environment, performing internal 
computations on it, and using the results of the computation to guide 
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the selection and execution of goal-directed actions. The initial sen-
sory input is provided by separate sensory systems, including smell, 
taste, liaptic perception, and audition. In its more complex forms, 
for example, learning is intimately connected to thinking and reason-
ing. Humans are not only able to think, but also to think about their 
own cognitive processes, resulting in meta-cognition. They can also 
for m higher-level representations. 
In cinematic narration editing is possible because the mind can 
achieve quite complex co-ordinations in, literally, split seconds, and 
this also touches on the nexus of relationships between form and 
experience, knowledge and perception, and established and in-coin-
ing information. One aspect in film culture has aspired to a rigorous 
logic, within which all the phenomena will become one tightly co-
herent structure; akin to a logical system at least as linguistics-based 
structuralism has conceived such an approach. Unfortunately its par-
adigms have maximised the difficulties in understanding the nature 
of mental operations on which film form depends. Insofar as thought 
is co-ordination, it must seek out, and yet tolerate both external and 
internal discrepancies. 
While some discrepancies are repressed, like conflict-inducing wish-
es in a Freudian theory, or "cognitive dissonance" in a more gen-
eral way, many discrepancies are recognised and endured, or used 
and indeed enjoyed. And this goes on not just as riddles, paradoxes, 
jokes, surprises, and so on, but also in ordinary thought. It has been 
truly said that contradiction is more the cause than the product of 
consciousness. It may be, however, that discrepancy is more basic 
than contradiction, since the mind is geared to integrating systems, 
which, without necessarily contradicting one another, are disparate. 
Most obviously this has to do with the sensory systems, sight, sound, 
touch, and our awareness of the different positions of the different 
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parts of our body in relation to space and gravity, momentum and 
counter-pressures. 
This also deals with mental sub-systems, like networks of associa-
tions. It seems that the mind monitors these various factors simulta-
neously, and computer scientists have begun to underline the impor-
tance of "parallel processing", in effect, the simultaneous processing 
of independent variables, whether heterogeneous or homogenous. 
It is this constant comparison of discrepancies, which enables one 
to differentiate between images and scenes, or to compare mutu-
ally exclusive paradigms or models for the same phenomenon.' '9 In a 
sense, perception is pattern-recognition, not in the sense of recog-
nising a simple template, like the visual equivalent of a paradigm, but 
the ability to "compare and contract similarities and differences, and 
co-ordinate them as variations. A good example is the "constancy of 
vision" mechanism, which enables us to "see" a table as rectangular 
even though, f rom all normal eye levels, perspective presents it as 
an irregular trapezoid, which, as we move around it, is a constantly 
changing series of forms. 
More probably is the case that the mind sets out f rom several aspects 
of a task-in-situation simultaneously, and what it offers as a solution 
to these multiple requirements is the product of convergence f rom 
every feature of content, context, function, and goal including de-
sire, wish-fulfilment and fear. "Simultaneous processing" might be 
a better phrase than "parallel processing", because parallels don ' t 
integrate so well. At any rate, the model of multiple, simultaneous 
operations allow one to understand the brain's remarkably efficient 
compromise between speed and heterogeneity. 
Rather than following old association chains, the brain must have 
far more efficient systems for cross-indexing and excluding informa-
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tion. For most of these operations consciousness is unnecessary and 
indeed, full articulation in consciousness would be impossible slow. 
Much conscious thinking takes the form of vague awareness, where 
the vagueness stands for a preconscious knowledge, which can of ten 
be so quickly retrieved that we think of it as having been conscious 
all along. For example, we often sense and with great confidence, that 
an argument contains a discrepancy, before we define what it is. And 
in normal speech, we somehow know that we know what to say, and 
roughly what it is, but without knowing exactly what it is, or what 
words we will use. And after the moment we've said it, it would be 
hard for us to repeat the words exactly. 
Of ten the conscious part of our thinking is restricted to a co-ordina-
tion of selected items of data, the setting of a goal, and a volitional 
decision to perform the task. The actual performance is no more 
conscious than instructing each foot alternately to take a step. Con-
sciousness does not think. Perhaps it is the result of the higher mental 
sub-systems registering discrepancies f rom one another. Consistency 
is not the basis of constructive thinking; it is what thinking constructs 
out of the disparate and the discrepant. Hence we-feel quite at home 
with all the irrationalities of film form: like "this picture here" also 
being "this place elsewhere", and like the edited flow of shots pre-
senting incompatible spaces within one screen space; and so on. 
To make sense of a film, the mind draws on our general understand-
ing of the cinematic situation, of which its forms are part, and of our 
general knowledge of the wider world, of which our knowledge of 
cinema is a part. The ability of quite young children to make sort of 
sense of TV depends less on receiving verbal disquisitions or decon-
structions of the medium, but rather through everyday experience of 
it: how parents treat its "illusions", that the dog on the screen will 
never bite us, that its images, and their multiple viewpoints, analogise 
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with perspective, which of course exists in the material world quite 
independently of its various approximations on paper. Even in real-
life vision we draw on basic mechanisms of form-percept ion when we 
understand that in audiovisual narration it is question of viewpoints 
which are moving, or that in a certain scene the heavily shadowed 
side of a man's face forms part of the same object as the visually very 
different sunlit side of that face, and that the shape of a head depicts 
a solid object, not a flat or convex surface. 
Apart from visual knowledge we need a probabilistic knowledge of 
the world. This means, for example, in a scene that the gun going off 
in one shot probably links with another man falling in another shot, 
and that a train compartment is not a room in a house but may well 
start moving out of the station, and so on. These items are not coded, 
and films can and do spring surprises on us. But spectators with no 
knowledge of guns or trains can hardly understand the spatial, or nar-
rative, connections between shots. Unless we assume that all beetles 
are small, a close-up of a beetle could read as a gigantic beetle, unless 
we have taken care to insert some explanation or to include a familiar 
object as a conspicuous scale in the same shot. If the spectator under-
stands these things, they teach him film form, which is why no one 
learns film form as he learns a verbal language. 
Assertions that the structures of verbal language dominate percep-
tion, or film form, labour under the grave disadvantage that no evi-
dence exists to prove it, and only piecemeal shred of evidence to 
even suggest it. Many effects attributed to verbal forms are better 
explained in terms of deficient or variant knowledge of the world. 
That cross-cultural, cross-sub-cultural and ideological differences 
radically affect experience, perception and film form is after all the 
commonest justification of art. This means that by rendering other 
thought-forms visible, it enables us to try them on for size, or for 
communicative or diagnostic purposes. 
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METAPHORICAL ASPECTS 
Philip Johnson-Laird has proposed several features, which are char-
acteristic of the human consciousness.100 One is that it functions as a 
superior operational system. The concrete and detailed control and 
implementation of muscle innervations, for example, take place on 
a non-conscious level. We have no consciousness of the numerous 
muscle innervations, which enable us, for example, to skate. But we 
have a conscious high-level operational control of our behaviour via 
a much more general program. This program could look like a script 
in the sense in which the term is described in Schank and Abelson 
(1977), that is, a narrative or a summary of a sequence of acts. Im-
portant aspects of storytelling can be seen as developing out of the 
procedures we use when planning. According to Johnson-Laird, an-
other essential feature of human consciousness is the ability to the 
embodied brain to make a model of it. Because this model has to be 
contained in the human brain itself, it follows that it must necessarily 
be much simpler than the brain. The function of this model as linked 
to its ability to improve the quality of the acts of which humans are 
capable whether these are physical or mental. 
The mental models of the consciousness are primarily phenomenologi-
ca\, representing exterior space, w ith the inclusion of agents and ob-
jects in this space. The raw material for these mental models consists 
of perceptions, and mental models describe the way in which we act 
in the world by importing features of it, using aspects of it as tools. 
Models are not just representations; they are tools, concepts that owe 
a great deal to the computer revolution that has diminished the clear-
cut opposition between mind and matter. An essential aspect of the 
mental models is the construction of the model of the person it-
self. The model acquires its elements partly f rom the exterior world, 
partly from the inner world. The conception of the person as an act-
ing figure in space is acquired from the exterior world bv imitation. 
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So, the person uses his or her visual perceptions of other persons as 
model schemata.101 The conceptions of abilities to perceive, to feel, 
and to think are acquired f rom the interior world, but the content ot 
the thought processes is mainly represented in forms f rom exterior 
space. 
Similarly the imagination used in more abstract thinking will employ 
model images of phenomena in and acts per formed in an exterior, 
objective space, which is marked linguistically by the use of figura-
tive language.102 The figurative and metaphorical aspects of language 
make it reasonable to assume that, trom an evolutionary point of 
view, abstract thinking has developed on the basis of the concrete 
scripts of acts and scenes which have gone through a process of ex-
traction of essential features that could be used as models for other 
mental processes. When Kosslyn (1980) describes the way in which 
a person is able to imagine that he is 'rotating' or 'scanning' a given 
complex of mental images, this implies that the mental processing of 
images takes place as a simulation of perceptual processes with exter-
nal objects. Besides scripts of actions, we also have scripts of percep-
tions, which enable us to carry out acts of hypothetical perception, 
that is, imagination. 
LANGUAGE AND IMAGE CONSIDERATIONS 
The ultimate theme of the image, the idea of creation, is conveyed 
by what strikes the eye first and continues to organize the composi-
tion. The forces that characterize the meaning of the story come alive 
in the observer's mind, and produce participation that distinguishes 
artistic experience from the detached acceptance of information.103 
The image is determined by the totality of visual experiences we have 
had with the object during our lifetime. The interaction between the 
shape of the object and that of things seen in the past is not automatic 
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and not ubiquitous, but depends on whether a relation is perceived 
between them."" The principles in art will learn us how things can 
be seen not only as such, but as they are represented. Also verbal 
descriptions might stir up visual memory traces, and can affect inter-
nally into the interpretation of images. 
The same can be said about thinking in other media. For example, 
kinaesthetic thinking requires the selection for attention of particular 
bodily movements, and verbal thinking requires the selection of par-
ticular words and sentence structures. Thinking is the performance 
of these kinds of operations on the elements of a particular medium. 
So, if thinking is conducted in the terms of a particular medium, then 
to put it into the terms of a different medium is to change it. Visual 
thinking cannot be put exactly into words, because all translations are 
distortions of the original thought. That is why thought can remain 
t rue to itself only if it remains faithful to its medium, and this is the 
reason for insisting that we keep kinds of thinking separate. 
In Arnheim's notions related to perception, the media correspond to 
our sensory channels. In the case of sight, the medium is visual and in 
the case of hearing, the medium is sound. These are the two sensory 
channels that Arnheim thinks as the most important for thinking. In 
thinking about language, the situation is different, because there is no 
single sensory channel corresponding to it. Language can be spoken, 
in which case it is heard, or written, in which case it is seen. So, lan-
guage is not so much a medium of perception but of representation, a 
medium in which we often speak of the visual arts as different media 
like painting, drawing, sculpting, etc. 
Language is not merely a more or less systematic inventory of the 
various items of experience which seem relevant to the individual; 
it is also a self-contained, creative symbolic organization, which not 
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only refers to experience largely acquired without its help but actually 
defines experience for us by reason of its formal completeness and 
because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations 
into the field of experience.105 This was developed into the Whorfian 
hypothesis that language moulds thinking. 
Thinking is generally affected by language, which itself adapts to 
thought and action. The use of language also calls attention to the 
different aspects of environment and culture. There are differences 
between existing cultures and languages. The importance of writing 
for societies and for individual thinking can hardly be overestimated, 
and its importance was clear to the earliest civilizations in which it 
developed. This writing consisted of picture symbols, which became 
connected in conventional ways to express ideas. They became as-
sociated with sounds of spoken language as the sound of the name 
of an object denoted by the symbol became the name of the symbol. 
For example, cultural behaviour is the process of symbolizing the sur-
rounding world as well as the own behaviour.106 It is a process, which 
works in two directions: it implies the transformation ot data, the 
transformation of nature, and it contributes to the identity of a per-
son or group that is the agent ot this symbolizing activity. Culture is 
not a linear activity of discovering the world, because there are many 
cultural approaches at the same time. The most characteristic feature 
of culture is its pluralistic character. In art as well as in sciences, in the 
continuous self-reinterpretation of various religions as well as in the 
meandering flow of economic order, reality shows always new aspects 
and structure. The existing map is not filled up, but rewritten in the 
new structures and symbols. Culture and reality are interrelated to 
such a degree that the restructuring history of cultures belongs to 
reality itself. 
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In order to interpret the functioning of the senses properly, one 
needs to keep in mind that they did not come about as instruments 
of cognition for cognition's sake, but evolved as biological aids for 
survival."" This means that perception is purposive and selective. 
Thinking about art media as a media of representation, one can con-
clude that just as perception is not a passive reception of sensory 
impressions, so representation is not imitating, because perception is 
an active search for visual structures and representation is an active 
search for equivalent structures in a medium of representation. This 
search requires active and constructive experimentation within the 
medium of representation. Representation is as thoroughly cognitive 
as is perception.108 
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THE SENSE OF ART 
Art is the imprint of life upon our consciousness, and a facet of t ru th 
projected within a particular framework of understanding. Relation 
of representation to art is and old and enduring process. Already with 
Plato and Aristotle, we are in a situation were imitation and resem-
blance were considered to be the main factors in art. This lasted well 
into the late nineteenth century, when philosophers became increas-
ingly aware of art as less concerned with imitation or resemblance 
and more concerned with aboutness. Works of art by Picasso and 
Duchamp are still about something. Ready-made and found objects 
such as Fountain and In Advance of a Broken Arm possess aboutness. 
They have semantic content, and the artist intended them to mean 
something. Even avant-garde works of art that defy interpretation 
have a subject, and mandate interpretation. On the other hand, pure 
orchestral music and non-representational architecture seem to re-
sist a definition of art in terms of aboutness. There is much art that is 
about anything. Pure decoration is another example. Such artworks 
can be simply beautiful, 'beneath interpretation', and 'solely in virtue 
of the perceptual impact they make on us'.109 According to Carroll, 
representation-type theories of art are inadequate to address all pos-
sible cases, much art is indeed representational, and visual art is es-
pecially likely to be representational."" 
Thinking about expression-theoretic account of art we come into 
terms of different emotions like sadness, joy, or fear. They became 
especially pronounced at the end of the eighteenth century, perhaps 
as a result of Romanticism and the rise of absolute music, and they 
resulted in a notable subjective turn in artistic practice throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.111 According to Carroll, 
x is a work of art if and only if X is (1) an intended (2) transmission 
to an audience (3) of the self-same (type-identical) (4) individual-
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ized (5) feeling state (emotion) (6) that the artist experienced (him-
self/herself) (7) and clarified (8) by means of lines, shapes, colours, 
sounds, actions and/ or words ." 2 
When philosophers of art talk about what, for example, poems ex-
press, they are not thinking broadly about the communication of 
ideas. For them, what get expressed are certain human qualities (also 
known as anthropomorphic properties), notably emotional tones, 
moods, emotively coloured attitudes, and the like. That is, the con-
cept of expression that concerns philosophers of art is the one in 
evidence in sentences like: 'This artwork expresses joy'.113 But this 
seems to be too narrow a conception of expression, although many 
philosophers, like Kant, write about the expression of aesthetic ideas, 
and these are not mere feelings. Much art is expressive, but it is not 
the case that all art is expressive of emotion. A great deal of twenti-
eth-century art is preoccupied with ideas, rather than emotions.114 
Nelson Goodman considered the idea of art media as symbol systems, 
which differ f rom natural languages in that they are non-discursive 
and are capable of being replete with significance. The use of these 
systems to create meanings is governed by rules, which are mostly 
intuitive and natural, but are also pardv conventional. In this view, 
artistic thinking is the processing of the terms of a symbol system, 
creating significance and following the appropriate rules ."5 Aesthetic 
thinking is the perception of that significance in the arrangement of 
those terms. Thinking in art is the goal of aesthetic education. While 
aesthetics as a concept is surrounded by some ambiguity, much of it 
emanates from the very nature of aesthetics itself. Aesthetics deals 
with how viewers interpret the nature of art and why they respond 
to art as they do. The ambiguous and problematic issues related to 
aesthetics emanate from variable character of individuals and human 
cultures generally, and the subsequent variable interpretations and 
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meanings given to artistic phenomena. In this sense, aesthetic study 
deals with the phenomenological and cultural dimension of artistic 
experience. 
Aesthetics deals with the variable nature of art, and involves contested 
concepts. For example, Morris Weitz's theory of art as a contested 
concept is based on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein who argued 
that no one trait can be found in common among some categories of 
meaning and for some types of objects and activities that are called 
art. Weitz followed this and described the quest for a single theory 
of the nature of art as a fool's errand. No one theory sufficiently 
explains art for all times and all places. Artistic meanings, functions, 
and forms are adjustable to changing individual and social contin-
gencies."6 We should think of art as an open concept, one whose 
boundaries could never be finally drawn and whose future could not 
be predicted. 
We can think of artworks as things that have one or more of a number 
of qualities, chief among which are those identified by the major his-
torical theories of art we have considered. A work may have some 
of the qualities identified as important by the representational, ex-
pressionist or formalist theories, no one of them being essential, any 
one of them being sufficient. Aesthetic study can proceed f rom the 
premise that the aesthetic instructional enterprise is problematic 
and embedded in social implications and significance. There are two 
slightly different ways of talking about aesthetic qualities and the ex-
periences around them. Firstly, we can think of their character as 
totally perceptual like perceiving colours. So, it is possible to speak of 
the quality of aesthetic experience, and the pleasure of things. Sec-
ondly, we can think of aesthetic qualities related to meanings, and 
try to interpret their significance in order to understand them. It is a 
question of the depth of art and the insights it brings. Our tradition 
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of art has for over a century been in a state of continuous change. It 
has consisted of a succession of movements and styles, accompanied 
by a value system that promotes change and results in the deliberate 
search for the new and the discontinuous. 
For example, formalism in art arose as a reaction to representational 
theories of art. Modern artists eschewed pictorial illustration, com-
posing paintings out of of ten non-representational shapes and masses 
of colour. Their aim was not to capture the perceptual appearances 
of the world, but often to make images noteworthy for their visual 
organization, form, and arresting design. John Cage's music or Rob-
ert Morris 's sculptures are formless but nevertheless art. It is not 
always clear what a significant form in art should be. Problems seem 
to be erupting with respect to the requirement that the exhibition 
of significant form be designed or intentional."7 Formalism was not 
content with providing a descriptive account. It was an at tempt to 
influence artistic practices by identifying what is important about art. 
It offered a definition of art that was more evaluative than descriptive. 
By identifying what it saw as important about art, it wanted to influ-
ence the way we decide what things are artworks rather than sim-
ply to describe it. Actually it did not clearly distinguish the descrip-
tive and the evaluative approaches, but seemed to assume that they 
amounted to the same goal. Making a work of art is an intentional 
activity. Making art cannot be viewed as something that involves only 
an artist and an art object; artists seek to convey meaning to others. 
In order to do this, they must consider the perceptual and cognitive 
capacities to their audiences. 
They must believe that others possess capacities and tendencies to 
see, think, and reason just as they do. They must also assume a com-
mon body of knowledge and belief, and they must assume a similarity 
of interests between them and their audience. It is by exploiting all 
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of these things that artists are able to manipulate the physical ma-
terials of their chosen medium and produce configurations that are 
comprehensible and interesting to others. Art appreciation is in large 
measure design appreciation, knowing how the work works, seeing how 
its parts are intended to function toward the realization of the points 
or purposes of the work. A natural object of artistic appreciation is 
artistic form, where artistic fo rm is understood functionally. What 
we appreciate in an artwork is how the forms function as means to 
bring about the ends of the artwork. How suitable an artwork is de-
signed to acquit its purpose is a remarkable source of the pleasure 
one can find in an artwork. Contemplating the way in which their 
design functions to secure the point frequently gratifies the reflection 
upon artworks. 
Creating an artwork involves electing the forms that the artist be-
lieves will function optimally toward realizing the point or purpose 
of the work. Forms are selected because they are intended or de-
signed to per form certain functions."8 In order to analyse the form 
of an artwork functionally, it is necessary to have some conception 
of the point of the work, which may be easy to isolate but it can also 
be elusive. That is why a formal analysis can go side by side with 
other interpretations of the work. Through a thorough interpreta-
tion it is possible to pick up the themes of the work, and use them 
as guides to relevant formal choices. Philosophical problems can also 
arise from the activities of art critics and historians. In fact, when 
people talk about art their assumptions may become more notice-
able and their inconsistencies more obvious. For that reason, much 
of aesthetics is reflection on what people say about art, rather than 
on artworks themselves. Aesthetic can also be used as an adjective to 
describe states of mind of the observer. Our state of mind is aesthetic 
whenever we look at things tor the qualities and significance of their 
appearances. The methods of aesthetics cannot be reduced to rule 
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but can be described as considering examples and counter-examples, 
making connections with earlier knowledge, and looking at language 
carefully, and considering the history of ideas. 
TOWARDS AESTHETIC INTENTIONS 
The historical, philosophical approach to aesthetic deals with what 
aestheticians have said, styles in aesthetic dialogues, and schools ot 
aesthetic thought. It offers a structured approach, closely resembling 
the content structure and teaching methodologies found in general 
education. This kind of educational and philosophical perspective is 
compatible with academic rationalism, because it is an intellectualised 
approach to aesthetics. Aesthetics is a unique form of perception and 
experience, and the proponents of this approach usually believe that 
art can provide intense experiences that entail perception of visual 
and tactile qualities integral to the object being viewed. There are real 
differences in aesthetics concerning the works of art. Some of them 
are better than others, and this means something different than that a 
given person simply likes some works of art better than others. At the 
same time, I want to work toward a theory of establishing questions 
around aesthetics that are open and flexible. There must be room for 
reasoned argument concerning the relative aesthetic merit of various 
works of art. Aesthetic experience occurs within the viewer and not 
literally in the object itself. 
A central difficulty in establishing a theory of aesthetic judgement is 
that aesthetic value seems always to come back to experience, and 
experience is by its nature subjective. The primacy of aesthetic ex-
perience in establishing aesthetic value must be maintained. Great 
works of art are considered great, ultimately, because of the quality 
of the experience they are able to provide. Regardless of any formal 
qualities that could be pointed out in a work of art, e.g. intricate line, 
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complex harmonies, fully-developed character, etc., if the work as a 
whole did not incite an aesthetic experience of a certain quality, it 
would not be considered a great work of art. Works of art have in 
common that they have been crafted, composed, designed and pos-
sibly presented by individuals, whose intent is that the work will be 
used as an object of aesthetic interest in some way. 
Aesthetic study entails developing skills that will enhance one's ability 
to respond aesthetically in a variety of contexts. For purposes devel-
oping aesthetic skills, one can call it aesthetic scanning. By aesthetic 
scanning, it is possible to mean examination of the sensory, formal, 
expressive, and technical aspects of the art object in question. It is 
possible to use aesthetic scanning as a tool leading to heightened re-
sponses to works of art and translating into an aesthetic sensitivity to 
all of the visual surroundings. Of course, it is possible to analyse one's 
experiences, and take a closer look on what aestheticians have said, 
and study different cultural definitions of art to develop aesthetic and 
perceptual acuity, experiences, and so on. 
According to this point of view, aesthetic perception is worthy of 
singular attention, and it is also evident that his approach accom-
modates art educational activities and assumptions like transfer of 
knowledge and skills occur from art making."' ' Aesthetic perception 
is more properly construed as an active search for meaning. In scru-
tinizing a work of art, a viewer will assume that an artist has made 
something meaningful and will try to make sense of it. Viewers will 
be concerned with what an artist intended to do in making that work. 
They will also go beyond trying to decipher intended meaning in 
order to organize their perceptions in other ways. Viewers will relate 
these newly discovered understandings to their lives and seek per-
sonal insights f rom works of art. 
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Looking at works of art is challenging because they can be understood 
in different ways and, for this reason, present puzzles and problems 
for viewers. A commonplace observation is that a work of art is never 
understood completely. Many people find viewing art to be an intrin-
sically rewarding experience. And many believe that viewing art con-
tributes to self-understanding and personal development. In looking 
at works of art, we confront the ideas, beliefs, and feelings to others, 
all of which reveal our own limitations. We accommodate different 
perspectives by reorganizing our cognitive framework to assimilate 
new points of view.120 
While many artistic goals are personal, others are shared. When art-
ists make art, they join an ongoing enterprise in which certain aims 
or goals are already established. They can choose to reject some but 
cannot reject them all. Otherwise, what they would create would not 
be recognized as a work of art. Artists working in the same art form, 
for example, cinema, painting, sculpture, and architecture, will have 
a cluster of related goals. Some but not all will overlap those of artists 
who work in another art form. A painter or a sculptor, for example, 
will often attempt to represent objects or things, but this is rarely the 
aim of an architect. Yet painters and sculptors, as well as architects, 
at tempt to create unified aesthetic objects. Artists working in differ-
ent artistic genres will also share certain goals. Painters of landscapes, 
for example, will typically have different (if overlapping) sets of goals 
f rom those who paint still lives or make films. The former might be 
concerned with the changing patterns of sunlight and the rendit ion 
of atmospheric effects, and the latter might exhibit a greater interest 
in rendering textural effects. 
Different artistic goals are also inherent in an artist's style. Let us con-
sider, for example, Expressionism, Cubism, and Surrealism, which all 
reject Impressionism. Each, however, does so in pursuit of a charac-
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teristically different set of artistic aims. Expressionist artists typically 
are interested in the depiction of personal emotions and feelings, 
subjective concerns that are often occupied with a protest against 
what is felt to be a hostile social milieu. Cubist artists, on the other 
hand, reject what is felt to be an Impressionist occupation with the 
mere rendering of evanescent effects of light and atmosphere. They 
strive to create pictorial alternatives to an optical conception of real-
ity through abstracting the shapes of objects and arranging them on 
a flat plane. Surrealist artists, unlike Impressionists, are concerned 
with the unconscious aspects of the psyche. They seek to liberate the 
creative unconscious through the use of a-logical automatic proce-
dures, startling jvixtapositions of unrelated objects, dream imagery, 
and private symbolism. 
Many of the goals that an artist has in making a work of art are related 
teleologically. There is a means-end relationship between and among 
them. Applying paint to canvas, for example, is a step Picasso took in 
order to realize the goal of producing a representation of the bomb-
ing of Guernica. Having an end in view, however, does not mean that 
an artist must be constantly thinking about goals in the process of 
making a work of art. Nor does it imply that an artist's goals cannot 
be modified in the process of creating a work of art. Artists often do 
change their goals as they receive feedback f rom the work and as their 
ideas and feelings evolve. 
TOWARDS ARTISTIC INTENTIONS 
An artist produces a work of art to convey meaning. Viewers who 
approach a work of art, therefore, do so on the assumption that it is 
meaningful. The will t ry to understand what has been produced. The 
first question to be asked concerns what the artist is doing or at tempt-
ing to do in making the work. In asking such a question, the viewer 
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is inquiring into the artist's goals. These constitute his or her inten-
tions in making the work. Many goals are readily recognized. Because 
these are recognized immediately, there is a tendency to overlook the 
role of one's cognitive background in making such understandings 
possible. Artist's intentions were shaped by the historical context in 
which they were adopted. Intentions are complex and shaped by cul-
ture. At least a part of an artist's intention is formed in light of the 
history of art itself. The artist intends to produce a work of a certain 
kind understood in light of the art of the time, and because of that it 
is often difficult to distinguish discussions of individual artists f rom 
discussions of the art world they participated in. In talking about the 
meaning of the work, it is often useful to have knowledge both of the 
artist's individual life and of the art world around it.121 
The ability to understand what Picasso was doing or attempting to 
do in painting Guernica quite literally depends upon the knowledge, 
beliefs, and understandings that a person brings to bear in scrutiniz-
ing his work. Viewers are able to understand much of what an art-
ist intended through scrutiny alone because artists have traditionally 
considered the perceptual and intellectual capacities of their audi-
ences. Someone who truly intended to represent a cat, for example, 
would not produce a configuration that would likely be read as an 
image of something else. Artistic intentions, then, are in some sense 
public matters, but understanding the intentions of an artist requires 
background information and knowledge. 
An intention is rarely the unambiguous and easily formulated pur-
pose of the artist one may have supposed. At any time a person has a 
variety of desires, some of which are relatively transient wishes, o th-
ers are long-sustained motives, and many lie between these extremes. 
These desires may be in conflict with each other and they certainly 
will not all be carefully thought through and articulated. Some of 
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them may never have been formulated at all, and the artist may be 
totally unaware of them, and yet they may be most important. 
If most works of art are comprehensible to some degree, circum-
stances of ten conspire to create estrangement between artist and 
viewer. In early and less complicated societies artists made work for 
a restricted audience that shared many of the same interests and be-
liefs. As a consequence, almost everyone was able to understand the 
work an artist produced. But as cultures expanded and grew more 
diverse, artists have tended to work for specific social groups whose 
ideas and values differed from others within the same community. 
The range of art objects available to the viewer is also greater now 
than ever. In earlier times someone's exposure to art would generally 
be limited to the relatively few works that were near at hand. Travel 
was difficult, museums were largely nonexistent, and books and re-
productions were scarce and inadequate. Now, art f rom the past as 
well as the present, f rom other cultures as well as our own, is readily 
available to anyone. 
There is yet another reason why average people find it difficult to 
understand works of art. As the making of art evolved from simple 
beginnings, it also grew more complex and reflexive. Artists were no 
longer content to serve the interests of other members of the society; 
they increasingly began to focus upon their own specialized interests. 
Artists of the twentieth century have of ten made it a point to stand 
apart f rom general society, and individual aesthetic and personal con-
cerns have come to the fore. Fine arts throughout much of their 
history reflected the values and concerns of the communities artists 
served; now art tends to reflect the interests and concerns of a much 
smaller segment of society. 
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Works of art, then, are inherently problematic. Even though of what 
artists intend to do is available through observation full understand-
ing is not automatically recoverable through scrutiny alone. Back-
ground knowledge is also necessary. Artistic intentions can also be 
ascertained through interviews with the artist or through public 
statements in which the artist reveals Iiis or her goals, either directly 
or through inference. The psychic activities that lead us to infer that 
there in front of us at a certain place there is a certain object of a cer-
tain character are generally not conscious activities, but unconscious 
ones. Finally they are equivalent to conclusions, to the extent that the 
observed action on our senses enables us to form an idea as to the 
possible cause of this action. So, there are similarities between the 
result of unconscious inferences and those of conscious conclusions. 
Familiarity with the milieu in which an artist works can also assist 
viewers in understanding an artist's intentions. Part of this milieu is 
the physical setting in which an artist works. Knowledge of personal 
events in the life of an artist can also help viewers determine intent. 
The social and cultural milieu in which artists work also shapes their 
goals and aspirations. Knowledge of the artistic tradition that an artist 
inherits of ten allows viewers to infer artistic goals. 
Because Picasso made a painting instead of a sculpture of Guernica, 
for example, viewers are entitled to infer that, like other painters, he 
intended to produce an arrangement of shapes and colors on a flat 
surface, not a three-dimensional object to be viewed from multiple 
vantage points. Because he was painting a public mural instead of an 
intimate easel painting, viewers can infer that, like other muralists, 
he did not desire to produce an object that should be scrutinized for 
its subtle textural and painterly effects. Because he used elements of 
Expressionism, Cubism, and Surrealism, viewers can infer a cluster 
of artistic goals Picasso shared with other artists who worked in these 
same stylistic idioms. And because he combined these stylistic idi-
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oms, viewers can infer that his artistic intentions differed f rom those 
other artists. 
A central conception of cognitive art education is transfer, an ability 
to apply one's learning in new situations. Theoretical problems that 
develop form assumptions of transfer have been discussed widely.122 
Whether methods and exercises specific to developing aesthetic 
perception can maintain integrity in art educational programs may 
influence whether the goal of heightened aesthetic experience is 
achieved. 
Marjo Räsänen defines: "When discussing the theoretical bases for 
assumption of cognitive transfer one needs to consider both the cog-
nitive characteristics and processes that are considered integral to 
the study of art, and those that are initiated by art experiences and 
then later transferred to and utilized in non-art contexts. Both mak-
ing and exploring art involve a form of thinking that opens the ways 
to multiple systems ot knowing and experiencing. Thinking there is 
an interaction among modes of thought means that the benefits of 
art study go beyond their own artistic cognitive outcomes. Artistic 
cognition consists of constructed, visual forms that are analogous, 
though not isomorphic; to experience . . . art study is a mind-builder 
different f rom any other subject area . . . art calls for interpretation. 
Artistic cognitive benefits consist of abilities of translation and trans-
fer opening up the possibilities of multiple meanings".12 ' A principal 
virtue of cognitivism is its ability to explain and sustain a number 
of ways in which people actually think and talk about art related to 
aesthetics.124 
If the power and/or meaning in an aesthetic experience are to be used 
as a measure of the quality ot an artwork, the experience must be a 
genuine aesthetic experience as that has been defined. Sentimental 
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experiences and trance experiences can also be powerful and carry 
meaning. In order to have weight for the evaluation of an art work, 
the power and meaning in the experience must be directly caused by 
the work itself, and not, for instance, the result of some chain of as-
sociation lor w hich the work was only the first link. 
When attempting to evaluate a work of art based on one's experience 
o f t h a t work, one must be reflective, interrogating one's thoughts and 
feelings to be sure of their source. Without substantial self-knowl-
edge, it is difficult, if not impossible; to know whether what one is 
experiencing has its origins in the artwork or in one 's own psycho-
logical makeup. The concept of transfer is connected to higher-order 
thinking, which Lewis and Smith define as a broad te rm including 
problem-solving, critical thinking, creative thinking, and decision-
making.125 
Focusing upon artistic intentions as a way of coming to understand 
a work of art stands in sharp contrast to formalist conceptions of 
art criticism. Formalist critics believe it is a mistake to appeal to an 
artist's intentions, a mistake they label the intentional fallacy.126 For 
the formalist, artistic intentions are private thoughts, mental events 
that occur just before or during the process of artistic creation. They 
argue that attempts to ascertain what these are send critics off on a 
fruitless quest for biographical and contextual knowledge and away 
f rom the work of art itself, the proper locus of critical concern. For 
formalist critics such 'external evidence" can only be an unreliable 
indicator of meaning. They reason that such knowledge is of ten una-
vailable, either because artists are no longer living or because they 
may not remember what their thoughts were. Then again, artists 
sometimes exaggerate when describing their intentions. Critics are 
thus faced with a dilemma, and, as formalists argue, are bet ter of 
seeking an understanding of a work of art through careful examina-
tion of its internal evidence. 
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A number of misconceptions underlie the anti-intentional thesis. 
One concerns the nature of artistic intentions themselves. First, con-
trary to what formalists believe, critics who seek to understand artis-
tic intentions are not concerned with transitory thoughts that occur 
in minds of artists but rather with the goals that artists seek to attain 
in creating works ot art with states of mind rather than with mental 
events. Second, the state of mind of the artist is not private but has a 
public character. Because making a work of- art involves an at tempt 
to convey meaning, many of these goals will be available to viewers 
directly. Furthermore, such goals, shaped by beliefs can be inferred 
through investigation into the societies and cultures in which the art-
ists live. Critics are not forced to rely solely upon what artists are 
willing to reveal. Third, formalist critics draw an arbitrary distinc-
tion between internal and external evidence. No viewer approaches 
a work of art with an innocent eye, but always with certain kinds of 
background knowledge that affects how the internal evidence of a 
work is perceived. Viewers who know more about an artist and the 
content in which works of art are created are able to see and under-
stand more than viewers who lack such knowledge. 
Works of art should have the capacity to afford aesthetic experi-
ence for which content-oriented and affect-oriented accounts can 
be given. Aesthetic properties are in any case response-dependent, 
and they are neither merely detected nor merely projected. Common 
conceptual frameworks obtained through social conditioning might 
explain the convergence of aesthetic predication. We value artworks 
because they afford the opportunity for us to exercise our sensibili-
ties, to recognize and to distinguish different qualities in the appear-
ance of things. The aesthetic properties of artworks alert us to the 
qualitative dimensions of the world at large and improve our capaci-
ties for discovering them. That is why aesthetic properties enliven 
our experiences. Aesthetic cognitivism claims that some works of art 
70 
AESTHETIC & PICTORIAL C O M M U N I C A T I O N 
can supply us with a deeper understanding of human nature and the 
human condition by imaginatively illuminating our experiences, and 
also the greatest scientific achievements are those that have made 
fundamental contributions to human understanding.12 ' 
Although viewers customarily seek to understand works of art in 
terms of artistic intentions, there is also another assumption under-
lying their interaction with works of art. Part of our contemporary 
concept of a work of art is that it is an artifact to be intellectually and 
imaginatively apprehended by viewers and thus function as a source 
of insight and enjoyment. This assumption might possibly be the re-
sult of social and cultural developments that have led over the past 
few centuries to contemporary ideas of the aesthetic. Andre Malraux 
has remarked that a "Romanesque crucifix was not regarded by its 
contemporaries as a work of sculpture; nor Cimabue's Madonna as a 
picture. Even Pheidias' Pallas Athene was not, primarily, a statue. '"2 8 
These artifacts are now understood in a different way than they were 
in the cultures of their origin. 
Whether or not this is peculiarly modem concern, it is nonetheless a 
genuine assumption that contemporary viewers bring to bear in their 
approach to works of art. With this assumption has come the idea 
that meaning lies partly outside the intentions of an artist. There may 
be more (or less) in a work of art than its artist intended, and specta-
tors have a legitimate role in uncovering what one might call aesthetic 
understanding of a work of art. This concern arises for a number of 
reasons. One is that information about an artist or the culture in 
which the artist lived may be inadequate or unavailable. We know 
little about the culture that produced the cave paintings at Lascaux, 
France, and even less about indiv idual artists themselves. Even when 
information about a culture and artist is available/ surviving lords 
may be inadequate. There a large gaps in our knowledge about the 
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cultures and artists of the past. When a viewer encounters a work of 
art produced in such circumstances, the best that can be done is to 
speculate about what an artist intended, recognizing that there may 
be no decisive solution to specific questions. 
Artistic developments have also affected the way viewers have come to 
understand works of art. T. S. Eliot observed that works of art are not 
only influenced by the tradition f rom which they emanate, but they 
also modify that tradition.129 What he meant is that later works of art 
create new and different possibilities for understanding earlier works. 
All of these situations, then, underscore a particular attitude with 
which viewers approach works of art. If viewers assume that works of 
art are outcomes of intentional activity, they of ten assume that they 
are aesthetic objects as well. As such, they are looked upon as sources 
of the kind of intellectual enjoyment that comes about through the 
imaginative use of one's perceptual and cognitive faculties. 
The intentional and aesthetic understandings suggest that viewers 
have an active role in responding to works of art. Such an assumption 
is confirmed by the findings of psychologists and others concerned 
with visual perception. It is now common to observe that perception 
and conception are not isolated but rather conjoined in a viewer's 
response to a work of art. Perception of a work of art is best under-
stood as an active effort aimed at obtaining understanding. As such, 
it parallels other kinds of efforts that people make in integrating ex-
perience into coherent wholes. '30 Philosophers, for example, have 
noted that aesthetic response possesses a structure similar to efforts 
aimed at establishing meaning in such disparate disciplines as sci-
ence and the law. Michael Polanyi characterizes all of these as species 
of " f rom-to" knowing.131 Aesthetic perception, like other modes of 
productive thinking, he argues, involves an imaginative synthesis of 
initially chaotic elements. In perceiving a work of art, we call up our 
72 
AESTHETIC & PICTORIAL C O M M U N I C A T I O N 
past experience, background theory and knowledge, bodily aware-
ness, and present concerns. From these tacit elements we project an 
understanding based upon the clues presented in a work of art. 
The imaginative element in aesthetic perception, as well as in scien-
tific discovery, has aroused the attention of philosophers in recent 
years. Much has been made of line drawings of ambiguous figures to 
illustrate what occurs when viewers perceive a work of art. In observ-
ing a figure such as the famous duck-rabbit, for example, viewers first 
see the figure in one way and then in another. 
Aesthetic properties give humanly accessible shape to things, and 
they evoke curiousness. Aesthetic experience involves the construc-
tive powers of the mind, and aesthetic experience is of overwhelming 
importance to art. According to Carroll, aesthetic experience is com-
prised of design appreciation and the detection of aesthetic proper-
ties.132 This is a matter of attention to and contemplation of aesthetic 
qualities and artistic forms. Aesthetic experience does not represent 
the only kind of legitimate response to art. Cognitive and moral ex-
periences may be equally appropriate. 
VISUAL AND LINGUISTIC CONNECTIONS 
l o think is to make connections. The connections of interest to the 
symbol systems are the internal connections between the elements of 
self-sufficient media or symbol systems. It legitimises only thought 
that stays within the terms of a symbol system. Integrated learning 
calls for connections across as well within symbol systems, whatever 
the result may be. Especially it is a question of connections between 
visual and linguistic elements. The reason is that much of the mean-
ing of the works of art lies in their relations with the world we live 
in, including personal and collective purposes, the culture around us. 
And culture is accessible mostly through language, but the cultural 
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network of meanings is mediated through language and behaviour. 
The categories embodied in language and behaviour is part of the 
constitution of meaning. 
One would expect a cognitive approach in psychology to be a natural 
link with discipline-based art education, but it has some problems 
in that direction. It fits well with those who think of art making as 
a principal activity of art education and of the various media of art 
making as the disciplines of art. For it allows them to say that to learn 
to draw is to learn to think visually and to use the symbol system of 
drawing. But it is less useful to those who count art history, aesthet-
ics and criticism as discipline of art. These disciplines use words and 
cannot claim to be either a medium or a symbol system. Still both 
the discipline-based art education and the symbol system approach 
share the view that art is cognitive and that its cognitions are unique. 
Related to this comes Howard Gardner 's theory of multiple intel-
ligence. Gardner thinks that intelligence is a way of thinking deter-
mined by some combinations of Arnheim's perceptual channels and 
Goodman's symbolic domains, overlain with the stipulation that they 
are useful in socially developed practices.133 
It has been found that the capabilities of young to discuss art have 
been greatly underestimated. It has also been found that with proper 
motivation and good strategies or through the interjection of con-
flicting ideas, groups of individuals without a formal educational 
background can deal with sophisticated aesthetic issues.134 There is 
evidence that the visual thinking of children begins as part of what has 
been called a plural-media activity.135 According to this view, when 
young children begin to draw, represent meaning visually, they do not 
make marks on paper that are intended for visual contemplation only. 
They engage in an activity that includes gesture, imitative noise and 
language, and their visual products are meaningful only in the context 
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of the total activity. The origins of drawing are not confined to one 
medium. This is the fact that is relevant to more general philosophi-
cal point concerning the role of language, which is essential in con-
necting works of art and culture. 
Arnheim thinks that this is because culture is irrelevant to the deepest 
significance of art that the different kinds of thinking should be care-
fully kept apart. Otherwise we might fail to grasp that significance. 
The meaning of a visual work should be grasped in visual terms, al-
though there might be linguistically based interpretation on culture, 
but this has been formulated in different media. The thinking that 
deals with visual medium, grasps its essential meaning. Still, crucial 
thing is that also there are two different media for thought, they can 
and should be constantly connected. We can isolate visual and lin-
guistic elements in a single work, but our thinking can move easily 
back and forth between them. Each one of the modes has something 
to contribute to our understanding. Thinking, while moving back and 
forth from one mode to another, can make distinctions and connec-
tions that might otherwise be impossible. There are two tracks, but 
one destination, which is a grasp of the meaning of the work ot art. 
Works of art are constituted as meaningful objects by both visual and 
linguistic materials of thought in interaction. Both approaches are 
valid and necessary ones, because they are part of what creates the 
work of art. 
This is just one way to take seriously the assertion that works of art 
must be interpreted, because before the interpretation it exists only 
as a material object and not as a work of art. By placing emphasis on 
the ways which meaning is made and experienced by viewers inter-
pretation analysis deals with the reception of the work of art and its 
variables which is in some tension with conventional ideas of influ-
ence and effects. Interpretation brings into focus a range ot issues to 
do with the process of mental imagery and mediation.136 
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APPROACHING INTERPRETATION 
In approaching the structure of art one can notice that structure is a 
concept including both content and form so far as they are organized 
for aesthetic purposes. The work of art is then considered as a whole 
system of signs or structures of signs, serving a specific aesthetic pur-
pose. Jean Mitry describes the supreme value of art as mediation 
between man and his own impuissance, his feelings of disharmony with 
and in the universe.1" Mitry thinks that artistic impulse ultimately 
expresses man's inexhaustible and unsatisfied feelings for the abso-
lute. Needing to explain, to preserve, and to control the mysterious, 
fleeting, and ungraspable present, man developed tools (science, art, 
religion), in such a way as to possess a s imulacrum." 8 
In contemporary works, which are related to our own cultural tra-
dition, the footnotes are in our head due to our sharing a common 
culture and experience. It is possible to think that whereas high cul-
ture's currently prevalent aesthetic theories assume that the artist is 
active and the spectator passive, in fact the artist is active and the 
spectator is active too. And if their activities don ' t exactly overlap, 
they're bound to collide somewhere in the middle of the work of 
a r t . "" 9 The spectator shares the emotions of many of the persons 
on the screen and simulates these so that all the resulting sensations 
give the colour of living experience to the emotional reflection in our 
mind.140 There are unconscious conclusions derived f rom sensations, 
which are equivalent in their consequences to the so-called conclu-
sions from analogy. Whenever the parts of retina in the outer corner 
of the eye are stimulated, it has been found to be due to external light 
coming írom the direction of the bridge ot the nose, the inference 
we make is that it is so in every new case whenever this part of the 
retina is stimulated. This if free of conscious thinking, and these un-
conscious conclusions are irresistible, and the effect of them cannot 
be overcome by a better understanding ol the real relations. 
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In short, the artwork does not simply offer a 'reflection of reality', 
but first and foremost it offers a type of engagement: it projects a state 
of being with the world in which the ineffable finds itself controlled. 
For example, Jean Mitry holds in common with Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and other existentialist aestheticians a view 
of the artwork as an invitation among individuals to share a certain 
valued life experience. The art work is a communication, and at the 
same time a revelation of being, in some full aspect of its particular-
ity."141 
Arthur Koesder has stated: "The mind is insatiable for meaning, 
drawn from, projected into, the world of appearances, for unearthing 
hidden analogies which connect the unknown with the familiar, and 
show the familiar in an unexpected light. It weaves the raw material 
of experience into patterns, and connects them with other patterns; 
the fact that something reminds me of something else can itself be-
come a potent source of emotion. '"4 2 
Aesthetic inquiry consists of an examination of the nature of art and 
why individuals respond to art as they do based on what meanings 
they give to art. Aesthetics as an area of study entails an examina-
tion of aesthetic meanings. For example, art criticism is based in that 
analyses and evaluations of art can be tested against information on 
a specific work of art and from perceptual evidence. In aesthetic in-
quiry, statements on art are examined as to their logical and rational 
t ru th and their persuasive power. Works of art are related to a variety 
of contexts, including the world they represent, the artist who made 
them, the audience, and the art world and various aspects of the cul-
ture in which they were produced. 
A basis for interpretation is provided in Arthur Danto's theory of 
art.143 Unlike modernist theorists, Danto thinks that the observer 
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must attend to the non-exhibited qualities of a work. We must look 
not only at the relationship of elements within the work, but also be-
yond the object to its historical, rhetorical and philosophical contexts 
in order to comprehend its meanings. Danto thinks that doing so our 
interpretation constitutes the work of art. Danto's theoretical think-
ing points out that the works of art are about something. They are 
created to present a view of the world and to affect our attitudes and 
visions of the world. Danto thinks that works of art can be thought of 
as an externalisation of the artist's consciousness, because we cannot 
overlook the fact that works of art derive their identities and structure 
f rom historical and causal matrices. Their meanings and associations 
are bound to the cultural framework of the time and assume causal 
connections with an artist environment. A causal line is a temporal 
series of events so related, that given some of them, something can be 
inferred about the others whatever may be happening elsewhere. 
The works of art embody ideas that express an age, the attitudes 
and beliefs that define a world by those living in that period. It is 
through the attributes of style and expression that the observer dis-
covers these ideas. Further on Danto thinks that artists do not merely 
assert these facts or ideas in their works, because they suggest them 
in ways intended to transform the way the observer receives them. 
Art aims at some effect and transformation in our affirmation of the 
way the world is viewed. The artist's use of rhetoric and metaphor is 
an at tempt to get the observer to take toward the work an attitude, 
which involves more than recognition of a t ruth or an idea. The ex-
pression of the otherwise inexpressible is not the only communica-
tive function that, for example, metaphors serve. They also achieve 
a certain communicative compactness, since all the applicable predi-
cates belonging to the metaphorical vehicle are implied succinctly 
through the vehicle itself. Works of art can cause viewers to heighten 
and confirm convictions or transform their ways of thinking about 
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their convictions. Danto contends that interpretation is puzzling to 
a person with insufficient knowledge. He acknowledges that at one 
point in the history of art, there was complicity between artist and 
spectator, in which the latter was to disregard the paint and gape at 
the Transfiguration, to stand dumb in front of it.144 This is not t rue 
anymore, works of art have meanings that can be distinguished from 
those held by other cultural objects, and this opens up possibilities 
for talking about them. 
Danto thinks that aesthetic understanding is far closer to intellectual, 
cognitive action than to a mode of sensory stimulation and calls for 
an aesthetic stance as something that has to be constructed. Danto's 
theory of art presents a foundation for interpretation that is predi-
cated on our understanding of art being culturally, philosophically 
and historically developed. That is why we must shift our conceptions 
of interpretation to a broader, more global approach. In this way we 
might have a better theory for interpreting works of art and a better 
foundation for teaching students to understand their meanings. 
Theories of art as a foundation for interpretation provide insights 
and they entail more work on the part of teacher and student alike. 
Teachers will have to present works of art in a more studied context, 
knowing something about the history of art, the art world, and art 
theories which will better enable them to explain the artist's inten-
tions, theories of art the work rejects or internalises, technique and 
style. Students will also have to develop grounding in art history, the-
ory and knowledge about the different contexts (cultural, historical) 
of the work. The more and more detailed background research will 
be a guiding force toward a more plausible and complete unders tand-
ing of the different aspects of contemporary art. 
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SIGNS, SYMBOLS, MEANINGS, AND TEXTURES 
It is understandable that human beings are highly visual, and it was 
not until the first crude graphic display screens were introduced in 
the late 1960s that computers began to change our relationship to in-
formation and forge a new kind of space. Computers are largely based 
on the structure of he way the human brain processes information. It 
is one thing to understand that human memory is organized in lists 
and lists of lists cross-referenced by associations between them, and 
it is another thing to see that system on a screen modelled not on 
pencils and printing presses but on how a human mind processes in-
formation."1 4 5 Within this world (real and unreal), the spectator can 
freely rearrange that information and impose new structures. Seeing 
ideas as visual objects changes your view of the world because "when 
everything is visible: the display becomes the reality".146 
In visual perception we are immediately aware of the world around 
us.147 Visual perception is not passive recording of the stimulus ma-
terial, but an active concern of the mind, and reading a picture is a 
sequence of mental processes exactly like reading some other reality. 
And because the sense of sight operates selectively, then the percep-
tion of different shapes consists of the application of form categories, 
which one might call visual concepts. The theory of visual perception 
as coordination, assumption and estimation, was gradually developed 
by gestalt psychologists and their successors f rom about 1920, and 
was taken from perceptual and cognitive psychology into art theory 
through the 1950s. The most notable developers in that process were 
Rudolf Arnheim, E.H. Gombrich, György Kepes and Anton Ehren-
148 zweig. 
For example for Arnheim "every element of a work of art is indispen-
sable for the one purpose of pointing out the theme, which embodies 
the nature of existence for the artist."149 In this sense Arnheim finds 
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symbolism even in works that, at first sight, seem to be little more 
than arrangements of fairly neutral objects. The meaning of a per-
ceived event changes the pattern of possibilities for future action, and 
meaning is the selective function on the range of the recipient's states 
of conditional readiness for goal directed activity; so the meaning of a 
message to you is its selective function on the range of your states of 
conditional readiness.'"50 
Defined in this way, meaning is clearly a relationship between the 
message and the recipient rather than a unique property of the mes-
sage alone.151 And Donald MacKay suggests that states of readiness 
are for organism's large numbers of conditional probabilities. Asking 
a question is a means of changing the conditional probabilities of 
the questioner 's states of readiness.152 The Gestalt psychologists were 
the first to establish the significance of phantom forms in visual sys-
tems.153 Phantom formalisations can transform scattered, atomistic 
sense data into configurations, forms, objects, and scenes. Resem-
blance itself is a phantomisation when, for example, the perceiving 
mind groups a particular patch of grey tones into a shadow-moulded 
face. Phantomisations are not merely subjective but shared and social 
facts, which are rooted in coordination with the material aspects of 
the world. One might even speak of vision having its own syntax and 
grammar, woven from the brain's structures and experiences, and 
handling language as one kind of structure amongst others. Phantom 
forms can transform concrete graphic features into pictorial repre-
sentation. They are particularly important in editing, in determining 
what will be a strong or weak feature, w hat will catch the attention 
and what will be overlooked. 
Like the Gestalt psychologists, Hugo Münsterberg felt that every ex-
perience is a relation between a part and whole, between figure and 
ground. It is the mind, which has the ability to resolve this relation 
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and organize its perceptual field. Münsterberg was the pioneer of the 
film/mind analogy to film theory. The perception of movement, or 
the impression of it, was not a result of seeing successive stages of the 
image, but included a higher mental act. The spectator invests the 
impressions into them. He ascribes the sensation of viewing move-
ment to the displacement of a figure on its ground and mentions 
that we can, through willed attention, reverse that relation, altering 
our perception of the movement. All depends on how our attention 
structures the perception.154 Movement's vectors and anticipated 
trajectories commonly override the static features of a composition, 
creating new, and more choreographic impression. 
Münsterberg had a hierarchic notion of the mind; that is, he felt 
it was comprised of several levels, the higher levels depending on 
the operation of the lower. Each level resolves the chaos of undis-
tinguished stimuli by a veritable act virtually creating the world of 
objects, events, and emotions that each of us lives in. At its primary 
level, the mind animates the sensory world with motion. It is well 
known that his description of the so-called phi-phenomenon put him 
decades ahead of later theorists who would account for ' the illusion 
of moving pictures by recourse to the theory of "retention of visual 
stimulus." Münsterberg characteristically went beyond this passive 
view to an active one in which the mind at its most primitive level 
confers motion on stimuli. The spectator interacts on an individual 
basis with it, because e the meanings are created through attention. 
Münsterberg describes this phenomenon by recounting some fa-
mous experiments in perception, but he never tries to explain it. The 
phi-phenomenon is for him a given. It shows that at its most basic 
level the mind has its ow n laws and constructs our world in exercis-
ing them.155 It shows as well that the technology of film implicitly 
recognizes these laws and works its effects on the mind itself. This 
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single, basic mental capability was enough to let Münsterberg con-
ceive of the entire cinematic process as a mental process. Cinema 
was the art of the mind.156 The art of the photoplay is to organize and 
control different responses in the most suitable way. This way one 
can achieve aesthetic affects from the experience. The view of film 
form as mind's eye view coheres well with an emphasis on film as 
diagram, as discourse, as a sequence of ideas in visual form, or like 
in formalism, a sequence of forms re-presenting visual ideas. Moreo-
ver film, like the other visual arts, represents visual thinking and vis-
ible thought. In a word, forms in art, media, and discourse exist in 
hybrids of forms, perception and the perceived. Mind or mentalist 
theories risk occluding a raison d'etre of film form, that the mind, 
instead of relying on its own resources, is presented instead with a 
real representation to offer stabilised forms, interesting detail, and 
stimulating information. 
For example, parallel editing in film differed from standard proce-
dures, and it was mind's capacity to split its attention or to distrib-
ute its interest over number of events at roughly the same time. It 
seemed obvious to Münsterberg to describe all cinematic properties 
as mental. Besides the basic quality of motion, he notes that close-ups 
and camera angles exist because of the mind's very way of work-
ing, and this is "attention." Not only does the mind live in a moving 
world, it organizes that world by means of this property of attention. 
In the same way the motion picture is not a mere record of motion, 
but an organized record of the way the mind creates a meaningful 
reality. Attention operates on the world of sensation and motion, just 
as angle, composition, and focal length are properties a step above 
sheer recording of intermittent photographs. 
At even higher level Münsterberg confronts the mental operat ions 
of memory and imagination which go beyond simple attention to 
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give this world a sense, an impact, a personal direction. The filmic 
properties which respond to these mental operations are the various 
kinds of editing all of which confer on both motion and significant 
camera work a dramatic direction and organization. At the highest 
mental level are emotions, which Münsterberg considers to be com-
plete mental events.157 
Thus in ascending his psychological hierarchy, Münsterberg has care-
fully pointed to the material analogues in cinema, which relate to 
each stage of mentality. The primitive illusion of movement given 
to us by the mind's operation on intermit tent photographs is sup-
plemented by select attention attained via angle, composition, image 
size, and lighting. Corresponding to memory and imagination are the 
natural resources of editing, which compress or expand time, create 
rhythms, and render flashbacks or dream scenes. Since the materials 
of cinema are the resources of the mind, the form of cinema must 
mirror mental events, that is, emotions. Film is the medium not of 
the world, but of the mind. Its basis lies not in technology but in 
mental life. 
The mention of the free play of the mind and separation from practi-
cal again sound the Kantian traces. Film is connected with realm of 
freedom that has both psychological and metaphysical dimensions. 
Münsterberg links film with existing conceptions of art in order to 
defend it against its detractors, and the conceptions of art he invokes 
do not tie the object in any essential way with the imitation of the 
outer world.158 Following Kant, Münsterberg employs an entirely dif-
ferent kind of analysis when he turns from psychology to aesthet-
ics. Psychology is part of a scientific mode of thought. It tries to 
explain aspects of what Kant called the phenomenal realm, the realm 
of sense experience where things are linked in time, space, and cau-
sality. Aesthetics plays an important role in the overall philosophy of 
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Kant and an even more important role in Münsterberg's system.15" A 
disjunction between outer forms of space, time, causality, and mental 
processes is essential to Münsterberg's theory.160 According to Car-
roll, Münsterberg often speaks of functions, which means that his 
analogies might not be called phenomenological but functional.161 So, 
functional analogies might be developed between mind and film. The 
sciences of the phenomenal world can never get outside that world 
to the basis of life and consciousness. They are locked within a world 
of causality. He also placed ethical first principles there which serve 
to justify our normal moral sense, giving us the ability to judge one 
action as better than another and, more important, allowing us to 
go beyond ourselves in so judging. Just as we demand that everyone 
accept the logical principles by w hich we make sense of the material 
world, so we demand that everyone recognize the transcendence of 
certain moral principles without which we couldn't properly speak 
of right and wrong actions. For Münsterberg the isolated art object 
must appeal to the disinterested perceiver in all its uniqueness, first 
stirring the mind and then putting it to rest. 162 
The film must follow a purely mental world, replacing the relations of 
appearances in the world with mental relations. The film differs f rom 
the dream mainly in completeness. Whereas the dream may arouse 
certain fantasies and emotions, leaving us bew ildered or trembling on 
awakening, the aesthetic film will dispel all the energies it calls into 
play. It will take appearances from nature reorder them in light of the 
mind, and, by doing so stir our emotions. It will then neatly tie up 
those appearances, giving them a final order, which at once asserts 
the priority of mental laws over chaotic appearances and at the same 
time completes the spectator's experience in a way, which leaves him 
lacking nothing. 
85 
AESTHETIC & PICTORIAL C O M M U N I C A T I O N 
Münsterberg's idea of the spectator 's relation to the cinema is an 
interesting point-of-view concerning the role of the spectator, and 
cognitively speaking Münsterberg was ahead of his time in noticing 
the activeness of the spectator, and the individual and personal atti-
tudes, experiences, and interests that will affect the unique decisions 
in question. Far less was understood about the workings of attention, 
imagination, memory and the emotions.165 
David Bordwell has made differentiations between four kinds ot 
meanings: referential, explicit, implicit and repressed or symptomatic.164 In 
searching for referential meanings the perceiver may construct a con-
crete "world", in constructing the film's worlds, the spectator draws 
not only on knowledge of filmic and extra filmic conventions but also 
on conceptions of causality, space, and time, and on concrete items 
of information. In explicit meanings the perceiver may move up to 
a level of abstraction and assign a conceptual meaning or "point" 
to the fabula and diegesis she constructs. In implicit meanings the 
perceiver may also construct covert, symbolic or implicit meanings, 
units of which are commonly called "themes", or problems, issues, 
questions and so on. The perceiver may also construct repressed or 
symptomatic meanings, which are like disguises; they may be treated 
as the consequence of the artist's obsessions.165 
IMAGESAND REFERENCES 
Raymond Durgnat has suggested that the te rm "syntax" coming f rom 
linguistics which deals only with distinct and prespecified forms nor-
mally implies the bringing together of distinct units, but pictorial 
form evolves extension and continuity and from this angle pictures 
are nothing but syntax, the only pure syntax there is.166 For example, 
a line is not really one distinct unit after another, it is a unit by being 
an extension of the same thing: a line is not syntax of points. The 
form of each and every object is adjusted by its viewpoint, and by 
86 
AESTHETIC & PICTORIAL C O M M U N I C A T I O N 
their relationship with one another, so that depending on the point-
of-view each perspective of a shape is different, and this is one of the 
basic differences between visual perception and language because, for 
example, the shape of a verb does not change, but the shape of a table 
changes depending on the viewpoint. For example, a basic rule, not 
only of pictorial but also of visual perception is: If two objects seem 
to overlap, then the completed one is in front of the other. '"67 
Rudolf Arnheim has demonstrated that images can serve as pictures 
or as symbols; they can also be used as mere signs.168 The three terms 
(picture, symbol, sign) do not stand for a kind of images; they de-
scribe three functions of the images. A certain image may be used 
for each of these functions, and will of ten serve more than one at a 
time. An image serves merely as a sign to the extent, which it stands 
for a particular content without reflecting its characteristics visually. 
To the extent which images are signs they can serve only as indirect 
media, for they operate as mere references to the things for which 
they stand, not analogically, and therefore not for thought in their 
own right. However, numerals and verbal languages are t rue signs. 
Images are pictures to the extent to which they portray things located 
at a lower level of abstractness than they are themselves. They do 
their work by grasping and rendering some relevant qualities (shape, 
colour, movement) of the objects or activities they depict. An image 
is concrete in itself, but it is abstract f rom what it is a picture of. In 
the visual arts people often mean abstract to mean non-representa-
tional of anything that one can recognize, but even representation is 
abstract in the sense that it only picks up some aspects of the thing 
it refers to it. A photograph is semiabstract in the sense that it leaves 
the object; it reproduces some aspects of the object, but not others, 
for example, shading but not depth, and in a photograph one of ten 
looses the contour of things. 
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Abstractness is a means by which the picture interprets what it por-
trays. A picture is a statement about visual qualities, and such a state-
ment can be complete at any level of abstractness. Only when the 
picture is incomplete (ambiguous or inaccurate) with regard to the 
abstract qualities, the observer is called upon to make his own deci-
sions about the features of what he sees. An image acts as a symbol 
to the extent to which it portrays things, which are at higher level 
of abstractness than is the symbol itself. A symbol gives a particular 
shape to types of things or constellations of forces. As symbols, fairly 
realistic images have the advantage of giving flesh and blood to the 
structural skeletons ot ideas.16'' 
Trevor Whittock thinks: "For the symbol to be successful the vehicle 
must be rich in figurative connotations."170 Symbols allow events to 
represent other events, possibilities and abstractions, which do not 
exist as objects of sense exist, though some may be hidden in deep 
structures of reality. We categorize the world into separate objects in 
perception, and we describe the world as being made up of separate 
objects by the words in language. It is an interesting question how 
far perceptual and verbal classifications into objects are the same. 
They are certainly similar, but there seem to be hardly enough names 
for the objects into which the world is divided perceptually. During 
perceptual learning - such as when learning to see biological cells 
with a microscope - new objects appear f rom initially random or 
meaningless patterns. When given names, such as 'nucleus' and 'mi-
tochondrion' , the student sees these patterns as objects. What is seen 
and accepted as objects also depends upon whether they are regarded 
as functional units. A hand, or an arm, or the pages of a book are 
functional units, though they are complex structures. In microscopy 
the criteria for what is a functional unit may be highly theory-laden, 
and so may change as theoretical descriptions change."171 As R. L. 
Gregory puts it: "The most striking - and a unique - feature of Mind 
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is the acceptance and use of things as symbols standing for other 
things."172 
Arnheim thinks that human mind might be forced to produce rep-
licas of things, but not naturally.173 Memory retains or exaggerates 
significant things, and easily forgets the rest. E. H. Gombrich thinks: 
"... we generally do take in the mask before we notice the face. The 
mask here stands for the crude distinctions, the deviations f rom the 
norm that mark a person off f rom others. Any such deviation, which 
attracts our attention, may serve us as a tab of recognition and prom-
ises to save the effort of further scrutiny. For it is not really the per-
ception of likeness for which we are originally programmed, but the 
noticing on unlikeness, the departure f rom the norm which stands 
out and sticks in the mind. '"7 4 
For example, caricatures, in the sense of pictures that capture the 
"essence" of some represented object, are recognizable for people 
quicker than photographs.175 A caricature is surprisingly faithful to 
how the mind remembers things, and Hochberg thinks that various 
objects with which we are familiar have canonical forms (i.e., shapes 
that are close to the ways in which those objects are encoded in our 
mind's eye).176 Also, in addition to the visual features of the repre-
sented object, there are non-\isual features that might be encoded; 
thus the caricature might in fact not only be as informative as is the 
accurate drawing: it might even be more directly informative for the 
task that the subject is to perform.1 7 ' Hochberg writes: "Neverthe-
less, the way in which the physiognomy and expression of Mickey 
Mouse is encoded and stored must be identical in some fashion to the way 
in which those of a mouse - and a human - are stored. It is very likely 
that these similarities are not merely the result having been taught 
to apply the same verbal names to both sets of patterns (i.e., both to 
the features of caricatures and to the features of the objects that they 
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represent), what we learn about caricature will help us understand 
how faces themselves are perceived. '" '8 
Symbolic interpretations that make one concrete object stand for an-
other equally concrete one are almost always arbitrary. We cannot 
really tell whether a certain association was or is in the conscious 
or unconscious mind of the artist or beholder unless we obtain di-
rect information, which needs analysis. The work ol art itself does 
' J 
not offer the information, except in the case of symbols standard-
ized by convention, or in those few individual instances in which the 
overt content of the work appears strange and unjustified, unless it 
is considered as a representation of different objects of similar ap-
pearance. 
OBSERVING PICTORIAL ELEMENTS 
Pictorial art attempts to capture the three-dimensional structure of a 
scene, some chose view of particular objects, people or a landscape. 
The artist's goal is to convey a message about the world around us, 
but we can also find in art a message about the workings of the brain. 
Many look to art for examples of pictorial depth cues, perspective, 
texture gradients, and so on. Pictorial art can tell us a great deal about 
vision and the brain if we pay attention to the ways in which paint-
ings differ f rom the scenes they depict. We might learn that artists 
get away with great deal impossible colours, inconsistent shading and 
shadows, inaccurate perspective, the use of lines to stand for sharp 
discontinuities in depth or brightness. These representational mod-
ifications do not prevent human observers f rom perceiving robust 
three-dimensional forms. Art that captures three-dimensional struc-
ture of the world without merely recreating or copying it, offers a 
revealing glimpse of the short cuts and economies of the inner codes 
of vision. The non-veridicality of representation in art is so common 
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that we seldom question the reality why it works. R.L. Gregory writes 
in The Intelligent Eye that perception is not a matter of sensory infor-
mation giving perception and guiding behaviour directly, but rather 
that the perceptual system is a 'look up ' system; in which sensory 
information is used to build gradually, and to select from, an internal 
repertoire of 'perceptual hypotheses'.179 
The size of a retinal projection varies with the distance of the physical 
stimulus object f rom the observer. That is how the distance dimen-
sion distorts the perception. The eye may see an object, which is 
actually maintaining its size, as changing it during the movement. 
So there are these perceptual modifications, which effect and vary 
depending on the object's location relative to the observer. When 
the image of an object changes, the observer must know whether the 
change is due to the object itself or to the context or to both; other-
wise he understands neither the object nor its surroundings. The ob-
servational object must then be abstracted from its context, and this 
can be done differently: one thing is perhaps the way of performing 
an abstraction because the observer may want to peel off the context 
in order to see the object as it is, in complete isolation, and the other 
way is to observe all the changes it undergoes and induces because of 
its place and function in its setting.180 
There is a need for an image-maker to create actively certain kind 
of views, so, that for example the patterns inside the image would 
appear as three-dimensional as possible. Overlapping is particularly 
useful in creating a sequence of visual objects in the depth dimension 
when the spatial construction of the picture does not rely on other 
means of perspective.181 For example, the space-building role of su-
perposition in Chinese landscape painting is well known. The relative 
location of mountain peaks or clouds is established visually by over-
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laps, and the volume ot a mountain is of ten conceived as a skeleton 
of echelons or slices in staggered formation.182 
Also transparency can bring super-positional effects into the image. 
Physical transparency is obtained when a covering surface lets enough 
light pass through to keep the pattern underneath visible. It is by no 
means a guarantee of perceptual transparency, which can be obtained 
without physically transparent materials. Superposition of shapes is a 
prerequisite of transparency, and a necessary but not always sufficient 
perceptual condition.185 The rule of simplicity predicts the function-
ing of transparency. Purely on shape relations based transparency is 
perceived also in painting and sculpture. The notion of two things 
appearing in the same plane is sophisticated and found only at refined 
stages of art like in Renaissance, and Modernism. 
Objects can take part in the third dimension in two ways: by tilting 
away from the frontal plane and by acquiring volume or roundness. 
This differentiation of spatial conception can be observed in all the 
visual arts, in architecture, sculpture, stage design, and choreogra-
phy, and it represents a particularly important factor in the pictorial 
medium. There is still much experimentation to be needed before 
we can establish the comparative weight of different factors, and not 
without a greater knowledge of the physiology of vision. When visual 
perception must make a choice between a simpler shape and a spatial 
orientation, it usually chooses the former.184 
For a stationary eye and a stationary observer, the image of an ob-
ject at any point in space is simply projected to some point on the 
retina and thence to the cortex. Given the position of the point in 
the retinal image, it is not difficult to understand how we manage to 
perceive the object's direction in space. The viewer's body is in al-
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most constant motion in the world, his or her head is in motion with 
respect to his or her trunk, and his or her eyes are in motion in his 
or her head. Julian Hochberg thinks that moving observers need two 
kinds of eye movements to look at moving (or stationary) objects in a 
three-dimensional world: "Compensatory movements, smoothly and pre-
cisely executed, permit the eye to remain fixed on some point while 
the body moves. In addition, we have skilled pursuit movements that 
swing the eyes smoothly to keep them fixed on moving objects, and 
the adaptive mechanisms of accommodation and convergence that bring 
any object to which we are attending into clear focus and central 
location on the retina. In addition to these saccadic eye movements 
bring the fovea f rom one point in the visual field to another, in rapid 
jumps that take only about 1/20 of a second to execute. '"8 5 
That is why the normal vision would be impossible without the co-
operation of these muscular actions, and according to Hochberg the 
viewer's perceptual system must in some fashion "make allowanc-
es" for the eye movements they produce before it can assign spa-
tial meaning to any stimulation of the retina.186 So the perception of 
movement depends upon certain physical condition. The movement 
must attain a certain velocity before it is perceived as movement. The 
contrast between a moving object and stationary background makes 
the movement clearer and more obvious. Primarily the movements of 
the images of objects do not produce perception of movement across 
the retina, because the eyes are also moving to and fro in the head, 
and thus images of stationary objects are constantly moving across 
the retina. 
One needs the kind of eye movements that Hochberg ment ioned 
earlier to keep everything in balance. That is why M.D. Vernon asks: 
"Why is it that our surroundings appear stationary although their 
images are always moving on the retina?"187 It has been hypothesized 
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that sensations to the brain from the muscles, which rotate the eye-
balls, change continuously as the eyes move, and that these changing 
sensations offset and compensate for the changing retinal impres-
sions. Another explanation is that the changing retinal impressions 
are compensated for in some way by an awareness of the motor im-
pulses proceeding from the brain to the eye muscles, which cause 
them to move the eyeballs. Whatever the explanation, it seems that 
we are able to differentiate between movements ol the retinal images 
caused by movements of the eyes, and movements within the retinal 
image caused by movements of objects in relation to their surround-
ings, which appear stationary.188 It seems likely that with all its limits, 
our storage capacities allow us to reconstruct earlier segments in the 
light of later information. There is a need to extend present per-
ceptual psychology, which is still largely confined to the study of the 
individual event, into the sequence of perceptual consequences. It 
might be helpful in the programming of interactive, and virtual me-
dia, and in cases where the narrative itself is of a special visual event. 
It seems likely that with all its limits, our storage capacities allow us 
to reconstruct189 
As we look at the real world, we can see a very large visual field within 
which there is rather small area of special attention, and within that 
there is a surprisingly small area of sharp focus. No clear or definite 
boundary separates these zones. If the turn of our head establishes 
the larger field, the smaller areas depend on our glances, running 
at about two per second, and a maximum of four. Changes in the 
scene may stop the eye movements, for example, when montage is 
produced by the filmmaker, so, the spectator doesn' t have to produce 
his or her own. These glances do not register everything we notice, 
and our attention of ten shifts about the visual fields independently 
of them. The act of seeing necessarily involves associated thoughts, 
which may briefly replace visual attention. The eyes make many ex-
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ploratory movements, saccadic glances, which are prompted largely 
by expectations associated with the preceding glances, or by attrac-
tion f rom conspicuous feature within larger zones. Even in periph-
eral areas of vision movements swiftly pre-empt attention for obvious 
bio-functional reasons. In contrast, the screen picture is one large 
visual field, which ends very abruptly and arbitrarily at each edge. Its 
overall texture as one picture, with its consistent type of semi-ab-
straction renders conspicuous a relationship ol parts, which becomes 
a graphic unity, a pictorial composition. This has no real equivalent 
in normal world looking, yet it seems to act as a powerful source of 
significance. Around this picture, the head, eyes, and thoughts move, 
not necessarily following the compositional structure, but constantly 
encountering its conspicuous features. Thus the picture becomes a 
succession or sequence of visual fixations, albeit retaining a continu-
ous overall presence. The succession constitutes an internal editing 
or montage, though this is distinguished f rom editing or montage in 
our special sense, where succession replaces continuity of presence, 
Normally the internal relationships of the shot pre-occupy us, since 
most of the information lies there in front of us. One doesn ' t only 
overlook the edges of the shot, but one also hears the sound as being 
in the scene, even when a single loudspeaker is placed well to one side 
of it. If the source of the sound is so ill-placed, for example, behind 
the projector as to threaten the illusion, one usually contrives to get 
used to it, to make a sustained mental-constructivist effort to re-co-
ordinate the cues, and mentally return the sound into the image. 
We as observers do not reconstruct a light source in order to re-
cover the depth from shading and shadow, we do not act as optical 
geometers in the way that computer graphics programs do. We do 
not notice inconsistencies across different portions of a painting but 
recover depth cues locally. In the real world the information is rich 
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and redundant, so we do not have to analyse the image much beyond 
a local region to resolve any ambiguities. When faced with the cues 
of pictorial art, the local cues are more meaningful, albeit inconsist-
ent with cues in other areas of the painting. Like many aspects of art, 
discrepancy between art and the scene it depicts, informs us about 
the brain within us as much as about the world around us. 
PICTORIALISM IN A LANDSCAPE 
There is a complicated inter-relationship between the perception of 
the movement of the surroundings and the movement of the body, 
which is displayed in what is known as 'parallactic movement ' . For 
example, as we move forwards in a car along the road, the retinal im-
age of the landscape in front of us expands, flows around on either 
side of us, and then contracts and becomes sucked in behind us.190 
This effect is not usually very noticeable in ordinary daylight, when 
the whole visual surroundings are perceived as rigid and stable while 
we ourselves move. But it may be apparent in driving at night, when 
the surroundings are not clearly perceived. And if we look at objects 
on either side of us, we may see them moving rapidly in the direc-
tion opposite to that in which we are moving; but the farther away 
they are, the slower the movement, and the horizon is stationary. 
In fact, the retinal image of the landscape is continuously distorted 
or deformed as we move, but we are not consciously aware of this 
deformation; instead we perceive it in terms of our own movement 
across the landscape. This is something that film can also pick up in 
relation to perspective and visual thinking. Thus a rough generaliza-
tion may be made that the total amount, which can be attended to at 
any one moment , is constant. If attention is concentrated on a small 
part of the field, little will be perceived in other parts; if attention is 
diffused over a larger area, no one part will be very clearly and ac-
curately perceived.191 
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Often the conscious part of our thinking is restricted to a co-ordina-
tion of selected items of data, the setting of a goal, and a volitional 
decision to perform the task. The actual performance is no more 
conscious than instructing each foot alternately to take a step. One 
can feel quite home with all the irrationalities of film form. To make 
sense of a film, the mind draws on our general understanding of the 
cinematic situation, of which its forms are part, and of our general 
knowledge of the wider world, of which our knowledge of film is 
part. Young children's ability to makes sort of sense of different tel-
evision programmes depends less on receiving verbal disquisitions or 
deconstructions of the medium, but rather through everyday experi-
ence of it.192 
In film movement draws the eye, and its vectors and trajectories usu-
ally override the static (visible) elements of the composition. The 
contradiction between the pictorial scene and the frame is relegated 
to a very low-priority awareness, and instead one concentrates on the 
scene, where the interesting and fruitful information lies. Although 
the composition of the picture guides our eye, few of the eye's move-
ments reproduce the picture's compositional lines. Nonetheless, the 
composition looms large in our apprehension, as one keeps encoun-
tering its structure. The roving, or browsing eye apprehends, not only 
the whole pattern but more like successive sub-configurations, some 
of which constitute objects or actions, some of which are purely pic-
torial, graphic structures. The shot is a complex entity with various 
elements at once co-existing and competing for our attention. O n e 
can never see every possible configuration, or every detail, because 
our seeing is always selective, and though sometimes one can stay 
content with the obvious, and pre-coded form, one is also guided by 
important inputs from non-visual content and context. 
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The composition of moving pictures shares many elements with still 
composition. Yet movement counterpoints this to the point of over-
riding and disrupting it. It creates a sort of third dimension by imply-
ing a space for the objects to move through as they shift. Movement 
loosens space, and therefore the composition of the image. Simul-
taneously trajectories override relationships, movement and speech 
give faces more autonomy, or rivet the attention towards them. Usu-
ally the nexus movement, or change in rhythm and duration counter-
points, or dismantles the unitary composition of the sill image. Space 
ceases merely to imply movement and time. It enters into concrete 
relationships with them. 
Time, image and parallactic movements are bound together in the 
films of the Greek director Theo Angelopoulos. His lilms are picto-
rial meditations on the feeling of different landscapes, human and 
natural. Temporality in experiencing a landscape is further compli-
cated by the movement of the body itself, a phenomenon we call 
kinesthesis. This is relevant to the work of Angelopoulos. When mov-
ing across landscape space there is not only a dynamic flow of per-
ceptions derived f rom external sources, but there is also the muscular 
and nervous movement of the body itself through space and time.193 
This is something that is related to cinematic thinking. Angelopou-
los is a virtuoso of long takes, especially the "figures in a landscape" 
kind.194 In this kind of thinking 'landscape' includes streets, interiors, 
and any sizable area. Angelopoulos' camera tracks between follow-
shot phases and "free-range" roving, between extreme (scenery with 
distant figures) and the old mid-shot distance (knees-to-head), at 
which modern wide-angle lenses allow plenty of landscape above, 
around, and between people.195 It is an example of European pictorial-
ism and montage thinking where there is plenty of time for people to 
come into the frame and walk slowly over it, while the camera tracks 
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down after them. Also, many scenes start with a long shot, and avoid 
close-ups. 
"The camera movements subserve the general scene, subordinat-
ing to it any calligraphic or camera-conscious side-effect; they pick 
out details less than they change or vary its aspects and general con-
figuration. 'Aspect' here, carries its original, visual, sense: the partic-
ular facet seen. It is as crucial to pictorial meaning as what is seen. It 
dictates the camera-angle, not vice versa (albeit film theory regularly 
misattributes to camera angle meanings stemming f rom aspect). As 
compared with cuts, the moving camera's gradual angle changes allow 
a more solid, sustained sense of scene.'"96 Angelopoulos strengthens 
his universes by a feeling for a man-in-environment - theme. This is 
possible by an unhurried choreography of camera and characters, and 
by heavy emphases on people's silent or cryptic thinking. It seems 
that Angelopoulos rejects montage (or uses montage-within-shot) as 
too manipulative a technique for capturing the reality or essence of a 
given moment in a given place. Andrew Hor ton thinks that Angelo-
poulos forces the spectator, through the slow pace and continuous 
takes of his films, to become more aware of the environment, whether 
it is man-made or natural.19 ' In the hands of Angelopoulos the long 
takes transform into 'sequence-shots'. 
"Hard-edged landscapes, like architecture, and people who, being 
distant, make pictorially small movements, encourage cuts on strong-
ly static forms; these strengthen the graphic collision dear to m o n -
tage editing (hence Hollywood usually preferred cuts on movement , 
as more self-effacing.)"198 Walter Benjamin has recognized that the 
meaning derived from landscape and architectural space is received 
'by a collectivity in a state of distraction', slowly appreciating its 
symbolic environment through 'habitual appropriation' , or through 
everyday use and activity.199 Angelopoulos creates new relationships 
99 
AESTHETIC & PICTORIAL C O M M U N I C A T I O N 
between the camera and the scene. It is a question of montage within 
the camera and montage within the shot, which seems to become a 
more 'normal ' way of expressing than the usual montage thinking. 
The Russian montage theory was based on the idea of shot as a unit 
that does not change much. But when we have long tracking shots 
and pans, the shot ceases to be just one unit, one look, and becomes 
several (25, 50, etc.) units, which do not distract the attention to-
wards the shot as a whole. In a way, it is distracted, because when the 
scene proceeds and moves forward, the spectator looses the touch 
of places and lorgets the veridical relations of things. When one usu-
ally perceives things, one knows exactly where one's body is, and 
one relates all that what one sees into a feeling of one's body. That 
is important in a human vision, because when one concentrates on 
something, one does not separate it f rom its surroundings. When the 
camera rolls over a scene, it shows only parts of the whole, so after 
60 seconds camera movement, the spectator has forgotten the places 
of things, and that is important related to editing. The structures 
of film are largely function of our knowledge of the world, and our 
expectations as to what we will, or need to be, shown. Stefan Sharff 
has spoken of slow disclosure, which means the gradual introduction of 
pictorial information within a single shot or several.200 As a method 
it can be applied to one scene or to a whole narrative; basically it is 
a way of avoiding a simplistic and over-expository flow of informa-
tion. 
In Angelopoulos' Voyage to Cythera (1983) this gradual pictorial infor-
mation is introduced with different kinds of sequence-shots: "The 
landscape shots using freely in and out of POV positions. Alexander, 
quitting the old actors' audition, walks leftwards, in a follow crabbing 
(sidewise travelling). He's distanced f rom us by a busy foreground 
(behind which he briefly disappears, the camera keeping pace with 
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his presumed walk). As he remerges, pauses, and turns his back to 
camera, the camera moves round and forward into a space so close 
to his that his colleagues stepping forward to address him seem to ad-
dress camera; which makes it, and conspicuously, his POV But that's 
jarred when he re-enters shot, and at some distance, and from the 
right (against the earlier momentum left)."201 
In an Angelopoulos film reality and imagination mix and reflect each 
other. This all has a specific quality, which creates stimulating dif-
ferences. Alexander's journey in the film has three circles: First, 
Alexander leaves his daily environment, second, he creates a dream 
hero, and third, the relationship between the artist and the old man. 
The voyage has self-critical aspects in it; it functions as a vision, a 
meditation and an analysis of the man's creativeness related to the 
world outside him. The complexity of the narrative structure and the 
visual approach has some specified meanings in Voyage to Cythera due 
to overlapping of different layers of time and the free manipulation of 
time. Angelopoulos extends many dedramatising tactics. His special 
interest is in the landscape and stretches of dead time. Angelopou-
los' camera examines the scenes with its own curiosity, enumerating 
the contents of the shot before it with only small movements, and 
after that, panning in the appropriate direction.202 Angelopoulos is a 
modernist in creating a recognisable, self-conscious style, which he 
carries throughout his works. In his films the long takes and camera 
movements create dialectic among different elements in the shot.205 
Angelopoulos relies on the powers of cinema to present fine details 
without sacrificing a large-scale image. 
Primary image processing is characterized by parallel processing. 
Based, for instance, on excitation from more than 100 million rods 
and cones and on memory-stored schemata, the brain constructs 
gestalts and holistic fields of intensities.204 These may be fields of 
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texture, as in the processing of areas of colour- and light-intensi-
ties, geometrical figures, and complex visual patterns. The excita-
tion created by this process of primary input processing and by these 
asynchronous fields is of ten connected with visual aesthetics proper. 
The aesthetic and cultural cannot stand in opposition. The aesthetic 
dimension of a film never exists apart f rom how it is conceptualised, 
and how it is received. 
Angelopoulos' visual style functions in intimate relation to the char-
acters, events, and the themes of the films. It speaks to us humane-
ly about very complex situations. It continuously expresses subtle 
t ruths about the characters in the films and their predicaments. An-
gelopoulos' style is in a much more intricate and complex relation to 
the actions, subjects, settings, characters, and events of the films than 
either being a mere reflection of our commonsense understandings 
of them. This sense of style will understand Angelopoulos' style as 
expressing and creating in the spectator extremely complex states of 
consciousness and awareness far beyond anything summarized either 
as a theme or as a mere perceptual disruption of formal de-famil-
iarization. The first generalization that one can make about Angelo-
poulos' style is that it heightens spectator's consciousness of time. 
The retardations of editorial and interactive rhythms and the general 
avoidance of elisions whenever possible in Angelopoulos' work make 
the spectator especially aware of time Secondly, and partly as a result 
of its temporal effects, it is of the essence of Angelopoulos' style that 
it continuously reminds us that meaning is enacted. It is not a quality 
of an abstract system of themes and ideas nor a more or less fixed 
stance toward other more or less fixed, logical, perceptual, or rep-
resentational norms. It is the consequence of an activity, a per form-
ance, the result of a series of shifting choices. 
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There are several important conclusions to be drawn f rom this sty-
listic state of affairs in Angelopoulos' work. In the first place, such a 
sense of style re-establishes the figure of the author as a felt presence 
in the work. The author is not in a coolly ironic or detached relation 
to the work. Insofar as one feels Angelopoulos' stylistic choices being 
enacted and continuously revised within the films, the author is felt 
to be vigorously in the films, meditatively moving around in them, 
adjusting relationships, comparing positions, weighing, discriminat-
ing, and judging. 
The author is bringing humanly valuable meanings into existence, 
shot by shot, moment by moment , in continuously adjusted and re-
adjusted acts of attention and intellect. The reason that this matters 
is that insofar as the author makes meanings and relationships in such 
a way, he gives us a model for all of the acts of making meaning per-
formed by the characters within the films. 
Many of Angelopoulos' principal characters become surrogates for 
the director in this process of meaning making. Alexander, the central 
figure in Voyage to Cythera, is only one of the most obvious examples 
of a character whose own tentative, laborious processes of search-
ing out meanings and adjusting relationships mirror the filmmaker's. 
The spectator of Angelopoulos' work becomes a collaborator in this 
process as well. One of the reasons that Angelopoulos' work requires 
such an enormous effort of attention from his spectators is that the 
ideal spectator is asked to participate in this process of searching out 
and making meanings. 
Angelopoulos' work gives us a very special sense of what meanings 
are and how they are made. This is a sense that is different f rom most 
of films and a sense that has important consequences on our func-
tions both in our lives outside of the film theatre and in our lives as 
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spectators of his films. In Angelopoulos' films meanings are produces 
of specific acts of human performance. They are made in time and 
with difficulty, and they are always in process, up for revision, adjust-
ment, enlargement, and correction. In this respect, Voyage to Cythera 
is a textbook lesson in the process of meaning making. Angelopoulos 
deliberately presents the world of his film so that virtually nothing 
is known, or can be known, with any degree ot certainty, about the 
t rue or correct relationship of the principal characters. Everything 
must be worked out, and all the meanings must be made. The cam-
era work enacts the work of knowing that Angelopoulos' style always 
figures. Angelopoulos' style is the record ot the whole process as it is 
conducted bv the filmmaker and enacted by various characters within 
the film. It is a record of a series of imaginative exertions, a history of 
labours of attention and discrimination. 
Style is the tracks left behind by this continuously renewed and ever-
shifting course of work. This conception ot cinematic style does not 
limit it to an affirmative function. Creativity frequently requires clear-
ing a space through the application of negative energies as well. This 
is to say that Angelopoulos' style tries to change our concept of what 
a scene or s character was suppose to be. Angelopoulos' style is of ten 
designed to complicate simple situations and to prevent reductive 
judgments, to widen narrow views, and to broaden perspectives. An-
gelopoulos' style of ten seems designed to delay or complicate easily 
formulated thematic interpretations. It attempts to slow a spectator 
down, to retard his or her sense of semantic completion, not only by 
actually slowing down the pace of events in the films, but more im-
portantly, by continuously enlarging the possibilities of interpretation 
around any one character, action, or scene. 
This is to say that precisely in the places in which a spectator may 
want to rush to judgment, to stabilize a reading around a particular 
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meaning, Angelopoulos' style opens up new views, or qualifies and 
complicates old ones. Angelopoulos' directing creates new point of 
views and shifts of angle of vision. Where a spectator wants to hurry 
to an interpretation that can be lifted out of the particularities of time 
and space, Angelopoulos' style deliberately slows us down or slightly 
shifts our understanding. Angelopoulos' style encourages the same 
tentativeness about final meanings in his spectators that his most sen-
sitive principal characters demonstrate in his films. Angelopoulos' 
ideal spectators, like his ideal characters, live in a world in which 
meanings must continuously be open to being made and remade in 
the shifting particularities of specific times and spaces. Meanings are 
on the move, and Angelopoulos asks that his spectators and most 
sensitive characters become as semantically mobile as his style. Since 
meanings and relationships are not weightlessly, metaphorically, or 
abstractly posited or gestured into existence, but are enacted slowly 
and laboriously within the particularities of space and time, they are 
never final or ultimate. They are never more than tentative and pro-
visional. It meanings are on the move, an adequate understanding of 
style in this sense must communicate the sheer work of establishing, 
maintaining, and remaking a set of always eroding relationships be-
tween characters and between characters and their surroundings. 
One of the most powerful meanings between Angelopoulos' style 
and his narratives communicate is to express some of the ways in 
which consciousness is translated into the forms of dramatic situa-
tions or into the forms of social interaction between characters. The 
style exists to express an imaginative and passionate residue in those 
moments. Angelopoulos orchestrates states of energetic silence or 
moments of solitary meditation in his films. Specifically, Angelopou-
los' style minimizes the pull of naturalistic, economic, and practical 
concerns within a scene in order to maximize the pull of emotional, 
spiritual, and intellectual concerns. Angelopoulos de-realizes certain 
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social and physical forms of representation in order to realize move-
ments of mind and desire, fugitive feelings, and impulses that would 
otherwise be lost or invisible within a scene. Angelopoulos' silencing 
of the dialogue, his momentary stopping of the plot, and his slowing 
of the pace of scenes are in the service of nurturing a special, nar-
ratively non-repressive, imaginatively evocative relationship between 
the spectator and the film. 
Angelopoulos' audiovisual style in his films is more than an artistic 
matter: it is a statement about the purpose and value of possible rela-
tionships to experience and expression. It is a declaration of faith in 
the ability of the active soul (of a filmmaker, a character, or a specta-
tor) to remain imaginatively free from being trapped by certain im-
bringing forces. It is an act of belief in the sheer power of cinematic 
language. 
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COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS A N D CINEMATIC MODELLING 
BUILDING UP THE VISUAL SYSTEM 
In a way cinema has a skill of redoubling the effect of light's motion 
because film images are actually moving, and a single image in a film 
never stands still, just as light never does, and just as the eye never 
does. The moving eye is the other half of moving light. "Modes of 
art using human experience for their subject that both engage the 
scanning eye and suggest its analogy to the inner life can rely on a raw 
emotional pull. In movies the camera itself is the seeking gaze, de-
manding enlightenment, and its choices can demonstrate its superior 
insight: good cinematography and editing give the effect of satisfying 
the eye's immediate prior longings at every instant. Ideally, the cam-
era unerringly finds what the bodily eye and the mind's eye are both 
unconsciously lusting for or perhaps dreading." 205 After being shown 
a rapid sequence of unrelated skills, viewers can recollect informa-
tion about some of the individual shots, and they show some signs of 
having visual expectations about what will come next. There is also 
evidence of a visual buffer that stores some small number of views.206 
We need mental structures to place the individual images and shots. 
Our visual system has been built up so that local space is heavily con-
trolled by subjective perspective. This was t rue even before pictorial 
perspective's development, which includes a reference to the fact that 
perspective's pictorial development is a rational, objective thing, and 
does not involve subjectivism. There is also a question of a point-of-
view, which marked visual perception even longer before it appeared 
in images. In visual perception perspective is necessary, because we 
cannot deal with the object's forms, places, and where they are head-
ing for, without the help of perspective.207 Pictorial perspective is 
already a construction on which real-life vision intricately and radi-
cally depends. The differences between real-life vision and pictorial 
structures explain why pictorial perspectives are very flexible. 
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In processing an audiovisual How of a narrative perceptual, emotion-
al, and cognitive aspects are functionally related and represent inter-
acting neural processes in the brain-body totality. Most of the neural 
processes are not conscious, since much of the constructive work in 
image-formation, and much of the implementation or simulation of 
motor programmes, takes place at a non-conscious level. But many 
processes will be felt as intensities and saturations. Torben Grodal 
has presented a four step —map concerning the processing of the 
audiovisual input.208 
S t e p I S t e p 2 S t e p 3 S t e p 4 
First visual Memory j Construction of Reactions: 
analysis of J matching, narrative Tensities, voluntary 
voluntary networks of scene or telic, motor, 
textures, associations. universe: sequential. 
lines. arousal, 'Erno tensities', 
figures. 'affect appraisal' paratelic, 
and semi-voluntary, 
Intensities Saturations labelling. repetitive 
cyclical. 
Motor 
Emotivities, 
autonomic relations. 
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The first step consists of basic perception with rays of light enter-
ing the eye and activates the millions of rods and cones there. The 
brain makes its first analysis of input, and it will try to analyse colour, 
contrast, and so forth, and figures, ground, and spatial dimensions. 
This process creates perceptual intensities without any meaning in 
the ordinary sense of the word. Grodal thinks that many abstract 
paintings and experimental films try to produce an input that can 
only be processed at a Step 1 level.209 Modern ideas of 'pure aes-
thetics' often equate aesthetics with Step 1 processes, as in Pollock's 
paintings and Brakhage's films, although this is a limited definition of 
aesthetics. The second step consists of memory matching. The brain 
runs through its memory-files in order to match and determine the 
identity of what has been shown. So, the brain searches its memory-
files for possible matches. They are not, solely, visual structures, but 
also with affective values and labels. This accords with Eisenstein's 
description of the way in which emotions are represented and evoked 
by montage.210 The cinema can work through highly elaborated im-
ages but the screen can also be used merely as a window through 
which one can look at realities. The quality of the screen image mat-
ters less than the visual composition of the reality shown. It is a mat-
ter of showing things more than staging or revealing them. Eisenstein 
arranged the dramatic of his images often across the width of the 
screen with more or less empty areas above and below left to catch 
the mood of the place, or to document the peasant life. Of ten in 
Eisenstein's films, the visual centre of the shot differs f rom the dra-
matic centre, and occasionally the films subside into aestheticism, as 
when the peasant or kulak faces in The General Line (1929) stare down 
with the impassivity of old masters in their frames. 
According to Grodal, if a film concentrates its representations on a 
Step 2 level by merely showing different visual items that activate a set 
of memory files, the effect of the film is normally labelled 'lyrical'.211 
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This is what happens in many music videos and some commercials, 
which might be called the activation of networks of associations. Mak-
ing the matching procedure difficult, so that the brain has to activate 
many items in many files in order to make the match may enhance 
the effect.212 In most narrative films, Step 2 processing immediately 
leads to Step 3, which consists of relating and contextualizing the 
earlier items. It might be called the cognitive-emotional appraisal and 
motivation phase.213 Arousal states normally activate telic arousal-re-
duction procedures. If no cognitive, voluntary, or autonomic outlet is 
found for the scenario, it will regress to a Step 2 mode. Step 3 leads 
to Step 4, which consists of reactions at a high level of arousal. There 
are three main types reactions. First ones correspond to canonical 
narrative schemata, implying hypothetical or actual, voluntary and 
teleological response. The second ones consist of hypothetical or ac-
tual semi-voluntary paratelic response (for example, long sequences 
in musicals). The third type is an autonomic response, such as crying, 
laughing, shivering, or making involuntary body movements. 
This overall diagram is an interesting way of putting together differ-
ent elements in the processing of audiovisual inputs. Of course, it is 
a simplification of the whole process. The different processes don ' t 
necessarily go in linear directions, most likely they go back and forth, 
and also they might all happen quite simultaneously. 
LEVELS OF MEANING AND SEMANTIC PROCESSES 
Mental, and visual processes are essential in exploring cinema's visual 
and stylistic meanings, and the semantic processes according to film 
visuals are crucial to audiovisual research. The concept of seman-
tics refers in its origins to philology, where it means the research 
of meanings with words, and from where it has gradually slid into 
the meanings themselves and into the research connected with them. 
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There is a willingness to connect semantics with natural verbal lan-
guage, as linguistics call it, and then it can be either a special area 
inside linguistics or a wider feature of it. The general semantics is 
not to be restricted only to words, but also to syntactic meanings 
and wider references. Extensions of this kind can change into excep-
tions or break totally and gain independence through that, and then 
we can refer with semantics to all kinds of meanings. We can also 
talk about visual semantics and we can think, not only of signs and 
symbols, but also of the structures of the meaning inside the mind 
itself. The cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of 
mental processes above and beyond perception but the essential in-
gredients of perception itself."214 For excellent reasons, high culture 
normally tries to maximise an artwork's semantic yield, but some-
times it might be useful to reinforce certain uncertainties in aesthetic 
theories. There are uncertainties as to when two ideas so mesh as to 
constitute a structure or theme, when their affinity remains merely 
incidental, when it makes an echo but generates no further ideas of 
much substance or consequence, when the similarities in a metaphor 
stop. There are uncertainties as to how far unity proposes a structural 
intentionality of some sort. For Eisentein's theory of montage might 
seem to strengthen the opposite view, that the fact of juxtaposition 
within an artwork is sufficient to turn any two spots, local events, into 
a structure provided even the slightest, vaguest or most general affin-
ity between the exists. If montage exists between shots, as Eisenstein 
assumed, it must also exist between sequences or indeed ideas."215 
Merleau-Ponty thinks that perception is the 'original text' of con-
scious experience, and thus of phenomenology itself.216 Merleau-
Ponty thinks that man's body is not an object but a condition for 
objectivity, a point of contact between consciousness and the world. 
Thus, meanings are contributed by consciousness, and perception is 
more than a mosaic of discrete sensations and more than their sum. 
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Perception is a primordial structure of encounter and engagement 
of the lived-body with and in the world. It is the mode of access, 
the opening upon the world that allows consciousness its objects 
through that agency of the body. Thus, perception becomes the ex-
istential paradigm of intentionality, the 'original text ' or expression 
of the structure of consciousness which carries it's meaning within 
itself, as it shows itself.21' Before perception can be predicated (that 
is, intended as an object of consciousness), it must itself provide the 
horizon and grounds that make predication possible.218 Perception is 
just that act which creates at a stroke along with the cluster of data, 
the meaning which they have, but moreover sees to it that they have 
meaning."219 
Perception, like the structure of consciousness, is never empty but 
always the perception of something. Given its existential nature, its 
link with the body that is finite and always has a particularly directed 
and biased access to the world, perception of something is invariably 
the marking of a choice and the setting of boundaries that constitute 
a field or context and its primary significance. Perception is struc-
tured and structuring expression of intentionality in existence. Per-
ception is a lived experience and it also brings latent and operative 
thought into existence. Thus, we can speak of perception as thought 
itself, because perception not only engages consciousness with the 
world in a gestalt structure but also expresses through that gestalt the 
structure and structuring activity of consciousness in existence. In 
cognitive thinking, terms like 'gestalt' are closely related to cognitive 
terms like 'pat tern ' and more loosely related to cognitive te rms like 
'schema'. For example, George Lakoff's cognitive semantics repre-
sents a systematic research into the mental models that s t ructure the 
human phenomenological world, and, although the precision of his 
theories and analytical examples of images and metaphors as mental 
models is modern , his way of thinking is very similar to that of phe-
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nomenological analysis of aesthetic phenomenon carried out earlier 
in cognitive studies. 
Seeing is an experience. A retinal reaction is only a physical state 
— a photochemical excitation. Physiologists have not always appreci-
ated the difference between experiences and physical states. People, 
not their eyes, see. Cameras, and eyeballs, are blind. Attempts to lo-
cate within the organs of sight (or within the neurological reticulum 
behind the eyes) some nameable called 'seeing' may be dismissed. 
That Kepler and Tycho do, or do not, see the same thing cannot be 
supported by reference to the physical states of their retinas, op-
tic nerves or visual cortices: there is more to seeing than meets the 
eye-ball."220 The changes of perception are, or are due to, changes 
of interpretation commit us to saying that there are two processes, 
perceiving and interpreting. It is doubtful whether in real life we do 
experience a scene as a whole, as a succession of details to w hich, for 
example close-ups are a close approximation. When one focuses his 
or her eyes on a point one remains conscious of the scene as a whole, 
so camera close-ups are far more emphatic, and will cut up the visual 
whole quite drastically. 
Russell Hanson thinks that one can rely on introspection of per-
ceptual processes, and reason that interpreting is intellectual while 
seeing is not supposed to be intellectual, and that we are aware of 
interpreting but not aware of processes of seeing.221 For Richard L. 
Gregory this seems an important mistake: 'Hanson's view is here a 
hangover from stimulus-response accounts of behaviour. The crucial 
point is that animals, an s well as adult humans and scientists, predict 
f rom limited sensed data to situations, which can be related only by 
kinds of inference. In fact we have every reason to believe that per-
ceptions have their richness and integrity as well as their predictive 
power through inference. This is almost self-evident to the psycholo-
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gist working on perceptual processes (though with exceptions), but it 
is anathema to philosophers seeking unadulterated, theory-free and 
assumption-free sensory data."2" The processes of seeing involve 
many processes which could be described as interpreting, though we 
are not aware of these or any processes of perception A difference 
between passive reception and active perceiving is contained even in 
elementary visual experience. 
That given world is only the scene on which the most characteris-
tic aspect of perception takes place. Through that world roams the 
glance, directed by attention, focusing the narrow range of sharp-
est vision now on this, now on that spot, following the flight of a 
distant sea gull, scanning a tree to explore its shape. This eminently 
active performance is what is truly meant by visual perception,"223 It is 
a question of treating cognitive material on any given level and every 
process that may be included in thinking takes place at least in prin-
ciple, in perception. Visual perception is visual thinking, confirms 
Arnheim.224 One can also say that thinking is internal perception; it 
comes f rom one memory trace within the mind encountering other 
memory traces. Thinking is the mind perceiving itself.'25 
EXISTENTIAL CONDITIONS 
Vivian Sobchack thinks that existentially embodied perception func-
tions in a threefold manner.22 ' ' First, perception presents itsell to 
the world as the concrete manifestation of intentionality. It is inten-
tionality commuted to existence through the body's presence in the 
world; it is the body's material presence that gives intentionality ex-
istential form as a concrete activity. And second, perception connects 
intentionality with the world; it points to and indicates the world 's 
presentness to consciousness and its objective presence - a presence 
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toward which intentionality is directed through the lived-body and its 
perceptive activity. Third, perception represents itself to itself and to 
others in the world as the existential condition and expressive con-
vention of intentionality. As consciousness is aware of itself in exist-
ence, it is aware as a perceiving consciousness capable of perception; 
perception is not only intentionality prereflectively presenting itself 
to the world and others through its projects, but it is also intention-
ality reflectively representing itself to itself as consciousness and its 
significant experience of existence. 
And further on Sobchack thinks: "Given these three functions of 
perception in existence, perception as it is lived and made concrete 
through the body-subject can be said to originate the correlations of 
the sign in the most primordial and seemingly prelogical movements 
of its being-in-the-world. Language and communication, however, 
do not emerge merely because I have a body as an instrument of 
perception that brings them into being. Rather I am my body. My 
body as lived perceptively, as engaged intentionally with the world, 
is already languaging and communicating by virtue of its systemic 
structure and material correlation with the world."227 
In art, the painter first stages his subject through the mind, or through 
sketches and models. In photography, the photographer has to stage 
what she or he photographs, and the theatre director might think in 
terms of stage pictures. In film, one can think of choosing the ele-
ments through montage through a pictorial angle. What cinema does, 
or what an image does, is just as much reality as all the other things 
in the world (because one is looking at it, so it must be reality), but 
it rearranges that reality because the cinematic form is a different 
form. So, instead of "through that world roams the glance directed 
by attention", in cinema one's glance works in the order dictated by 
the film director; it is directed by his attention and bv the form of the 
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Him. And instead of his focusing at will, he is giving a close up, or a 
long shot, and the camera makes one follow "the flight of a distant sea 
gull", or it prevents one from doing it. Film form is a different order 
of perception on a world, which in some ways is the same as ours, 
in other ways different. While one is sitting in a cinema watching 
images, one can also see the cinema and the other people, and one 
can see that the image is only an image. In still photography the te rm 
'shot ' refers to a single exposed image. In cinema it means a series of 
frames. The cinematic frame is the picture. 
Frame in a film has four overlapping, and highly confusable senses, 
the single image, its edges, the shot, and its field of view. If static 
frames are shown at sufficient speed, the human eye has difficulty in 
isolating them from one another, and a succession of broadly simi-
lar static pictures can fuse into 'one picture with movement ' . The 
single frame is not exactly invisible, but in ' the moving picture' it is 
indistinguishable. It is invisible as a unit, but a single frame is briefly 
visible, and indeed legible. Between virtual invisibility and legibili-
ty many intermediate gradations are possible, depending on varied 
features of content and context, and their conjunction. The frame 
maybe in some sense subliminal, and if some theories of subliminal 
suggestion are correct, the individual frame might even be invisible 
but legible. For example, in Eisenstein's Battleship Potemkin (1925) 
there are single black frames between certain shots, which, though 
passing unnoticed, strengthen and sharpen the cut between the shots 
on either side of it. There is a sense in which such a black frame is 
an inserted 'shot' , although it shows nothing and was not exposed 
through a camera. Graphic feature is a useful t e rm for all those pictorial 
features, which are non-representational. 
The usual definition of the shot as an uninterrupted series of expo-
sures runs into complications. It assumes that the frames were ex-
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posed and displayed at the same speed. But if the film is run through 
the camera more slowly than it is then displayed, the result will be 
what is called fast-motion. For example, in a scientific film, a camera 
might be set to shoot at the rate ot three frames a day in four weeks, 
so as to show a plant grow, as it were in seconds. Far f rom being a 
mere novelty, the device has serious use as a discovery procedure 
for scientific purposes. Fast motion entails interruption, in the sense 
that the next exposure is delayed or retarded, however, the same shot 
may be uninterrupted in the sense that it is taken in the usual way, or 
that the successive exposes are triggered and stopped by an automatic 
timing device. The need for even motion favours automatic timing 
devices, without the need for interruption by humans. Given certain 
subjects, however, slow motion may be achieved by human inter-
ruption. The spectator may have no way of knowing which process 
was used, and whether she is watching a shot or multiple shots. We 
still speak of 'fast-motion shot', because it looks like one movement 
through one shot. The form of display does not reveal the form ot 
production. In slow motion, the exposures are neither interrupted 
nor delayed, though their display is. Thus scientific films can reveal, 
for example, exactly how a bubble is broken up as the bullet trom a 
rifle speeds through it. 
Motion in the real world is very of ten too fast for us to see clearly, 
and slow motion does not strike us as an illusion, but rather as won-
derfully meticulous detailing, so that it satisfies our reality-sense. 
Paradoxically, animation is closer to fast than slow motion. The usual 
definition of animation requires that the object must be moved by 
hand, or at least, individually controlled by irregular human interven-
tion between frames. The definition does involve grey areas. Puppets 
pushed by the finger require animation techniques, whereas pup-
pets on strings can be filmed normally, whence the rival definition 
that in animation films the objects depicted as moving do not move 
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themselves. Between animation and "live action" many weird hybrids 
abound, the name for the bizarre genus being "pixilation". Thus one 
might photograph a real live person in real live space but in fast-mo-
tion so arranged as to suddenly displace him from A to B to C ... Z. 
The identical effect could be achieved by shooting the scene normally 
and then editing selected frames. Or one could pixilate and edit. As so 
often, the effect of the final form depends on the spectator's percep-
tual processes, and the "constructivist" effect of fo rm must contrive 
to fit their "restructuring" combinations of physiological structura-
tions, and of acquired experience. Whether used to counterfeit live-
action, to outrage reality, or to intensify realism, all these effects take 
their "meaning" from the spectator's knowledge of normal events, 
speeds, scales, photographic processes, production techniques, and 
so on. If in a sense they are illusions, and certainly, where the repre-
sented movement is concerned they are simultaneously recontexted 
by knowledge, and "downgraded" to impressions or diagrams. 
Whereas the photographic shot is a single picture, the film shot can-
not be defined as such, since movement is continuous alteration, es-
pecially when an object leaves or enters the shot, or when the camera 
moves generating an ever-changing scenic segment. If the shot none-
theless has a sort of felt unity, rather like our sense of "a picture", it 
is by constituting one continuous space-time chunk, with its cont inu-
ous movement and change. In one central respect, the photograph-
ic shot and the film shot are diametrical opposed. The photograph 
stops movement, and renders eternal the facts and relationships of 
one brief space-moment. The eternal moment conquers t ime. Still-
ness conquers change, and space transfixes movement. 
In contrast, the movie shot thrives on the transformation of the "m o -
ment of space" by time, duration, movement and change. Not that 
it renounces the option of stillness. It may depict a scene without 
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movement, or what is called the "freeze-frame" may still movement 
as the still camera does, although the display-time of the shot repre-
sents a controlled duration which the photograph on the page does 
not seek. The control of duration is an editing decision. The freeze-
frame is another terminological oddity. In effect it is one exposed 
frame, reprinted on a whole series of frames. As photographic proc-
ess, it is a single framer as cinematic display it is multiple frames, 
not "a frame" at all. Interestingly subtle surprises are possible as be-
tween freeze-frames and moving pictures of immobile scenes. Of ten 
"freeze-frame" refers to the sudden freezing of a moving shot: which 
in some respects is now two shots, movement, then fixity, normal 
change, then impossible transfixity. But here too grey areas occur, as 
in Bob Fosse's Sweet Charity (1969), where the spectator-can hardly 
tell whether certain freeze-frames were shot with a still or a cin-
ematic camera. 
Whenever film theory starts f rom photography it risks all the confu-
sions that arise f rom the use of "shot" to describe structurally op-
posed entities. It is tempting to propose some alternative te rm for 
the moving shot. "Take" f rom "taking a photograph", would be ap-
propriate. Alas, the term is already bespoke - as in "Scene one, take 
one". For it is common for a shot to require several attempts, and 
then movie cameramen call the shot a "scene" and each try a "take". 
In fact, of course, each "take" is a scene and a shot in itself. With the 
result that "scene" applies to (a) the camera's shot, (b) the scene in 
front of the camera during that shot, and (c) the general setting im-
plied by the series of shots of which that particular shot is part. How-
ever baffling to those who expect linguistic forms to possess some 
structural logic these riotous terminological shifts originate in the 
practicalities of production process, such that no particular need is 
felt for consistent terminology, as distinct f rom specialized, provision 
and local purposes. These purposes are, to establish relationships be-
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tween disparate entities - such as the scene to be shot, the shot in the 
camera, the shot as edited, the overall scene to be suggested. Since 
editing is by definition a relating process, it is all the more useful 
to avoid the traps set by language, which is too easily satisfied by its 
own forms of coherence, and occludes the demands of correct cor-
respondence. 
One can refer to smaller parts of the visual world, or to its whole 
framework; so it is a changing, developing and evolving process, while 
all the aspects are subject to continued confirmation, reappraisal, 
change, completion, correction, deepening of understanding.228 One 
can speak of cinematic semantics, with which we can understand the 
exploration of cinematic meanings, concentrating on specific cin-
ematic things like exploring the meanings of moving images, succes-
sion, montage-combinations and camera-effects. So in this connec-
tion the interest focuses on all kinds of visual and stylistic meanings of 
cinema. Concerning the reality the camera can only catch the visual 
surface of the physical world from one particular viewpoint, which is 
really restricted to the surface of local happenings because every shot 
has to happen within a closed area. 
Lots of the processes within that closed area are not complete; thus, 
if one makes a film about weather, one can not do it within a scope 
of a photograph because all the events that make the weather are so 
scattered around the world that all one can really do is to put different 
photographs together and then the spectator infers a connection. If 
one makes a film about the weather by combining 40 different shots, 
that is really outside photography because the connections which are 
demonstrated exist through editing, not within the photographs. Con-
sequently as soon as one combines two photograph one has exceeded 
the limits of photography, and one makes an abstract or general con-
nection. As a conclusion one can say that film is a great deal more 
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abstract than it looks because it depends on the connections between 
the photographs, not on what happens in the picture. What happens 
on a screen is like a clue to a whole association of ideas that come with 
it. Photography is conspicuously a fragmentary aftair, depicting not 
objects and events, but aspects of appearances.. Mainstream aesthet-
ics has assumed that any objectivity was thoroughly compromised, or 
redeemed by the selectivity of the process, technique, and authorial 
decisions. A photograph is the traces of reality, but not even a syn-
edoche of reality. It is really only one way ol constructing abstract 
graphics, which by visual analogy, resemblance, and association are 
interpreted as scenes. It is less an illusion than an allusion. 
To some filmmakers, good editing poses first a visual question and 
then a visual answer. In experimental studies of film or video cut-
ting, both the visual question posed and the larger story structures 
within which the shots are presented significantly affect how the ed-
ited shots are comprehended.2 2 9 The mental structures fitted to our 
successive glimpses at the screen and at the world cannot have the 
characteristics of the world itself. Movements as we remember or an-
ticipate them do not continue to run off in time, nor do remembered 
or anticipated layouts continue to exist in space. 
When following a narrative film, a spectator internalizes the whole 
structure of interests depicted in the drama, and this structure in-
cludes alternative outcomes to various lines of action which the spec-
tator must keep track of in some sense before one alternative is actu-
alized in order for the film to be received as intelligible. Film theoriz-
ing progresses by criticizing already existing theory, and in criticizing 
one theoretical solution to a problem, one may also see one's way 
to a better solution. It is a question of dialectical criticism, a mode 
of rational inquiry. This was the point of cognitivism because of the 
emphasis tíiat it placed on the efficacy of models, which exploit the 
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role of cognitive processes (as opposed to unconscious processes) in 
the explanation of cinematic communication and understanding. Its 
proponents share certain convictions, for example, cognitive models 
may provide better answers to many of the theoretical questions con-
cerning cinematic narration. Cognitivism challenges many narrative 
paradigms because it focuses on the evaluation of cinematic commu-
nication through our best abilities of experience and reasoning.230 
Thus the question is of the perception of phenomena and thinking 
(logic), in which there lays a human being's chance of gaining infor-
mation about reality by perceiving it with the help of experience and 
thinking.231 But as Gordon Rattray Tavlor writes in The Natural His-
tory of the Mind: "However, the genius of a Goethe or a Shakespeare, 
a Sophocles or a Tolstoy, A Milton or a Racine, seems to be of a 
somewhat different kind. Here it is the imaginative projection, which 
counts, the power to identify with the emotions of the others and to 
express them in words and simulated deeds. This demonstrates that 
thought is not solely a matter of intellect. There is a constant inter-
play between the coolly reasoning cortex and the impulsive, excitable 
mid-brain. And this is t rue not only of the works of geniuses but of 
the 'thinking' of everyday life."232 
When viewing a film we will perceive it at a certain conceptual level as 
directed by viewer and/or addresser, programming, for example, by 
means of narrative schemata, framing, zooming, and other indexicai 
procedures indicating formats of attention.233 At the same time, the 
viewing will activate networks of associations below the threshold of 
consciousness, and activate superior, 'propositional/abstract ' frames 
and themes. Films are comprehended universally, because it is clear 
that the spectators can understand films that are made in different 
cultures and in different circumstances. Maybe this links with the 
idea, that there is something common and shared in the universal 
123 
COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS A N D CINEMATIC MODELLING 
understanding of images and sounds, which is based on human na-
ture and understanding of different phenomena. For Jean Mitry, the 
cinema is a medium of re-experience, of discovery and creation. It is 
a phenomenon in which meaning - never fully predetermined - arises 
as a function of perceptual, emotional, and intellectual activity; and in 
which the world - never fully meaningful - is grasped again as dynamic 
presence.2 '4 Most narrative fictions will simulate reality because emo-
tions aroused can be symbolically gratified by fictitious acts. A specta-
tor seeing attractive phenomena in visual fiction is promised possible 
future mediations with its objects by identifying with a protagonist 
and his or her mediating acts. To participate at this level of meaning, 
the spectator must identify with some protagonists' capabilities for 
subjectivity and action within the fictive world of the screen. 
In cinematic narration a cut juxtaposes not only two scenes, but also 
two graphic configurations, or structures. This juxtaposition is a 
visual event, so the structure of each shot can strike against its pred-
ecessor, generating a clash, or a collision, which is physically palpable 
in its energy. A kinetic kick may be generated by the juxtaposition of 
strong, and bold compositional lines. A cut may be smoother if the 
centre of interest in the first shot's last frame roughly co-incides with 
the centre of interest in the second shot's last frame. In such cases 
the spectator 's eye can move swiftly from one centre of interest to 
another. Gerald Mast has pointed out that "any work of art is a self-
contained little universe, a microcosm complete in itself".235 And an 
interest in universes like that is based on the tact that they offer us 
something what is different compared to natural universes. The uni-
verse of a work of art is finite and orderly, and its order is perceptible 
and comprehensible, because it functions under certain laws, it has 
logic of its own. 236 One can understand cinema's universe as a kind 
of microcosm, a world with its own order and logic but also a world 
with associations and connotations related to its viewing process; and 
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when a spectator puts his soul into that world, he or she sees that it is 
a "picture" of that world; one can feel oneself "inside" that picture, 
but in a second one can move "outside" that picture and observe the 
whole process.237 
To experience cinema is based on a two-way tension of that kind. Thus, 
as we watch films we are at the same time under many simultaneously 
appearing stimuli. Cinema is composed of visual images (whether 
coloured or black and white ones), spoken or written words, music, 
actors, sets and so on, of many ways of telling its emotions and ideas 
to the public. The simplest way to define the film image would be to 
identify it with a single frame extracted from the filmstrip. But such 
a definition would possess serious deficiencies. Psychologically when 
watching a movie, we experience action, movement, and sound, not 
a static frame. We need to accept as images the gesture of a hand, say 
or the ringing of a telephone. In order to conform then to ordinary 
discourse and common experience, a looser definition of film image 
is necessary. This suggests that the film image should be thought of as 
any simple object or event, normally perceived and regularly identi-
fied as a single entity, that is presented on either the screen or the 
sound track."238 Image is multifaceted and ephemeral concept. Our 
experiential reality is flooded with perceived, remembered and imag-
ined images because we are living in an image culture. 
In cinema, systems of communication are based on the artist's choic-
es from elements ot construction. According to Juri Lotman every 
image on the screen is a sign: it has meaning, and it carries informa-
tion.239 And while doing that, there are two kinds of meanings: first 
of all, images on the screen reproduce some sort of objects of the real 
world, and then a semantic relationship is established between these 
objects and the screen images (objects become the meanings of the 
images reproduced on the screen); on the other hand, the images on 
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the screen may be augmented by some additional, often totally unex-
pected meanings. One can call them additional meanings, which can 
be symbolic, metaphorical, metonymical and so on.240 Films can use 
symbols of many sorts to arrive at an extra layer of experience. This 
does not have to be a generalisation, an allegory, or a moral but just 
an extra awareness of the characters' feelings, of forces and factors 
operating inside the story. Cinema has been called a chain of visual 
impressions running and interlocking in an uninterruptible succes-
sion of graphic bombardments.2 4 1 What this is to say, is that visual 
thinking and cinema language have to be understood as a certain kind 
of intellectual activity, because in a creative cinema a most simple 
kind of scene involves a massive series of directorial decisions that 
go far beyond the realistic situation behind the scene.242 The film 
experience is a system of communication based on bodily perception 
as a vehicle of conscious expression. It entails the visible, audible, ki-
netic aspects of sensible experience to make sense visibly, audibly, and 
haptically.241 As a communicative system the film experience uniquely 
opens up and exposes the inhabited space of direct experience as a 
condition of singular embodiment and makes it accessible and visible 
to more than the single consciousness who lives it. 
For example, Clive Bell thought that painting is art if and only if it 
possesses a significant form.244 Though the importance of form was 
made especially apparent by the tendency of modern art toward ab-
straction, significant form was a property said to be possessed by all 
artworks, past, present, and future. Significant fo rm is compromised 
of arrangements of lines, colours, shapes, volumes, vectors, and space. 
Genuine art, on this view, addresses the imagination like the figures 
of Gestalt psychology, prompting the viewer to fill the artwork in such 
a way that we apprehend it as an organized configuration of lines, 
colours, shapes, vectors and spaces. Noel Carroll thinks that theorists 
like Bell did not argue simply that formalism was the best theory for 
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newly emerging and newly acknowledged forms of art.245 They main-
tained that formalism revealed the secret of all art for all times. From 
the formalist perspective art could be representational, but unlike the 
representational theorist, the formalist regarded representation as an 
incidental rather than as an essential property of artworks.246 
SYMBOLIC FANTASIES 
Miklo ' s Jancsó's Red Psalm (Még ké a nép, 1971) is visually and cog-
nitively an exceptionally interesting example of art that is based on 
historical events, because the storv line follows a series of revolu-
tionary peasant uprisings in Hungary between 1890 and 1910. The 
Hungarian title Még kér e nép is a title of a poem by Sándor Petőfi 
meaning "the people still demand", and referring to the theme of the 
film. The scriptwriter of the film, Gvula Hernádi, found a notebook 
of "Socialist psalms", and he and Jancsó were heavily influenced by 
Deszö Nagy, a historian, who emphasized the meaning of popular 
folklore as an inspiration for the uprisings. Yvette Biro, credited as 
"dramaturge", helped transform the ideas into dramatic actions and 
characters.247 The actual performances in the film are imaginary, and 
many of the incidents and happenings inside the narrative were im-
provised during the shooting of the film. 
The setting of the film is Hungarian plain with a river, a church, some 
farm buildings, and a railway line. The film begins with a peaceful 
image of a woman's hand holding a dove, and this image is accom-
panied by the tinkling of bells, and the music of the "Marseillaise". 
The scene stretches out to show a group of men and women peas-
ants, horses, and soldiers in uniform. The local bailiff steps in, and 
the peasants sing, dance, and walk. The bailiff tells the peasants that 
he wants to talk with them, and the peasants demand rights for the 
people. One of the reads a Friedrich Engels's letter comment ing the 
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political situation in Hungary in the late 1890's. The bailiff withholds 
sacks of grain from them, and a blonde woman (Andrea Drahota) 
tries to link the separate groups of villagers. A group of women ap-
proaches the soldiers, takes their rifles f rom them, and throws them 
on the ground. Then they confront the bailiff. 
The peasants dance around to the music of the "Carmagnole". A 
folk-violinist quietens the mood, and few officer cadets hover around 
the folk-dance troupe curiously or thoughtfully. A dark-haired cadet 
half-offers villagers a jug of wine, and his reddish-haired companion 
has little sympathy for them. A senior officer with curly facial hair 
leads in new troops, throws a sword down into the ground, and tosses 
the red-haired officer a revolver, as if recalling him to a duty. Infan-
try surround a circle of villagers, who turn outwards to face them, 
reciting Socialist proverbs. Three women walk past a line of soldiers, 
slowly baring their breasts while reciting a "red psalm", and strolling 
into the distance they also drop their skirts, and close into a circle. 
As the soldiers, deserting their posts with a shout, run towards and 
past them. A line of villagers with locked arms follows triumphantly, 
as distant cavalry herds the soldiers into a tight clump. 
Night falls, and around the bonfires of stacked rifles the peasants sing 
another militant song. The sympathetic cadet strolls amongst the vil-
lagers, and with a revolver in hand he tells a guitarist that he was sent 
to kill him. Village women welcome him. The folk-dance group has 
emerged with the other villagers, and they dance around them sing-
ing "Johnny is My Darling, the Union volunteer." The cadet's walk 
subtly responds to its rhythms, but a senior officer rides his horse 
at him, nudging him backwards to the other cadets. He throws his 
revolver down, but another cadet retrieves it, and passes it to a third 
one who fires at the villagers. The darkest-haired of the three women 
("three graces") silently raises her hands, and one of them bleeds, as 
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if f rom bullet. Her gesture signifies, not so much surrender, as display 
to her comrades. A cadet kisses her shoulder, but other cadets walk 
him backward, and one of them shoots him. He lies, as if dead, be-
tween the sword thrust in the ground, and two village women. They 
kneel over him, and one of them bends to kiss him, and reviving he 
looks probingly into camera, while still touching the hilt of the sword. 
Instead of a wound, the dark girl's hand now bears a red cockade, 
which she parades to her fellows. Johnny is My Darling resumes, and 
now the villagers are free ol the circling cavalry, surrounded by fertile 
scenery with farms, fat heaps of grain, and flocks of sheep. The three 
graces stroll along a path away from camera, before being pursued by 
young village men, who surround them, seize them, bring them back, 
and lilt them into huge wooden water-vats, around which dancers 
whirl long coloured streamers. 
In an open field with few trees, an elegant young landowner, the 
Count (András Bálint) hand his hunting ritle, as if disarming himself, 
belore talking to the villagers. The hawkish-cadet takes it, but semi-
casually keeps it in the picture. Afar, the cavalry have re turned. The 
Count embraces the guitarist, and shakes hands with the villagers in 
respectful way. Sitting under a tree, he expounds an iron law of eco-
nomics, that abundance can only lower prices, and therefore wages. 
He recommends austerity, and the accumulation of moral capital. 
To this a crabbed-faced man opposes another list of demands, and 
this time for political rights and for workers' organisation against the 
autocratic system. The aristocrat quietly replies that education must 
precede rights, before lying down, turning over, and dying. Village 
women approach, and kneel affectionately around his body. Towards 
them gallops a smartly dressed blonde horsewoman, and the village 
women help her lay out a white sheet for the dead man. 
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This kind of combination of actions, movements, dialogue, and mu-
sic is typical for Jancsó. Although there are many conflicts inside the 
narrative, the general mood of the film is one of celebration, and 
the peasants show more unity and comradeship in their actions than 
despair and loss of hope. The movements ot the people are choreo-
graphed, but the overall impact is one of spontaneity, joy, unity, and 
hope. The peasants are capable of positive action, and they are con-
stantly in a state of debate and argumentation. Still their real strength 
lies in unity and mass action, which is richly produced through their 
singing and dancing. The songs and dances represent a wide range of 
peasant feelings and experiences with strong, nationalist undercur-
rents. There is not much in the film that corresponds to a naturalistic 
use of dialogue. There are slogans of economic and politic tactics, 
and assertations of solidarity and allegiance. 
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The rhythm of the speeches varies a lot, and the formal quality of 
them creates moments of repetition, and segments of phraseology. 
The peasants express their feelings as a group, and as a class. This 
brings in wider historical perspectives as qualifying elements of nar-
rative in Jancsó's approach. The men and the women have different 
roles in the narrative, and they tend to move and act in groups. The 
occasional nudity of women has a special dimension, and creates dif-
ferent responses, and also brings in more emotional and sensual than 
intellectual tones. It is a sign of free spirit among the peasants, and a 
counterpoint to the heavy clothing of other participitants. 
In earlier Jancsó-films such us the Round-Up (1965) and the Red and 
White (1967), women are seen mainly as victims of male violence, 
but from Confrontation (1968) on, women begin to take more active 
roles in resisting the opposition, and in attempting to defeat it.248 In 
the Round-Up, the occupying Austrians promise a peasant that he can 
escape execution if he can find a partisan who has killed many. Be-
fore suffering torture or execution, victims must march in file, fo rm 
circles, strip or lie down, or undergo these absurd ceremonies that 
merely display their subjection to the will of authority. Jancsó be-
longs to a generation appalled by the revelation of wartime atrocities, 
and the Nazi death camps. Jancsó suggests that power is exercised 
through public humiliation, and total control of the victim's body.249 
With Jancsó the style of his films is geared to a collective struggle. 
The moving camera makes no separation of leaders and led. Red Psalm 
develops an essentially literary text by means of physical movement , 
whose minimally terse dialogue suggests without specifying historical 
trends, moments, and issues. Characters are not of ten individual-
ised. They are more like anonymous performers rather than positive 
heroes or heroines. Almost all villagers are young, and the almost 
total absence of the old people seems to function as a part of the 
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film's style. Jancsó's style is of ten abstract, and increasingly complex 
combination of camerawork, dialogue, sound, colour and music. Red 
Psalm shows his characteristic style as most expressive and powerful. 
The direction interweaves different dimensions of space., move-
ment, and change. Most unusual is the walking choreography with 
its changing body movements, and rhythms. There is also a strong 
pictorialist dimension with the images of landscapes. They are of ten 
revealed gradually, and the camera movements become a focus of at-
tention with their own kinetic dynamism. They are calligraphic, so, 
the camera lens seems to move across the scene as a pen moves across 
a piece of paper. There s rarely any one centre of visual interest that 
is followed throughout the shot. Usually, the camerawork is a com-
bination of zooming and tracking, and drifting f rom one individual 
to another, and from one group to another as they confront and in-
termingle throughout the narrative. The camera does not stay with 
one activity or character for very long, and olten incorporates several 
centres of interest within the frame. From this constant succession 
of actions and movements emerges a pattern that sets up the play ot 
opposing forces, and qualifies the nature of on-going confrontation 
between different groups. 
The lack of interest in following certain characters and performers 
throughout the scenes, and the avoidance of following a conventional 
plot structure give the film its episodic and abstract nature in which 
the spectator's attention changes without warning f rom one series 
of actions to another.250 Jancsó tries to avoid normal continuity, and 
instead of that creates a kind of different continuity with a focus on 
certain themes and structures rather than following characters and 
their actions. Visual and rhythmic delight is created mostly through 
the moving camera. The compositional values of the narrative are 
very high, and, for example, in the scene with the peasants massacre 
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by the soldiers the camera watches everything from high angle and 
in a long shot. This creates a majestic composition with painterly 
dimensions The soundtrack is meticulously wrought, when overlaid 
sounds add aural space to visual space, and the sparse use of words 
enlarge local actions to wider patterns of history, and the music sug-
gests moods and tension into the narrative. 
Some of the characters come in pairs, and many elements in the film 
are paired in one way or another. As well as pairs there are triads, 
and in dramas as in histories these relations change all the t ime in the 
course of the narrative. These cinematic forms are descriptional since 
the narrative events could remain identical even if technical or other 
factors would have created different forms. Fiction writers shape the 
narrative to accommodate a character or a scene which they wish 
to describe as their descriptions respond to some narrative require-
ments. Description dominates narrative, and vice versa. Film's basic 
unit, the photographic shot, is a descriptive structure, and in all the 
arts style serves description as conspiciously as it serves narrative. 
In Red Psalm the pictorial landscape becomes an arena, like a theatri-
cal space, which is created by a body of actors whose relations assert 
a visual and diegetic unity.251 The same logic applies in a conventional 
theatre, when actors enter the space around them, or play scenes 
amidst the audience a s well as on stage. There is a sense of spatial 
unity in Red Psalm, and it survives many changes of setting, breaks in 
the action, and edits in time. In this respect Jancsó anticipates An-
gelopoulos, another figures-in-landscape artist. They are both devel-
oping through their totally cinematized settings a form of extended 
theatre. Red Psalm is able to combine richly realistic elements with 
choreography and behaviour with great stylisation.252 The real sur-
prise of this is that it is not unrealistic or artificial, but more like a 
mixture of different elements. 
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In Red Psalm Jancsó mixes realistic and unrealistic elements, and uses 
narrative and non-narrative elements side by side. J ancsó ' s use of 
folk rituals add a strong sense of visuals into the overall narrative, 
because the emphasis lies on physicality of the different forces in-
side the images. Jancsó processes the different formations of the per-
formers with the emphasis on movements and gestures, and when 
the individual performers move, everything is always in relation to 
some of the groups. Also details mean a lot, because through the use 
of his moving camera Jancsó could focus on tiny, and of ten unex-
pected details that will follow. 
Jancsó's direction is built on stylised manoeuvres that stretch realism 
of the scenes. The films are symbolical fantasies enriched by phenom-
enological realism. The poetic abstractions are included in the nar-
rative by the physicality of the performers, and vividly photographed 
landscapes. Atmospheric and changing expressions vibrate with life, 
and creating dissonances, and human ambiguity around them. The 
sensual photography produces painterly images with dramatic coun-
terpoints. Meanings of the narrative are changing and fluid. Red Psalm 
has visual materialism, which requires an auteurial vision to elaborate 
COGNITIVE FUNCTION AND PERSPECTIVE 
The cognitive skills of humans have not been developed in opposition 
to their emotions and their bodies; on the contrary, they have been 
developed to carry out the preferences of the body-mind totality. 
The evolution of cognitive skills has pragmatic origins: it is easier to 
obtain food and avoid danger if we have precise cognitive maps of the 
world than it is if the world is just an eternal deconstructed flux. The 
emotional ties among humans have developed because such affective 
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(emotional) bonding has had a positive ecological value.253 The cog-
nitive processes, which Freud and others call 'secondary' processes, 
are, from the point of view of evolution, the primary ones, which we 
share with the rest of the animal kingdom because we want to per-
ceive and represent the world in such a way that by actions we can 
implement our body-brain preferences in an optimal way.254 
This sense of a 'body-mind totality' is crucial to Grodal's cognitive 
approach, and places it in opposition not only to psychoanalysis but 
also to behaviourist psychology.'53 Behaviourist psychology discounts 
the importance or sometimes even the existence of mental processes, 
and aims to explain even apparently highly conscious and complex 
human behaviour and its associated emotional components in terms 
of physiologically based reaction to stimuli.256 To sum up this psy-
chology in a brief, caricature way, all human life can be understood 
as an extension of the dog that has learned to salivate when a bell is 
rung, because it associates the ringing of the bell with the provision 
of food. 
Cognitive science judges this approach to be inadequate to the phe-
nomena it seeks to explain, and contends that in order ' to under-
stand language, visual phenomena, or behaviour', it is necessary to 
understand the mechanisms and structures by which these activities 
are processed by the human mind-brain, and for Grodal, ' the hu-
man mind-brain ' includes the perceptual system - the senses of sight, 
hearing, smell, taste, touch - by which we receive stimuli and data 
from the external world and f rom our own bodies.257 
Cognitive science, however, takes a constructive and functionalist ap-
proach. It concurs with post-structuralism and deconstruction in ac-
knowledging that meanings are constructed and are not metaphysical 
essences that can be grasp through intuition or through a particular 
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interpretative procedure; but sees such constructions as the product 
of social negotiations between human beings with brains and bodies 
who are trying to function effectively in a world of which they are a 
part - trying to know, to gain accurate cognition of, the world and 
themselves. The fact that they may no gain accurate cognition - that 
their interpretations of the meanings o the world and ot themselves 
may be wrong - does not entail that cognition is arbitrary, oppressive 
or impossible; rather, the possibility of error entails the possibility of 
accuracy. I f i t is possible to get the meaning wrong, it is also possible 
to come to know that it is wrong and to find ways in which a correct 
meaning might be found. 
Mental models are pretty permanent , and it is visual fiction, such as 
film, that makes them especially visible, because audiovisual media 
are the most sophisticated yet invented by man for simulating and 
manipulating the many different aspects of the ways in which we per-
ceive, feel, think, act, memorize, associate, and socialize.258 
The idea of simulation is important in Grodal's cognitive film theory. 
Film can simulate reality, and in order to do so it employs ' the same 
cognitive and affective mechanisms that we use in our real-life expe-
riences and in our mental representations of them. Higher mental 
life relies on the ability to execute hypothetical, fictitious imagina-
tions.259 Grodal takes the view that the human mind cannot access 
the world directly; it operates, rather, by making evaluations, based 
on knowledge, understanding and emotion, oi the degree of reality 
- or, as Grodal terms it, the 'reality-status' - of a particular configura-
tion of images. We are constantly making judgments as to whether 
an apparent phenomenon is reality fantasy, or dream, fact or fiction, 
credible or unbelievable. 
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Such evaluations are complex acts involving a range of procedures, 
and in visual and other fiction they can be rendered uncertain by a 
variety of techniques. Dream sequences or flashbacks in a film may be 
fairly clearly signaled as such - for instance, by switching into black-
and-white and/or slow motion and/or silence - but they may also be 
presented without obvious signposting and initially cause disorienta-
tion in the viewer. The creation of uncertainty about the 'reality-sta-
tus' of a set of film images contributes to a film's aesthetic effect. 
A film works by activating a range of psychosomatic dimensions in 
which mind and body work together - perception, cognition, memo-
ry, emotion, and what Grodal calls 'enaction', the carrying out of acts 
in response to situations and stimuli. In watching a film, one can-
not enter the screen world to participate in its action, and one does 
not usually carry out, in the off-screen world, the acts suggested by 
one's response to the situations and stimuli that the screen presents 
- though exceptions can occur. Nonetheless, one's mind and body 
may prepare for and/or imagine such acts, as when one tenses one 's 
muscles, for fight or flight, in response to a situation represented on 
the screen that, if it occurred in real life, could demand the enaction 
of such responses. A film also activates two different mental proc-
esses: the associative, in which one phenomenon is linked to another 
by some likeness; and the sequential, in which one phenomenon fol-
lows another. 
Their linear form is not due to abstract logic, but to 'real-world con-
straints on the sequencing of events and the downstream" relations 
between motives, cognitions, and acts.260 If this flow is disrupted, for 
example by the activation of associative mental forms or by repre-
senting a consequence before a cause, different aesthetic effects and 
different emotional tones will be produced. Given that the conscious 
capacity of human beings is limited, any audiovisual experience will 
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comprise a mental hierarchy in which some phenomena - of ten those 
that arouse a strong desire for an enactive response, a desire to do 
something - will be the focus of attention. Other phenomena will 
not disappear, but will form 'a non-conscious associative network 
enriching the experience', or a macro-frame, a set of propositions 
determining the nature of the focus to which one is attending.261 
The experience may involve what Grodal terms proximal, 'subjective' 
experience, and distal, 'objective' experience. In proximal experi-
ence, phenomena 'are experienced as located in the body-mind' and 
may be described in terms such as 'causes pleasure to mouth, skin, 
causes pain to mouth, skin, causes inner feelings, releases cognitive 
and hormonal response'. In distal experience, phenomena 'are ex-
perienced as located in the exterior world' and may be described in 
terms such as 'a given item is sweet, soft, sharp, appealing, green'.262 
Grodal sees subjective experience in film as linked, not to a freer play 
of the mind and feelings, but, paradoxically, to a greater constraint 
on voluntary acts. 'Subjective camera' entails strict limitations on the 
placing of the camera, since the camera has to be positioned where 
the eyes of the protagonist, in any given scene, are supposed to be. 
It can be seen that Grodal offers a formidable and comprehensive 
theory that marshals a range of terms and concepts rather different 
f rom those of psychoanalytic film theory and that, in its emphasis on 
'innate brain circuitry', sets itself against the post-structuralist em-
phasis on the endlessly mobile, always reconstructible subject.263 
CINEMATIC COMPREHENSION 
David Bordwell has described the way in which the viewer uses the 
film as a series of cues to construct the narrative, whereas stylistic in-
formation tends to be thrown away and may be difficult to retrieve.264 
On the other hand, humans have an almost unlimited capacity for 
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storing and recognizing images. Bordwell develops a cognitive theory 
of film comprehension, which he explicitly opposes to a psychoana-
lytic theory of film.265 Psychoanalytic film theorists define the experi-
ence of reality as not being delimited by the horizon of conscious-
ness (or ' common sense'), but argue that it includes myth, ideology, 
and unconscious desires and fantasies. According to psychoanalysts, 
our consciousness is merely the tip or peak of our identity, most of 
which remains hidden and repressed. But for cognitive scientists, 
consciousness is not a mere superstructure, but the base, or basis, 
of identity. Following the cognitive scientists, Bordwell argues that 
film theorists should begin with cognitive explanations of filmic phe-
nomena, and should move on to psychoanalytic explanations only if a 
cognitive account is found wanting.266 
The basic premise of Bordwell's theory is that narration is the central 
process that influences the way a spectator understands narrative film. 
Moreover, he argues that spectators do not simply absorb a finalized, 
pre-existing narrative, but must actively construct its meaning. Bor-
dwell develops his theory within what is called the 'constructivist 
school' of cognitive psychology, which studies how perceivers 'make 
sense' of the world f rom inherently fragmentary and incomplete data 
and experiences. For example, we can only directly see three sides 
of a six-sided solid cube. But from this incomplete experience, we 
complete the cube by 'appending' the other three sides. Bordwell and 
other cognitive film theorists argue that film is like a six-sided cube in 
which spectators see at most only three sides on screen. The specta-
tor has to complete the film by appending the other three sides, so 
to speak. 
Bordwell outlines a cognitive theory of film that tries to explain how 
spectators complete a film's narrative, rendering it coherent. Specta-
tors are not free rational agents who can simply 'fill in the gaps' in a 
139 
COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS A N D CINEMATIC MODELLING 
film in any way they wish. Instead, intersubjective norms, principles, 
and conventions guide them. When watching a narrative film, spec-
tators do not simply 'absorb' the data, because it is not complete in 
itself. Instead, they have to process this inherently incomplete data. 
And they process it using what cognitive psychologists call schemata 
- norms and principles in the mind that organize the incomplete 
data into coherent mental representations. Schemata are activated by 
'cues' in the data. Bordwell notes that gaps in the data are the most 
evident cues, for they are simply the missing data that spectators need 
to fill in. For example, a cube 'suggests' its three hidden sides (the 
missing data) by a variety of cues, the way the three visible sides are 
projected in space, the way the viable sides form edges, and so on. 
More accurately, the cube cues us to fill in the three hidden sides. 
This process of filling-in is called hypothesis or inference generation. 
Narrative films cue spectators to generate inferences or hypotheses 
- but not just any inferences. When comprehending a narrative film, 
one schema in particular guides our hypotheses - the one that rep-
resents the canonical story format.267 Moreover, comprehension ol 
a narrative is made easier if it is organized around a goal-oriented 
protagonist - a character who drives the narrative towards his or her 
predefined goal. Spectators do not, therefore, enter the cinema with 
a blank mind and passively absorb the film's narrative. Just as each 
language-learner internalises the rules of his/her native language, so 
each film spectator internalises a schema, a template or set of norms 
and principles with which to comprehend narrative films. Spectators 
internalise a schema called the canonical story format. 
Bordwell also identifies several types of gap (the most recognizable 
cue in the text). When analysing gaps, we need to ask: Are they tem-
porary or permanent? Most are temporary - that is, resolved by the 
end of the film. Second, are they flaunted or suppressed? A gap is 
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flaunted when the spectator is made aware that there is some infor-
mation they need to know about the fabula, whereas a suppressed 
gap does not call attention to itself. Finally, are the gaps diffused or 
focused? 
A diffused gap is open ended, leading the spectator to generate a 
series of non-exclusive hypotheses, whereas a focused gap is clearly 
defined and leads the spectator to generate an exclusive hypothesis. 
A diffuse gap introduced at the beginning of a film can be gradually 
brought into focus as the film progresses. The expositional moments 
in a film introduce pertinent background information about the set-
tings, characters, and states of affairs. Exposition can be concentrated 
into a few scenes or, more rarely, diffused throughout the whole film. 
If concentrated, it may be preliminary (appearing at the beginning of 
the film) or delayed until the end (as in detective films). The syuzhet 
can also set up false leads, complications in the action, and subplots 
to delay fabula information. Or it may convey some information on 
several occasions (redundancy), to reinforce the importance of that 
information and ensure its effective communication. 
Edward Branigan's cognitive model of narration presupposes both a 
sender and receiver of a film - in fact several senders and receivers. 
Branigan draws upon concepts from cognitive science, narratology, 
and linguistics to develop his theory of film narrative and narration -
more specifically, a theory of a story world's space, time, causality, of 
point of view, levels of narration, the relation between subjective and 
objective narration, and the relation between fiction and narrative. 
Like Bordwell, Branigan employs the concept of schema to explain 
the role of narrative in organizing the spectator 's experience ot a 
film. Moreover, Branigan does not represent the narrative schema as 
a linear list, as Bordwell does when writing about the canonical story 
format. Instead, Branigan develops a more open and dynamic model , 
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one organized as a hexagon with the main narrative actions (exposi-
tion, complicating action, and so on) represented at the points of the 
hexagon, and linked together by connecting lines.268 
This model captures the complexity of narrative more than a linear 
model because it describes the recursive nature ot narrative: 'Narra-
tive is a recursive organization of data; that is, its components may 
be embedded successively at various micro- and macro-levels of ac-
tion'.269 The narration conveys these narrative events to spectators, 
and the uniqueness of Branigan's theory and methodology lies in the 
complex model of narration. 
According to David Bordwell: "Meaning-making is a psychological 
and social activity fundamentally akin to other cognitive processes. 
The perceiver is not a passive receiver of data but an active mobilizer 
of structures and processes (either 'hard-wired' or learned) which 
enable her to search for information relevant to task and data at hand. 
In watching a film, the perceiver identities certain cues which prompt 
her to execute many inferential activities - ranging from the manda-
tory and very fast activity of perceiving apparent motion, through 
the more 'cognitively penetrable' process ot constructing, say, links 
between scenes, to the still more open process of ascribing abstract 
meanings to the film."27U 
Every cinematic text should be as it is, tull of clues, which allow us 
to deconstruct the assumptions, gaps, disconnections and points of 
breakdown. But the notions against it are clearly shown in cinematic 
texts that are based on streams of consciousness, dreams or free asso-
ciations. The riddles and gaps connected with them, offer us a chance 
with so many explanations that the confidence is lost. Of course, we 
can think that every gap in a cinematic text can be explained by some 
code. But if every cinematic text is characterized by an interaction of 
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many kinds of structures (which break down each other), then it is 
not possible to generate fully and clearly which structure is responsi-
ble for a certain gap in a cinematic text. 
Rudolf Arnheim thinks that a human mind can be forced to produce 
replicas of things, but it is not naturally geared to it, since perception 
is concerned with the grasping of significant form. The mind finds 
it hard to produce images devoid of that formal virtue.271 And as 
symbols, fairly realistic images have the advantage of giving flesh and 
blood to the structural skeletons of ideas. "They convey a sense of 
lifelike presence, which is often desirable. But they may be inefficient 
otherwise because the objects they represent are, after all, only part-
time symbols."272 
In the 1990s, film theory shared in the retreat f rom grand theory to 
be found across the humanities and human sciences. The most widely 
publicized idea of the decade was postmodernism, and this claimed 
that the era of grand narrative, and theories was over. Christianity, 
Hegelian philosophy, Marxism and structuralism were all consigned 
to the dustbin of a history that had effectively come to an end, things 
would still go on happening, but no large-scale systematic change 
would ever again occur. What were left were local, partial, provisional 
narratives and theories, aware of their own fragility, and thus able to 
provide specific insights without ever proving oppressive. This chimed 
in with the advocacy of 'piecemeal theorising' by thinkers who would 
not have allied themselves with postmodernism, such as the cognitive 
film theorist Noel Carroll.273 There are plausible theories about story 
structures, in the form of hierarchical analyses which account for 
much of readers' memories of the story's contents. These analyses 
describe the structures of the narrative film, and not the spectator 's 
mental representation during the viewing of the film. 
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VISUAL LANDSCAPES 
Visual perception, and cognitive understanding of visual processes 
are extremely important in analysing the films of Béla Tarr. In a Tarr 
film reality and imagination mix and reflect each other. This all has a 
specific quality, which creates stimulating differences. Tarr extends 
many de-dramatising tactics. His special interest is in the landscape 
and stretches of dead time. Tarr's camera examines the scenes with 
its own curiosity, enumerating the contents of the shot before it with 
only small movements, and after that, panning in the appropriate 
direction. Béla Tarr is a modernist in creating a recognisable, self-
conscious style, which he carries throughout his works. In his films 
the long takes and camera movements create dialectic among differ-
ent elements in the shot.274 
Tarr blends European cinematic traditions with a new kind of cin-
ematic awareness. Tarr has openly expressed his admiration for Jean-
Luc Godard and Abbas Kiarostami, but in terms of style their work 
is at some distance from his. His use of the sequence-shot (a single 
shot that takes in a significant amount of action and information) to 
orchestrate complex movement and edit it within the frame without 
cutting links him, of course, to Miklós Jancsó, as well as to early 
Sergei Paradjanov, and to Tarkovsky, Angelopoulos and Sokhurov: all 
figures who have been in major roles in the cinema of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Tarr's vision, though, is distinctively his own. His 
films have presentness, a being-there that marks them off f rom the 
historical preoccupations of Jancsó, and fixity of place and time that 
separates them from the perpetual Odysseys of Angelopoulos. Nor, 
as a non-believer, does Tarr share in Tarkovsky's sacred vision of the 
four elements of the material world, transmuted from Russian Or-
thodoxy. The sheer weight of his images seems to make them im-
mune to the temptations of a lustrous transcendence. 
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Tarr's film Werckmeister Harmonies (Werckmeister harmoniak, 2000) is 
a mesmerising and cognitively interesting mediation on popular dem-
agogy and mental human manipulation. Tarr is a highly acquired and 
original filmmaker, and has yet to acquire the broad critical following 
of fellow Hungarian Miklós Jancsó and Greece's Theo Angelopoulos 
who are often referred as his closest filmmaking relatives.275 Werck-
meister Harmonies may start to change things and p rompt rediscovery 
of his earlier works, including especially Damnation (Kárhozat, 1987). 
Tarr is one of the few genuinely visionary filmmakers in our time. 
Adapted from Laszlo Krasznahorkai's novel The Melancholy of Resist-
ance (1989), Werckmeister Harmonies also reunites the technical team 
behind Satantango (Sátántangó, 1994), photographer Gábor Medvigy 
and composer Mihály Vig for an opus that's recognizably a Tarr film 
but in comparison with Satantango also different. Events move for-
ward at a relatively rapid pace related to Tarr's earlier films, to a final 
half-hour that brings in a greater emotional dramatic. The setting 
of the film is usual to Tarr: a small and bleak Hungarian village, in a 
freezing winter temperature. 
Werckmeister Harmonies is a classic demonstration of his symphonic ap-
proach to filmmaking. Tarr's images and sounds work subliminally on 
the spectator's emotions over large expanses of t ime even when the 
spectator is dimly aware of what 's going on. Through Gábor Medvi-
gy's hypnotic camerawork the perceiver is not a passive subject but an 
active one, contributing substantially to the final effect of the work. 
There are many processes involved with this, physiological, precon-
scious, conscious, and unconscious. Some perceptions are automatic 
responses beyond control; for example, film's medium depends upon 
these automatic abilities of senses and human brain. A lot of the ob-
ject recognition is preconscious, and these kind of mental processes 
differ f rom physiological activities because they are available to the 
conscious mind. Much of reaction to film's stylistic devices might be 
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preconscious because one learns different cinematic techniques, for 
example, f rom classical films. 
Photography depends on freezing the movement of that moment , so 
photography falsifies the world by freezing it, and by falsifying it; it 
gives the world expressive strength. Film works exactly the opposite 
way: it starts with a movement, and it unfreezes the world; even when 
the world is static, one can, by moving the camera, give movement 
to the static world. Film is not a photographic art so much as it is a 
performance art because still-photo thinking is a reverse of moving 
image thinking. So one essential filmic operation can be considered 
sequential linking of spatial images. The motion picture in itself is 
an event because it looks different every moment , whereas there is 
no such temporal progress in painting or in sculpture. Motion being 
one of its outstanding properties, the film is required by aesthetic 
law to use and interpret motion. Consequently, for a spectator many 
kinds of shifts in viewpoints (through varied camerawork) may be 
completely invisible, because he or she looks through the images, 
not at them, and therefore has little or no idea where one shot ends 
and another one begins. Performances are disciplined, and essentially 
marionettes in Tarr's hands. 
Though never explained in the film, the title ot the film refers to the 
17th-century German organist-composer Andreas Werckmeister, es-
teemed for his influential tones on harmony and musical construc-
tion. It is a fitting parallel for a filmmaker whose films work on 
the emotions in as unfathomable a way as the compositions of great 
symphonies. In an age when an average film contains approximately 
1000 shots per 100 minutes, Tarr's two-and-a-half-hour Werckmeister 
Harmonies has an improbable 39 shots in 145 minutes. Viewing its 
intense contemplation of an atavistic world of strange catastrophe 
and grim survival is both an unnerving and fascinating experience.276 
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The material of expression most characteristic of the cinema is the 
multiple, mechanically moving image and its placement in sequences. 
One of the specific codes of cinema is camera movement. This code 
involves the totality of the film field of vision as it relates to the stasis 
of mobility that can occur within the cinematic shot. Obviously, at 
any moment the camera either may rest static or may follow some 
path of movement (vertical, horizontal, circular), or some combi-
nation of those paths. Every shot is constantly making its choices 
explicit by having eliminated all the figures of potential movement 
or stasis that are not present. This code is specific to film because it 
requires the utilization of materials of cinematic technology. Unusu-
ally clear examples of the utilization of camera movement as codes 
specific to the cinema occur in the films of Hungarian director Mik-
lós Jancsó.277 
Stylistically speaking one can see Tarr's style, for example, in Satan-
tango (1994), as a continuation of the Miklós Jancsó -style in some 
earlier Jancsó-films (especially Agnus Dei & Red Psalm, 1969-71). 
These films flamboyantly flaunted the mastery of camera movement. 
Jancsó's near-schematic technique relied heavily on camera set-ups 
and long, wandering, and elaborates compositional scenes that com-
pellingly use the integration ot figures with the landscape. From the 
Soviet montage tradition came the idea of a group protagonist, which 
Jancsó turned into dedramatising ends. 
Jancsó's dramaturgy emphasised large-scale forces and momentar -
ily fluctuations. The scenes were played out in very long takes with 
constantly moving figures and ceaselessly panning and tracking cam-
eras. In Még kér a nép (Red Psalm, 1971) the groups have become 
pure emblems of social forces, playing out symbolic rituals in ab-
stract space. Any attempt to make sense of Tarr's films in strict nar-
rative terms is as doomed as an analysis of Jancso's abstract political 
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parables. Tarr's films lack the choreographic grace and visual allure of 
his fellow countryman's classic works of the 1960's and 1970's, and 
their black and white —photography bring in elements more related 
to Expressionism in art. Uniting both directors is a distrust of power 
structures and a resolutely Hungarian interest in mass resistance. 
The movement of Tarr's camera is always suspenseful. At the open-
ing of Damnation we see in long shot huge moving buckets suspended 
on wires like cable cars, hear them shunting in the distance back and 
forth f rom some unseen quarry. The camera slowly retreats until 
we're behind an apartment window that becomes a frame within a 
frame. What had seemed an exterior shot quickly becomes an inte-
rior one; what had seemed omniscience is in fact the point of view of 
a man staring out of the window at the cables. Tarr's camera moves 
back behind the man's head without showing his face until the head 
itself blocks the image of the moving buckets. 
Without a cut we are then made to realise that what we've been look-
ing at is what he sees, but now his very presence obliterates the image 
that was once ours and is now his, as it had been all along. As if to 
prove he can move in the other direction, Tarr later films an interior 
two-way conversation in long shot framed by billowing curtains. The 
camera tracks sideways along the curtains until the speakers are out 
of frame and then pulls back through the open window before lower-
ing itself to ground level where we read a 'Police' sign on the front of 
the building. Only as we're leaving do we find out where we've been. 
But this is not merely a demonstration of auteur virtuosity: reversal 
is a crucial element in the repetitive circular structure on which the 
film is based. 
In all, this tactic allows Tarr to keep the shot alive, to quicken our 
visual interest while also linking or developing his characteristic com-
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positions. Moreover, since we cannot see what is off-screen, camera 
movement offers a chance to arouse and foil expectations. Springing 
such surprises is a fairly traditional use of camera movement. More 
distinctive is the way in which Tarr's camera movements participate 
in a larger dynamic of opening and filling space at a tempo which al-
lows us to form anticipations about how the blocking will develop. 
Thanks to the long take and silent intervals, Tarr prolongs the very 
process of staging, leaving us plenty of time to recognise that we are 
forming expectations about where the character or camera will go 
next. 
Tarr's extremely slow camera movements of ten move away from 
or past the characters creating up a mood and sensation related to 
formal suspense. This makes it possible for Tarr the use of differ-
ent perspectives during the same shot. For example, in Satantango he 
changes perspectives from people to the landscape, and so on. The 
spectator of a Béla Tarr -film is, in a way, forced to see these changes, 
share the immobility of happenings, waiting and the expectations of 
the characters, while the shot proceeds. David Thomas Lynch thinks 
that this the way that, for example, Satantango combines distance with 
empathy, aided by a complicated chronological rearrangement ot the 
story and careful attention to the particularities of the characters.278 
The movement of the narrative point of view dislocates the position 
of the spectator's eye in turn. The spectator no sooner finds a foot-
ing in the events of the fiction than the editing breaks the te rms of 
scopic identification and opens up yet another space-time and yet 
another locus in which the spectator must insert herself. The indica-
tion of narrating and spectating subjectivities never quite achieves a 
coherent unity in the present and presence of the film image, but 
follows a movement without origin, present, or presence, a move-
ment that perpetually postpones the closure of eye to an unlocatable 
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future-past. For Tarkovsky, rhythm in the images is not the metrical 
sequence of pieces, but the time-thrust within the frames. Montage 
brings together time, imprinted in the segments of film. 
Pointing to Leonardo Da Vinci's portrait of a woman (shown in The 
Mirror), Tarkovsky claims that the famous painting is powerful pre-
cisely because in it one cannot find anything that one might particu-
larly prefer, one cannot single out any detail f rom the whole... and so 
there opens up before us the possibility of interaction with infinity.279 
He adheres to the same principle while showing a human face on the 
screen: rejecting facial expression as a way of conveying ideas, Tarko-
vsky attempts to reach into our innermost feelings, to remind us of 
some obscure memories and experiences of our own, overw helming 
us, stirring our souls like a revelation that is impossible to interpret in 
any particular way.280 According to Vlada Petric this attitude relates to 
the concept of la photogénie defined by Louis Delluc and Jean Epstein 
in the 1920s as the most unique feature of the film medium.281 
As Delluc puts it: 
"All shots and shadows move, are decomposed, or are reconstructed 
according to the necessities of a powerful orchestration. It is the most 
perfect example of the equilibrium of photographic elements."282 
William C. Wees thinks that the concept of photogénie did not get to 
the heart of the matter, because it directed attention to the image, 
but not to the properties or elements of the image itself.283 So it is a 
question of orchestrating all the elements of the film: narrative, ac-
tors, words, pictures music, and each aesthetic element intimately 
influence the meaning of every other. 
Tarr's camera movements are related to the general scene, subordi-
nating to it any calligraphic side effect. As compared with cuts, the 
slowly moving camera's gradual angle changes allow a more solid, 
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sustained sense of scene. Long takes stay with a stretch of world. 
Tarr's reflective moments flatten those sharp peaked rhythms of ac-
tion, decision, or suspense that might disrupt or supersede our sense 
of time. Working together these features of form elongate our sense 
of duration. The takes seem even longer than they are, approach-
ing a vision of sequence shots. In one respect Tarr's cutting nudges 
closer to montage editing than Hollywood norms. In Tarr's oeuvre 
the hard-edged landscapes are important, and people being distant 
make small pictorial movements; encourage cuts on strong, almost 
static universe. 
Tarr's physical landscape is marked by the long shots, where the 
different elements function as parts of the natural setting, but they 
too are part of a sub-textual language that calls up both private and 
universal associations from one film to the next. Tarr orchestrates 
the various elements in his own way: the action consists of what the 
characters and the camera do in relation to one another, so, there 
is the possibility of moveable and shifting relationships between the 
elements. Tarr's approach deals with the character's hidden agendas 
and duplicitous motives, adding to the overall paranoid and conspira-
torial atmosphere. Tarr's strategy creates various kinds of movements 
within stasis, and freedom within confinement.284 
Tarr's commitment to long takes, distant views and temps morts places 
an enormous weight upon the unfolding shot. Camera movement is 
the most obvious accessory here. In Tarr's films the camera move-
ments seem locally motivated. This tactic allows Tarr to keep his 
shots alive, and shift our visual interest. This is the way that Tarr 's 
camera movements participate in a larger cinematic dynamic, filling 
the spaces in a slow tempo; they offer a chance to arouse and foil ex-
pectations. The strategy with the long take is to take it to a m o m e n t 
of heightened expressivity. Its source is in a modernist aesthetic, the 
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absence of drama can command our attention and emotional invest-
ment along different lines. The strategy of building a long take to a 
moment of heightened expressivity, in the absence of drama, which can 
command our attention and emotional investment along mainstream 
lines, has its source mainly in modernist aesthetics. 
The movement of the body itself further complicates temporality 
in landscape experience, a phenomenon we call kinesthesis. When 
moving across landscape space there is not only a dynamic llow of per-
ceptions derived from external sources, but there is also the muscular 
and nervous movement of the body itself through space and time.285 
This is something that is related to cinematic thinking. There is a 
complicated interrelationship between, for example, the perception 
of the movement of surroundings and the movement of the body, 
which is displayed in what is known as 'parallactic movement ' . Tarr 
strengthens his universes by a feeling for a man-in-environment -
theme. This is possible by an unhurried choreography of camera and 
characters, and by heavy emphases on people's silent or cryptic think-
ing. It seems that Tarr rejects montage (or uses montage-within-shot) 
as too manipulative a technique for capturing the reality or essence of 
a given moment in a given place. 
Walter Benjamin has recognized that the meaning derived from land-
scape and architectural space is received 'by a collectivity in a state 
of distraction', slowly appreciating its symbolic environment through 
'habitual appropriation' , or through everyday use and activity.280 Béla 
Tarr creates new relationships between the camera and the scene. It 
is a question of montage within the camera and montage within the 
shot, which seems to become a more 'normal ' way of expressing than 
the usual montage thinking. 
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Tarr's thematic and stylistic concerns have their expressive motifs in 
showing the subjective logic, a kind of movement of thoughts. The 
subtlety of the lighting effects is not simply a source of legitimate 
aesthetic pleasure in its own right, but part of the thematic and psy-
chological structure ol the film. The stylistics of Béla Tarr is a world 
apart not only from Hollywood but also from the fractured forms and 
shock techniques of western modernism. Tarr has developed a new 
cinematic art f rom the long take, multi-planar composition and the 
complex orchestration of characters, sounds and objects in and out 
ot the frame. It is a meeting place for themes and styles, a kind cine-
ma of adversity: a fascination with the interface of nature and culture 
that co-exists with a sense of the terror lurking in the material world. 
This has been called "magical realism", but it is not supernatural by 
nature. Instead this kind of cinema exists in the face of adversity, 
both human and natural. In Tarr the very presence of different ele-
ments percolates the texture of the image, with its intimations of 
infernal wind, rain and cold and the flood of biblical proportions that 
threatens at the end of Damnation. 
Tarr's films are fine examples of artistic originality, because Tarr can 
create direct perceptual and imaginative engagement with the films 
themselves, and can give rise to a distinctive aesthetic mode sur-
rounding the films. Tarr is a European filmmaker who can mould 
sensuous or imaginatively intended material into original symbolic 
form. Tarr brings the rational, sensible and historical aspects of ex-
perience into an internal relation. All the different elements of his 
films are, in a way, inseparable, coherent, and mentally and physi-
cally embodied. Tarr's cinematic syntax makes possible increasingly 
complex combination of shots, which can generate an even greater 
variety of messages and meanings. Such combinations touch on the 
mystique of cinema: a peculiar and original cinematic reality Tarr 's 
film phrases, constructed through fragmentation, also tamper with 
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reality by showing the total geography of a setting and spatial rela-
tionships between the shots. Tarr shows that the intensity of viewer 
involvement depends on the energies, which radiate f rom the screen 
according to the filmmaker's arrangement of dramatic sequences. 
VISUAL MONTAGE, AND OTHER IDEAS 
In visual perception the transitions of elements inside narrative may 
even be more abrupt than habits of language might suggest. Phrases 
like "cutting between shots" risk suggesting that spectators experi-
ence first shot, then a cut, and then another shot in that order, as if 
experienced form reduplicated the material order of the strip of film. 
But the cut was never on display. The spectator never sees a cut tel 
quel, and moreover, the cut on the strip of film, is identical with .the 
frame-line between any two frames of the continuing shot. The new 
shot is offered at the same speed as the next frame in the old shot. 
The spectator sees the suddenly new form, f rom which he deduces, 
that the viewpoint or scene has changed. The second shot intervenes 
directly into the first. The spectator does not experience a cut, but 
the second shot, and the differences between the shots. What he 
or she sees is the new graphic form of scenic information. Any new 
viewpoint is a deduced difference, a difference of signified content, 
and not of signifying form. 
The invisibility of the cut, and the deduced nature of the change of 
viewpoint explain how cuts, although so "total", can yet be subliminal. 
Given successive shots of, say, a car speeding by a castle, the spectator 
sees, primarily "car-and-castle". Acting as a unity, this scene "over-
rides" the fact of different shots. The different views are a secondary 
difference, and correspond to seeing the same scene "afresh", look-
ing at things from another angle, or in a different light, or slightly 
adjusting one's mental set. Normally, each shot would show some-
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thing slightly different. One shot might emphasize the driver's expe-
rience, another the car's relationship to the casde, and so on. But 
neither of these emphasizes "ruptures" or contradicts the other. On 
the contrary: each complements the other. It develops the same gen-
eral situation in an on-going way. The shot is felt, not to interrupt its 
predecessor but to continue it, by proceeding to another point. The 
cut is a continuation and so easily a connection, the condition of an j ' 
association in which the relationship overrides the discontinuity. In 
cinematic narration strongly felt continuities are derivable, not only 
from spatial deletions, but f rom swiftness in describing a situation 
and its development, or the trajectories of a story, or transitions f rom 
one topic to another. Very often therefore abruptness is also smooth-
ness. 
If a connection is not immediately apparent, then of ten the spectator 
will nonetheless be patient, at least if the discourse so far seems to 
be coherent. For he understands that, in discourse as in discover-
ing the world, information comes to us "in bits and bytes", that is 
successively, and not simultaneously. Cinematic narration is indeed 
linear in the sense that exposition is as " t ime-bound" as narration 
or description is.287 Cinematic narration is not linear in the absolute, 
atomistic, sense, which would suggest that all of the information is 
broken down into separate "bits" which can only follow one another, 
as on a digital computer. Indeed, the shot, like any other picture, is a 
largely a simultaneous display, even when movement, change, picto-
rial composition and priority of interest render the reading of the 
shot sequential or successive. Similarly, words are both successive and 
simultaneous. "The cat sat on the mat" is a linear sequence, but "cat" 
is already an assemblage of data in no particular order. For example, 
it specifies, feline, furry, four paws, mammal, purring, scratching, 
and so on through all ones general knowledge of the cat in its various 
usual contexts and connections. 
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All exposition involves transitions and deletions, and the cut f rom 
one shot or scene to another is as swiftly sublime as any other ar-
rangement in discourse. Hence the insistence that a shot is less an 
illusion of real space than an idea of a visual-physical space. Just, as 
a discourse is a flow of ideas, so continuity in narration is a flow of 
visual ideas, abstracted space-time chunks and their contents, and 
the association of those contents. Whence the useful paradox that 
the abrupt being fast, can also be smooth. Everything depends upon 
how easy the association to the next idea is in context of the ideas so 
far. Similarly with film images, which may seem all the smoother for 
taking some disjunction in their stride, matching the disparate, and 
linking the alien. This is not to say that the mere fact of juxtaposition 
renders smooth. In cinematic narration as in verbal language, the 
thread of continuity may be initially abrupt, or mystifying. A great 
fascination lies in the difficulty of specifying where continuities end 
and in-coherences begin. 
This emphasis on the connectionist role of coherent meaning risks 
implying that only the spectator 's trust in some ulterior coherent 
meaning linking the shots, saves him from experiencing fast cuts as 
disorientating, violent, even painful "bombardment of images", al-
though avant-garde films might offer very scantily connected images 
at machine-gun speed. This very speed distances the spectator f rom 
each image. At this rate it might seem that it is almost impossible 
to jolt the spectator, and that, far from cutting being condemned to 
be violent, it is condemned to be smooth but this would dispose of 
everybody's theories of f rom Eisenstein's theories of dynamic col-
lision to the Hollywood's concern to maintain smoothness. Conti-
nuity annoyances are rarely a matter o f ' "pure form", nor even of 
interactions between it and human physiology. They are invariably 
semantic, involving the frustration of expectations and information 
processing. 
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STRUCTURING THE MOSAIC 
Visual perception is related to cognitive, psychologically based proc-
esses. Stored knowledge and different assumptions affect visual per-
ception. And perception consists of forming visual concepts, and 
mental representations, and making an image is like producing repre-
sentational concepts on the basis of visual concepts. These concepts 
and representations are structures consisting of essential and special 
features, which can be found significantly modelling the following 
example. 
"The significance of Sunless lies precisely in its openness, both in the 
formal sense that the film's subject-matter becomes indistinguishable 
from its style, and in the dialogical sense that those who see the film 
may gain a new kind of access both to those issues it raises and those 
it elides."288 
In Chris Marker's film Sunless (Sans soleil, 1982) the structure is 
mosaic.289 It is not only a question of images and what might link 
them, but also a question of spaces between the images, relations 
between images in space and time.290 The whole of a mosaic is almost 
invariably embedded in a larger architectural and geographical whole. 
Free-floating images and sounds connect different cultural manifes-
tations, rituals and practices conjuring various time levels. In one 
respect, the history, which Marker observes, is a collective history of 
events, sites and places, but pervading this is a history made up of 
personal memories. Sunless embraces Marker's concerns for the rid-
dled interface between real and imaginary, ideology and representa-
tion, history and memory. It is a hybrid, a composition of nouveau 
roman and ethnographic document.291 
Every documentary has its own specific way of narrating things, a 
voice of its own. Inside documentary Bill Nichols has spoken of po-
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etic mode, which shares a common terrain with the modernist avant-
garde.292 The poetic mode sacrifices the conventions of continuity 
editing and the sense of a very specific location in time and place that 
follows from it to explore associations and patterns that involve tem-
poral rhythms and spatial juxtapositions. Social actors seldom take 
on the full-blooded form of characters with psychological complexity 
and a fixed view of the world. More typically, people function on a 
par with other objects as raw material that filmmakers select and ar-
range into associations and patterns of their choosing.295 The poetic 
mode is particularly adept at opening up the possibility of alternative 
forms of knowledge to the straightforward transfer of information, 
the prosecution of a particular argument or point of view, or the 
presentation of reasoned propositions about problems in need of so-
lution. The poetic mode stresses mood, tone, and affect much more 
than displays of knowledge or acts of persuasion.294 The poetic mode 
began together with modernism as a way of representing reality in 
terms of a series of fragments, subjective impressions, incoherent 
acts, and loose associations. Breaking up time and space into multiple 
perspectives, denying coherence of personalities, and refusing to pro-
vide solutions to insurmountable problems had the sense of honesty 
about it even as it created puzzling or ambiguous works of art.29 ' 
For Marker it is impossible to reconcile the realist status of the im-
ages with their fluctuating status in time. Words and images are car-
ried with meaning, and the narration goes forwards and backwards, 
in a style that reproduces associative thought processes. The film's 
method seems to be the search for the various connections between 
totally different times and places, and at the same time to allow jux-
tapositions of images to resonate suggestively without having a clear 
and prefixed meaning. Marker 's juxtapositions seek to suggest con-
nections, and to put forward different questions. 
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In Sunless an unknown woman reads and comments on letters she has 
received from a friend - a freelance cameraman who travels around 
the world and is particularly attached to those two 'extreme poles 
of survival', Japan and Africa. The cameraman questions himself on 
the meaning of this representation of the world of which he is per-
petually the instrument, and the role of these memories, which he 
helps to form. One of his Japanese colleagues responds in his own 
way by attacking the images stored in memory, taking them apart on 
the synthesizer. A cinema producer takes advantage of this situation 
and makes a film out of it, but rather than casting these people as 
themselves and showing their relationships, both real and supposed, 
prefers to serve up parts of the material in the form of a musical 
composition. From these memories, placed side by side, is born a 
fictive memory... (Chris Marker) 
This is how Chris Marker has described the basic plot of Sunless, a 
deceptively simple description of the film's extraordinary journey 
through time, place and memory. Ostensibly an essay and a trave-
logue in which an unnamed cameraman returns to Japan, the film 
is an at tempt to come to terms with the continuities and changes that 
have occurred within this countrv in the af termath of the Second 
World War. As we follow the cameraman's travels across the country, 
we become aware that, for the cameraman, the places we visit are 
permeated by historical and personal memory.296 
Throughout his narrative Marker points out that Sunless as a film is 
a constructed, construed, and evaluated experience, in broadly the 
same way as any other kind of document. Normative spectators 
might assume this all to be discourse, based upon and referr ing to 
something. What is of ten called realism can't be the reality to which 
it refers. It deals in aspects of semi-abstractions f rom that reality. Far 
f rom one mode of realism fitting all aspects, realism has innumerable 
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modes, each adapted to some special set of elements. The film's con-
cerns and the cameraman's voyages extend far beyond the borders of 
Japan, as Marker seeks to understand how the situation of modern 
Japan relates to broad global changes in the contemporary world. '9 ' 
Hence, it is as a compass point within a field of global relations that 
Marker explores Japanese culture. Exploiting film's ability to blend 
different times and places together into a single strand ot time, he 
interweaves film footage from Japan alongside that of Africa, Iceland, 
France and the United States into an examination of the different 
forms of economic, ecological and cultural organization that coexist 
within the modern world. The film constitutes a critical examination 
of features of the contemporary cultural and political landscape. 
Through the use of his moving camera, Marker shows that move-
ment 's vectors and trajectories commonly override the static features 
of a composition. By this way, Marker creates new, and more cho-
reographic impression of the scenes depicted in Sunless. Movement 
quickly attracts the spectator, and Marker demonstrates that myriad 
movements within a crowd on the streets of Tokyo will be affecting 
through their intricacy, and heterogeneity of configurations and com-
binations. Editing means estimating the broad trajectories of inter-
est within a shot, and across cuts. Marker can magnetise attention, 
and subordinate graphic features to the pictorial ones, so that dif-
ferent compositions are to some extent re-organised around central 
themes. Sunless is also a film about cinema as a conduit for memory 
and history, and it critically explores the relationship between differ-
ent forms of representation. 
Marker is constantly reflecting upon the complexities of the question 
of representation and preservation of history in its various manifes-
tations. He is fascinated by the way in which technological media 
such as audiotape, videotape, photography and film have the ability to 
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trap and trigger impressions and memories, yet, in recording moments 
f rom the past, detach those events from their context or source of 
origination. This theme acquires added dimensions in respect of the 
impact of new technologies ot image making. At one point, the com-
mentary states: 
"I wonder how people remember things, who don ' t film, don ' t pho-
tograph, don ' t tape. How has mankind managed to remember? I 
know, it wrote the Bible. The new Bible will be an eternal magnetic 
tape of a time that will have to reread itself constantly just to know 
it existed." 
Sunless comprises a series of simultaneous verbal and visual reflec-
tions. It is a new form of history for a visual age: a history which 
does not consist of assembling data into some kind of logical argu-
ment, but in ruminating over the possibilities of memory and history, 
personal experience and public events, and the relationships among 
them."'8 Through the form of Sunless, Marker induces a critical dia-
logue between the film and its viewers, forcing the viewer to become 
active in interpreting the significance of what is being shown, and 
to ponder on the film's juxtapositions, rather than passively relying' 
upon the commentary to communicate their significance. And it is 
the fragment that forms the kernel of this endeavour. This concern 
with instigating a reflective consciousness, rather than simply con-
veying a message, is also vividly apparent in the general fo rm ot the 
observations of the commentary. The fragments of the cameraman's 
letters are mostly anecdotal and epigrammatical - indeed, even apho-
ristic on occasion stimulating reflection, rather than closing down 
299 meaning. 
This issue of the fragility of memory saturates the images and com-
mentary throughout the film. The landscape of Sunless is an image 
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world where cultural memory is scarred by an overriding sense oi 
the impermanence of things. The pathway taken in Sunless is not 
straightforward, but a journey through the labyrinth of time, place 
and memory. The history, which Marker relays is a collective history 
of events, sites and places, but pervading this, is a history made up 
of personal memories. In the course of the film, the camera-man 
reflects on his recollections of the political struggles of the past and 
on the different aims and strategies of representation that have in-
formed his filmmaking, frequently invoking and re-examining, the 
sounds, themes and images of his previous films and those films, such 
as Hitchcock's Vertigo (1958), that have left their mark on his work. 
Sunless is constructed f rom letters, impressions, quotations, images 
and film footage from around the globe, Sunless mixes together di-
verse materials: Marker's own footage, both old and new, but also 
clips from other films, interweaving these fragments into a complex 
and fragile whole. 
Sunless uses a narrative form that is based on sending letters f rom all 
over the world. This is a convention Marker had utilized in his films 
of the 1950s.300 Yet, the relatively straightforward use of this form in 
his previous works is, in Sunless, overlaid with more complex dimen-
sions. Whilst in Lettre de Sibérie (Letter f rom Siberia, 1957) Marker 
had constructed the commentary in the first person, opening the film 
with the words "I write to you", Sunless opens in the third person, 
with a female enunciator stating "He wrote me". The film consists of 
a spoken monologue by this unnamed enunciator, who reads and oc-
casionally comments upon fragments of letters sent to her by a simi-
larly unnamed correspondent whom we know from the beginning 
to be a freelance cameraman, but who remains unnamed until the 
end. The letters of the cameraman range from specific impressions 
and reflections upon images, places and events he encounters on his 
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travels, to observations about his planned or aborted film projects, or 
his recollections of the past and speculations about the future. 
An essential feature ot the originality and challenging nature of Sun-
less is the form in which it unfolds its themes. Themes do not emerge 
sequentially but cyclically, discreetly arising out of subtle correspond-
ences and repetitions that the edits establish in the course of the film. 
Marker consciously and consistently undermines any clear hierarchi-
cal structure of the film's elements, replacing this with a more demo-
cratic form of "shifting dominants", in which each moment of the 
film acquires a relative equality. This pertains even to the presentation 
of key imagery within the film. Although, as the film progresses, cer-
tain recurring images become of particular importance in the elabo-
ration of the film's themes - for example, the imagery of destruction 
and death (images of fire, natural disasters and the disasters of war), 
and most especially the imagery of the sea (a metaphor which carries 
many connotations in the film: memory, tlux, death and infinitude) 
- there is no attempt immediately to impose the larger significance ot 
this imagery within the film upon the viewer's consciousness. 
The film's continuity consits of fragments of images, binding together 
footage from his travels across the globe and footage f rom different 
moments in time in a way that stresses the mutability of their sig-
nificance. The images are stitched together into a series of sequences 
of varying length and tempo that establish intricate rhythms, visual 
harmonies and counterpoints within the film, and create gradual 
and sometimes abrupt changes in mood, subject-matter and loca-
tion. Marker's editing does not follow a uniform pattern. Of ten what 
seem to be random shots of the mundane are carefully contrived to 
achieve a particular aesthetic effect. Characteristically, Marker utilises 
the whole expanse of the screen, editing the flow of images with an 
eye to formal symmetry and contrast. In the spectacular scenes of the 
neighbourhood celebrations in Tokyo, for instance, Marker tracks the 
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dancing and parading figures across the entire length of the screen, 
having figures that exit f rom one side of the screen be replaced by 
others entering from the other side, and vice versa. Alternatively, 
in a passage that follows the journey of a train in Tokyo, he edits 
together groups of shots f rom different perspectives, which, like a 
Cubist painting, present the object of attention simultaneously f rom 
an array of alternative points of view. Attention is usually in the object 
which we are looking at, but it is not necessary pointed out into the 
experience. 
Marker demonstrates his mastery of the range of technical possi-
bilities of montage. Marker 's editing is dramatic and follows certain 
narrative line. It's a showpiece of montage. Normally visible editing 
implies no appeal to the spectator to become conscious of the cut as a 
formal event, or of the shot as a formal entity. They are not intended 
to function like alienation effects. Montage editing dynamites the 
illusion. Although in Marker montage deals in successive, separate 
shots, and not one continuing shot, it involves exactly the same visual 
mechanisms and elements. But whereas a single, continuing shot is 
an image with sub-configurations, the sequences are configurations 
some of whose sub-configurations are images. In a sense, the specta-
tor 's eye has less freedom, since the succession and duration of each 
image is controlled, and presumably eye movements cease or dimin-
ish, at least if the editing is fast enough. In another sense, the mind 
has more freedom, since the on-going configuration never presents 
itself as a fixed whole. It is a deduction, or reconstruction from the 
multiplicity of images held together only in the memory. The form 
disappears as fast as it appears, and the structure features space in 
time, but like the single image, it combines looseness in some re-
spects with integration in others. 
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The camera is of ten a visible presence of the inspecting gaze that one 
might imagine. The camera does not need to be turned on or even 
in place for the inspecting gaze to exist; merely its potential to exist 
might have this effect.301 Marker emphasizes the connectionist role 
of a filmmaker concerned with coherent meanings. The spectator's 
mind seems to concentrate more on relationships than differences. 
Marker 's film can achieve an especially intense excitement by tran-
scending images and sounds through a special cutting. A new visual, 
and physical osmosis occurs through his ideas. Film's space-time 
chunks are liquidised, they flow into one another, and similarly they 
are somehow abstracted. As shots replace one another in the same 
screen space, their graphic forms can collide, and visual features in 
one seem to strike against visual features in another. This kind of 
succession as collision depends, not so much on persistence of vision 
whereby the human retina retains an image, but on the mechanisms of 
visual perception. They are hardworking physical structures, and they 
generate physiological sensations. In the kinetic, and physical quality 
of graphic experience, there may well be physiological feedback f rom 
another source, the kinetics of sensory-motor experience. 
The inter-connectionist style of Marker is present throughout the 
narrative.In another passage, footage of an African heron prompts , 
by way of a free association on the part of the commentary, a cut to 
an emu in the Ile-de-France. The camera then focuses in on the eye 
of the emu, then cuts first to the gaze of an African woman and then 
to the eye of the recurring motif of the votive Japanese figurine of a 
cat. These images of the eye link up through the course of the film 
with a host of other images of the eye, and become linked in the com-
mentaries to themes ot power, surveillance, voyeurism, representa-
tion and the magical function of the eye (both the actual eye and the 
"camera eye") in non-Western cultures. The film's fascination with 
the eye is openly thematized by the voice-over, recurring in every-
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thing f rom the credit sequence of Vertigo to the documentation of a 
Japanese ritual. í ü : 
Marker has his own concept of montage, but one can sense the Soviet 
tradition behinti it. One can compare montage to a kind of syllogism 
with different details producing a new context on the level of a single 
mind. This was a mentalist view of the workings of the mind. Psycho-
logically it is a process where the mind tries to make sense of any new 
stimuli by thinking of links, explanations, or denominators between 
them thus reducing diverse or contradictory cues to one consistent 
cue. Maybe this also helped the Soviet directors to create simple gen-
eralisations from physical, and materialistic elements. The dialectic 
of montage is not only within a shot, or between different shots, 
between any details, and their overall context. Through montage one 
can think that cutting is in a way inseparable from selecting the shots, 
and arranging the images, and often it is also a question of staging 
the elements inside and between the shots. Marker 's employment of 
a montage technique, whilst bearing its own very distinctive traits, 
astutely draws on the innovations of Soviet monteurs such as Vertov, 
Kulesov, Eisenstein and Medvedkin. Eisenstein insisted that montage 
could exist, not only in the succession of shots but between the dif-
ferent textures of one image. He analysed montage between music 
and image, so, it was not difficult to expand thinking of montage 
between music and dialogue, or between one line of dialogue and the 
next one. This makes it understandable how one can think that mon-
tage is any sort of intellectual collision out of which new meanings 
might emerge. The dialectical use ot montage editing in early Soviet 
cinema to carry and consolidate a cinematographic message across a 
progression of images is utilised by Marker in a number of sequences 
in suggestive ways 
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For Marker a film rarely aims at self-sufficiency, but rather at com-
munication, which gives priority to ergonomic efficiency, as distinct 
f rom literalism. Almost all discourse (film included) is geared to 
its target audience's knowledge, assumptions, norms, preferences, 
judgements, hypotheses, deductions, in short, ideology or culture. 
This creates a paradox, because the film omits almost everything nec-
essary to its own understanding. It operates within a tissue ot mean-
ing, to which it relates as a social, and historical fact. Its meaning is 
an event, and this off-text substance enables a filmmaker to offer eve-
rything as a continuity, and a succession of cues, clues, and stimuli. 
To say that editing depends on knowledge is to say that it depends on 
implication. To a great extent, the art of editing is the art of anticipat-
ing the spectator's expectations and questions, and at a pace to which 
one can readily adapt. 
Marker is able, through his editing, to create a dialogue between 
them, to examine their different modes of signification and how they 
connect to each other. Marker uses a montage technique to create 
echoes and counterpoints between images, which alternately rein-
force, contradict or intensify each other. Any one sequence or series 
of images may establish an array of relationships as the film progress-
es. Whilst these examples demonstrate Marker 's use of editing to 
control tightly the unfolding of a sequence, his editing of ten veers in 
an opposite direction. Fragments of footage are of ten purposefully 
displaced, Marker sharply inter-cutting images in a way that defers 
their meaning. 
Marker's images are multi-factorial, structured combinations of 
many features. There are moments when Marker 's camera lingers on 
something for the sheer pleasure that its appearance provides. An im-
age can be defined as one thing which looks just enough like another 
to suggest it, or to remind the spectator of it in context. W h e n look-
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ing at pictorial form in Sunless, the spectator sees both the images and 
the scenes, which are depicted. The result is a hybrid, and selective 
compromise. The graphic features have a definite structure, which 
already affects the spectator's perceptual system, and constitutes an 
abstract composition with rudimentary elements of illusion. Through 
this the pictorial reading of sequences becomes a richer array of as-
sociations. To that extent, graphic and pictorial elements constitute 
different visual entities, albeit rooted in the same pictorial features, 
and neither quite separated from the other. In the carnival scenes in 
Tokyo, he scrutinises the intense concentration upon the face of one 
of the dancers. Throughout the film, there is a constant interplay of 
different levels of representation, and this again motivates Marker's 
editing. 
Of ten pictorial signifiers interest the spectator for their reminiscence 
of, and their information about a signified. This is how cinematic im-
ages with their wealth of information are so quickly subliminised. In 
Marker 's film, the graphic structure is primary in the sense of being 
the real, concrete, and present form, the material and physiological 
object of perception. It 's this form, which works upon the perceptual 
mechanisms, and, in some sense, controls, or profoundly influences 
the pictured form. The form and composition of the images concen-
trate the spectator's attention in a particular way. Remarkable is that 
features, which real-life vision scarcely relates, are sharply brought 
together, and into juxtapositions, which do not exist in real-life vi-
sion. Gradually, in the course of the film, one becomes aware of how 
these various sounds, like the film's images, are filtered through a 
synthesizer, which distorts their original sound. Like the zone, which 
translates memories into images, so the synthesizer music transforms 
the array of different musical forms into pure sound, flattening the 
distinctions between them. Thus flat images bring foreground and 
background features sharply together. Pictorial forms direct the spec-
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tator 's attention in certain ways, creating centres and movements ot 
attention, which can criss-cross, and compete. 
In Marker's film the structure of the image re-contexts the appear-
ance of the depicted. The role of music within the soundtrack is in-
terwoven into the thematic of the film. The film derives its title f rom 
a six-part melancholic song-cycle by Mussorgsky, and Marker 's tech-
nique uses counterpoint and repetition to announce themes in a way 
that parallels Mussorgsky's music. Although only a brief fragment of 
Mussorgsky's cycle of songs (a passage f rom "Sur le fleuve", the last 
ot the songs in the cycle, which concerns itself with death) is heard 
in the course of the film, Marker uses the song cycle as a vehicle to 
establish his leitmotif of the fragility of memory. Beyond such explicit 
references, Marker creates a series of discreet dialogues between the 
film and the song cycle, thereby establishing a hyper-textual rela-
tionship between the two. On a formal level, both works display an 
amazing richness in compositional conventions and expressive pos-
sibilities, but use extremely economic means to achieve these aims. 
However, Sunless shares more than simply formal compositional af-
finities with Mussorgsky's song cycle. They share an extensive com-
mon range of imagery and a common mood of melancholy. 
With Marker cuts are major sites of time dimensions. The motive is 
to quicken, and tighten up the concrete time. Time, unlike space, 
has no dimensions, and therefore no perspective. Thus it is more de-
pendent on the logic of implication. In this kind of narrative, concrete 
time intensifies the analogy with real-time successivity. However, cuts 
of ten express simultaneous happenings, and it's quite hard to say 
whether two different shots are concurrent or consecutive. Marker 's 
editing in the Tokyo-cityscape sequence, in its creation of abrupt and 
constantly shifting viewpoints from street level to rooftop, conveys a 
sense of simultaneity, the camerawork re-creating an effect of fleeting 
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glances scanning the city for its characteristic signs. Such ambigu-
ity is optional, and can be excluded if wished. It facilitates small, 
constant, and informal changes between consecutive and concurrent 
actions within a given sequence. In Marker these signs shuttle forth 
in rapid succession, some immediately decipherable, some less so, 
with little in the way of guidance for the viewer. Sometimes such use 
of montage slightly reverses time. In one shot a sudden event, and in 
another a character is distracted from some other activity by it. In a 
common practice, this kind of distraction ol attention is rendered 
by showing some other activity, and then suddenly being distracted. 
Strictly speaking the second shot begins earlier than the first shot, 
and normally a spectator doesn' t experience time winding back. This 
is how Marker captures both the sense of exhilaration and seductive 
allure that the encounter with the city provides, and the strange sense 
of fragmentation, illegibility and disarticulation. 
Marker treats Tokyo's visual elements as exciting and interesting. 
They are in a constant state of oscillation. City's subterranean dimen-
sions are also very important for Marker. Marker creates a kind of 
sonic evocation of the city. Marker's images explore the surface of the 
city through urban landscapes, and through city's various transfor-
mations. Tokyo is noisy, but also silent, and very intimate terrain with 
many-sided cinematic properties echoing visual, and often dreamy 
spaces. The obsession towards media images cerates a kind of halluci-
natory space filled with media images, and cognitive allusions. 
In Sunless Tokyo is represented as a delirious and fraught reality of dif-
ferent appearances, a dystopian 20th century equivalent of the floating 
world of the Edo period. This is a metaphor which finds its concrete 
embodiment in the shots of the many advertising placards of beauti-
ful young Japanese models suspended in mid-air over the city hang-
ing trom invisible wires and cables above the streets and railway lines 
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which run through the city. This intoxicating realm of advertising 
and the mass media invades public space and private thought alike.303 
Here the omnipresent video and television screens that adorn the de-
partment store walls, the computer-generated images, and the huge, 
Western-style advertising billboards and murals taken f rom the comic 
strip books hail to and prevail upon the passer-by, dwarfing them with 
their monumental scale. There is more than a suggestion in such im-
agery of the way in which the modern city acquires the character of a 
space of surveillance. The huge images adorning the city's billboards, 
featuring figures looking out of the posters, cast their gaze across the 
city, voyeurising the voyeurs. Equally, the erotically-charged images 
of young women and comic-strip heroines, on a scale inflated out of 
all proportion, seem starkly to counterpoint the impersonality, con-
straint and conformity that reign over the street-life below, as though 
they were the projections of repressed desires. In one of the most 
telling images, the reflections of a mass of figures in the subway are 
absorbed within the giant billboard image of a fashion model. 
As the narrator continues: "More and more, my dreams find their 
settings in the department stores of Tokyo, the subterranean tunnels 
that extend them and run parallel to the city. A face appears, disap-
pears, a trace is found, is lost, all the folklore of dreams is so much in 
its place that the next day, when I 'm awake, I realise that I continue 
to seek in the basement labyrinth the presence concealed the night 
before. I begin to wonder if those dreams are really mine, or if they 
are part of a totality, of a gigantic collective dream of which the en-
tire city may be the projection. It might suffice to pick up any one 
of the telephones that are lying around to hear a familiar voice, or 
the beating of a heart - Sei Shönagon's for example. All the galleries 
lead to stations, the same companies own the stores and the railroads 
that bear their name, Keio, Odakyu, all those names of ports. The 
train inhabited by sleeping people puts together all the fragments of 
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dreams, makes a single film of them, the ultimate film. The tickets 
from the automatic dispenser grant admission to the show." 
The images accompanying this commentary show people buying 
tickets for the subway, boarding train compartments, and, once seat-
ed, drifting into sleep, a segment which recalls and brings full circle 
the journey into the city in the film's opening passages.304 As this 
sequence progresses, images of the passengers' sleeping faces are al-
lusively inter-cut with images of the late-night television sequences 
replayed from the night before, suggesting the way in which these 
images of desire and violence become imprinted onto their subcon-
scious thoughts and dreams. The subway sequence is an evocative 
treatment of sleeping, dreaming, and waking as they relate to the ex-
perience of the spectator.305 The passage offers us not only an exam-
ple of the film's intricate use of montage to slip nimbly between the 
realms of desire and the everyday, dream and wakefulness, subjective 
and collective memory, but also an image of a world whose experi-
ence of the real is, in actuality, constantly and imperceptibly shif ting 
between these categories. Marker's quest for the t rue image is an 
ongoing task, since such images are not of ten found, and when they 
are they of ten come by surprise. Marker's hand-held camera seems 
to respond directly to the diegetic world.306 
The commonest forms of in-shot cheating are quick, slow, and re-
verse motions, and their free form relative pixilation, which deletes, 
repeats and inserts individually selected frames, all techniques, which 
Marker uses frequently. Usually the effect is obvious, and in that in-
stance it isn't cheating. It cheats in another sense, when it separates 
concrete and diegetic time, but constitutes also analysis and exposi-
tion, so it's a function of film as discourse. It's discourse time rather 
than concrete time. Nonetheless it can create strange effects of du-
ration. Marker attacks our present understanding of images.3"' The 
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meditation upon the metropolis of Tokyo becomes interwoven with 
a series of commentaries on the economic position of Japan, its po-
litical landscape, and its complex relations to other continents. One 
of the reasons why Marker returns to Japan is that it has arguably 
become the leading manufacturer of the new technologies that are 
transforming our experience of the world. The fascination of Japan is 
the manner in which the impact of new technologies has not simply 
eclipsed previous long-standing cultural customs, but coexists with 
pre-existent cultural patterns, creating a peculiar relationship be-
tween modernisation and tradition. Modernity, wherever it appears, 
does not occur without a shattering of belief, without a discovery of 
the lack of reality — a discovery linked to other realities.508 Marker 
continually returns throughout the film to various sacred observanc-
es and rituals that preserve the practices of the past. Hence, whilst 
pointing to the rapid changes that have taken place in recent Japanese 
historv, he probes the new cultural forms ot modern Japan for symp-
toms of the deeply encoded patterns of the past. Postmodernism 
marks the era in which visual images and the visualizing of things that 
are not necessarily visual has accelerated so dramatically that the glo-
bal circulation of images has become an end itself, especially through 
Internet. Marker's description in Lettre de Sibérie of Siberia as a land 
of contrasts situated between the Middle Ages and the 21 st century 
might provide a fitting epigraph for the analysis of his portrayal of 
Japan in Sunless. 
With Marker the ability to visualize a culture or society almost be-
comes synonymous with understanding it. The film points to the 
coexistence of very different experiences of modernity within the 
global economy. Intercutting images of the highly technologised and 
affluent society of contemporary Japan with images of the rural poor 
of Africa, a contrast is drawn between the processes of modernisat ion 
in Japan and a way of life that involves a daily struggle for survival. 
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On cognitive level, the problem of representing history for Marker 
is bound up with finding another way to write history, one that ac-
knowledges, rather than occludes, the processes of constructing his-
tory; a form of history that finds a place for history's indetermina-
cies, in terms of both the limits of representation and the problems 
that beset our understanding of the temporal. That other way for 
Marker involves an at tempt to convey something of "history's po-
lyphony" and, through the mutability of signification and the refusal 
of closure, to represent story as a living presence. We might say that 
Sunless is a demonstration of such a model of history. Marker's modes 
of presentation within the film represent a critical engagement with 
the question of representation itself. 
SHOT CONNECTIONS 
Julian Hochberg commented that the study of film could prove as 
central to the study of human perception as Renaissance painting 
for the development of rationalism.309 The reading of cuts furnishes 
vivid demonstrations of just how swiftly the mind can process new 
perceptual data, and construct a hypothesis ot their relationship with 
different data. This swiftness in reading and relating a new image is 
a function of "simultaneous parallel processing". The mind seems 
to concentrate on relationships rather than differences. The brains 
may be remarkable efficient, but they are neither magic nor omnipo-
tent. In film form, which is tightly time bound, information must be 
worked out. The reader of a written text may read fast or slow and 
re-read a passage ten times, but most films use the average constant 
understanding speed. 
This does not relegate cinematic narration to some category of coars-
er discourse than the performing arts, music and oral literature. Nor 
should one assume that films impose upon their target audience some 
174 
COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS A N D CINEMATIC MODELLING 
lowest common denominator of response, which would coarsen its 
delicate individualities. On the contrary: it reminds us that each in-
dividual spectator adjusts his or hers responses to each film, and in 
an ongoing manner. Certain sequences in Eisenstein's films delighted 
those intellectual spectators whose responses could combine picto-
rial sophistication with philosophical associations, or those who, af-
ter studying his theories, knew how he expected them to react. But 
the same sequences baffled, and therefore annoyed other spectators, 
whose response to films maximises that visual-physical "being-there" 
amidst the action described (the diegesis). When the spectator sees 
a new shot, he or she is, or course, quite free to note that fact, and 
meditate over it. But this would impede his attention to the ongoing 
flow of new information, and normally he or she has no reason to do 
so. The normative spectator is readily interested in this new develop-
ment, and in its relationship, and the entire context so far. 
The shot boundaries may be the least interesting thing about them, 
even when they help to structure an eloquent composition. The shot 
as an exact and integral thing is a "pawn", readily sacrificed to the 
overall flow. And the illusion, which it generated, is readily sacri-
ficed to the overall illusion, consisting of different pictures. It does 
not matter that these images contradict one another, thus breaking 
the illusions at this level. This formulation contrasts with the usual 
assumption, according to which film is "illusionist" because its visu-
al-physical form is somehow photo-, or movement-literal. Film can 
achieve an especially intense excitement by "transcending" this fo rm 
by cutting. A new osmosis of visual-physical experience occurs and 
the ideas which it diagrams. The intensity, which the former gives to 
the latter, allows the latter to override the former. Thus the created 
space-time chunks are "liquidised", they flow into one another, and 
at the same time they are somewhat abstracted.310 
1 7 5 
COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS A N D CINEMATIC MODELLING 
Stefan Sharff has been spoken of deletions in cutting.3" Deletions are 
an admirable term, because it is free from irrelevant implications. 
Deletions refer to apparent space, because the deleted spaces may 
never have existed. In the beginning Joseph Losey's The Go-Between 
(1968) two boys set out to explore a country house. The theme of 
exploration and the shots of impressively grand staircases and long 
corridors would seem to render continuity so conspicuous as to for-
bid deletions. But the film concentrates on particular chunks within 
the overall activity, thus telescoping a probably all-morning explora-
tion into a succession of split-minute shots. It nonetheless contains 
a sensed continuity, because the spectator sees the tempo of the ac-
tion in each image, and extrapolates it into the gaps. In this way 
the implications of actions override concrete fo rm and the diegesis 
is no longer then the actual film. The basic principles ot this kind 
of continuity highlight individual moments as to imply longer dura-
tion, and single actions to imply the whole flow of actions. Also every 
space implies necessarily to a larger space, because cuts as changes of 
viewpoint can loosen space and time, and also spectator 's attention 
in individual shots. And montage, as a collision of ideas, is in a sense 
also the omission of ideas. 
The cut is a visual relationship between successive images but it is not 
itself an image because before the second shot can appear, the first 
must have vanished. It must become only a memory, a kind of "phan-
tom form". Nonetheless, a visual relationship arises f rom the jux-
taposition; generating that paradox of a pictorial relationship which 
is not a picture. When Eisenstein theorized cuts as graphic collisions 
between the shots, he was only describing what every spectator, who 
sees his earlier films, unforgettably experiences. As shots replace one 
another in the same screen space, their graphic forms can "collide", 
and visual features in one shot seem to "strike" against visual fea-
tures in another shot. This collision is generating out ot both a shock, 
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which belongs in neither ot the shots, but accrues to the second shot 
before fading. This succession-as-collision depends, not on some 
"persistence of vision", whereby the human retina retains an image 
like some short-lived photographic process, but on the mechanisms 
of visual perception. These structures are not passive, transparent, 
and ethereally acquiescent to outside stimuli, but instead they are 
hardworking physical structures. They generate physiological sensa-
tions akin to a noise, and craftsmen naturally co-opt the sensations 
for their purposes, thus turning this "noise" back into "message". In 
the kinetic-physical quality of graphic experience, there may well be 
physiological feedback from another source, the kinetics of sensory-
motor experience but if so, the balance of "noise" and "feedback" is 
difficult to determine. 
The images, which relate directly across the cut, are not simple, sin-
gle entities. Each image is already multi-factorial, a structured com-
bination of many features. A cut may be very smooth in conspicuous 
respects, or very abrupt , with every opportunity for varying degrees 
in different combinations. In other words, the cut, as a general form, 
has no general meaning, which corresponds to all cases related to 
cuts. It is not really a semantic category even if it is a formal one. It 
accommodates very different relationships and meanings. The cut 
means whatever the juxtaposition of shots implies. It is this variety 
of relationships between intricately related forms, which make the 
art of editing a semantic craft, that is to say, a craft that is always an 
art. Film has the reputation of being a self-evident art, as obvious 
as perspective, but the self-evident is of ten made so by painstaking 
craft, by the art, which conceals art, and by adjusting intricacies and 
implications. 
Chaos and confusion constantly await it, whence procedural rules 
like the continuity rules try to sort out situations. New ways ot look-
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ing were a primary focus of the French avant-garde in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. What it means to look was thus 
a central concern of the modern art at a t ime of rapid social change. 
For example, the painters who worked in Cubism were interested in 
depicting objects f rom several points ol view simultaneously. It was a 
style resistant to the dominant model of perspective, because it pro-
claimed that the human eye is never at rest upon a single point but is 
always in motion. The Cubists painted objects as if they were being 
viewed f rom several different angles simultaneously, and focused on 
the visual relationship between objects. Cubism changed the nature 
of the relationship between the painted image and reality, and by so 
doing it expressed a new relationship between man and reality.312 
Many other styles (for example, Impressionism and Abstract Expres-
sionism) have also been responses to the dominance of perspective in 
Western art, and declared more subjective and complex visions. 
In cinematic narration some cuts can be so smooth that the very cat-
egory of cutting is thrown into question. In Rope (1949), Hitchcock 
constructed shots lasting ten minutes each (the maximum allowed 
by his equipment) and, on top of that, disguised the cuts by closely 
matching the first and last frames of adjacent shots. The cuts are 
detectable only because, such matching is surprisingly difficult tech-
nically. When the cuts involve no change of viewpoint, they are, in 
intention and in principle, undetectable, or rather they are moments 
within one sustained shot, one pause amongst others in the camera's 
continuous movements. Moreover, cuts are clear only to connois-
seurs who find them interesting despite Hitchcock's avowed intent 
of achieving as cut-less film. At the other extreme, cuts can come on 
in startling fashion, and some are indeed called "shock-cuts". Even 
incompetent, truly muddled cutting is experienced in a less local way 
than one might expect. Even in those badly put together home mov-
ies, we experience, not so much a succession of immediate rude jolts, 
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but a diffuser incoherence, a sense of rooms and walls floating uncer-
tainly around one another, of space as wavering yet constrictive. 
One might imagine that camera movements, being gradual, consist-
ent and like real-life vision, would be immune f rom whatever pos-
sibilities of distraction might plague cuts. On the contrary, a cut 
f rom a long shot of a scene to a close up can feel entirely natural, for 
it resembles real-life vision and the way our attention moves f rom a 
general orientation to a "closer look" at whatever attracts our eye. 
The cut swiftly fulfils our interest or clearly re-directs 'it. It is a good 
yestalt, a neater diagram than real-life vision offers. But if the camera 
moves from long shot to close-up, it takes longer, and redirects our 
interests less swiftly. There may be an intermediate period when we 
are not sure what we are being re-directed to look at. For such lesser 
clarity of "extraction" there may be excellent reason, and indeed the 
track-in to close-up can have very different effects, depending upon 
each specific configuration. It may be short, swift and inconspicuous; 
or slow and creepy, and so on. Nothing is more direct, logical and 
natural than the cut, and nothing is as swift, in asserting a new topic 
and providing information about itself. 
Nor does abstention from cuts respect the integrity of some unity 
of space, which would characterize real-life vision. In real-life vision, 
our attention consigns the overall consistency of the space around 
us to subliminal status, while our attention picks out, "segregates' 
but also inter-relates successive centres of interest. Our eyes may 
move like a camera but our attention jumps like editing. The im-
age on the retina never even reaches consciousness. The camera has 
no brain, only a retina, and tyro moviemakers quickly learn not to 
take expressions like "camera-eye" too literally. The camera moves 
like the eye produces images. Without exploring all the differences 
between, film and real-life vision, the overriding fact is clear, that the 
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human-eye and the camera-eye have nothing in common except a 
lens. Human vision is edited "in the camera" by the brain. The eye is 
thought-driven, and the film negative is a retina with no thoughts, no 
responses, and no senses. The cameraman's eye must direct the cam-
era's choices. The problem is not the sophistication of mechanical 
reproduction as compared to the naivety of the mind but the reverse 
since the machine is so primitive that the mind hardly knows how to 
gear down to it. 
PLACING THE CUTS 
The spectator 's mind is dealing with an irrational situation. The im-
age is incompatible with the visual field around it, and with the spec-
tator 's physical reality. The camera moves, but gravity tells the spec-
tator that his body is still seated, and his visual systems cannot come 
fully into play. What lays special duties on film continuity is not the 
clumsiness of the spectator's brain, but its accuracy in up-fronting 
the genuinely irrational nature of being there while being here. This 
is not to argue, as montage enthusiasts did, that camera-movement 
should be proscribed. On the contrary the director can compensate 
this by moving the camera in slow, smooth, and careful way, so that 
an unnoticeable unnaturalness is as rich a semantic intensifier as the 
"opposite" unnaturalness of the cut. A cut is the shortest distance 
between two points. It is the fastest and smoothest way to travel f rom 
one point to another, and by going straight to the new point it estab-
lishes a connection. A cut is both an analysis and a new association. 
Its segmentation preludes recombination. 
The discontinuity corresponds to the discontinuity between any two 
ideas, or indeed any two sentences. A series of short sharp sentences 
can be read more smoothly than one continuous, but convoluted 
one. We have followed a common habit of language (parole), where-
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by editing is the juxtaposition of shots. But it is an unusual type of 
juxtaposition for the spectator cannot see both shots at once. The 
juxtaposition is really a succession. In the more usual sense of juxta-
position the images are laid out side by side, as on a page, and the eye 
can move back and forth from one to the other both configurations 
being continuously present. Films can occasionally use "split-screen" 
effects, dynamically combining succession with juxtaposition. But for 
the moment our concern is in the more basic and pervasive form, 
suggesting montage as succession. 
A redefinition of a cut as a connection is paralleled in etymology. As 
a production te rm cut begins from craft process: the editor shortens 
shots by cutting a strip of film across the frame lines. But since he or 
she usually goes on to join the separate shots he "cuts together" and 
"between" the shots, so that cutting also means its own opposite, the 
linking and assembling cuts together. The te rm "editing" may carry 
slightly stronger connotations of recombination and assemblage, than 
"cutting". But the two terms are commonly synonymous, and the 
strongest distinction between them is that "cutting" associates with a 
manual craft, whereas "editing" up-fronts executive status. In French 
montage is the standard te rm for cutting and editing. The Russians 
adopted it as a standard term, to which the theories of Sergei Eisen-
stein and other Russian avant-garde artists gave a special sense. This 
was helped by the French avant-garde interest in dazzling cutting, and 
the two influences established montage in English as meaning con-
spicuous, creative cutting. The term montage sequence means a short 
sequence of conspicuous editing, often using optical effects of many 
kinds. 
To say that editing depends on knowledge is to say that it depends on 
implication. To a great extent, the art of editing is the art of anticipat-
ing the spectator's expectations and questions, and at a pace to which 
181 
COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS A N D CINEMATIC MODELLING 
he or she can readily adapt. In cinematic narration shots contribute 
to the logic of implication. Logic often implies causality, or some 
otherwise necessary relationship with determining prescriptions and 
inexorable consequences, as distinct from looser relationships, influ-
ences and tendencies. Usefully it stresses the positivism of the proc-
ess, the idea that mental constructions are very forceful and strong 
enough to form a structure on which film form (including editing) 
can rely. 
In cinematic narrative, the content or composition ot one shot might 
refer to another across long intervening passages. Sometimes this ref-
erence is a repetition of ten it is a variation, which routinely involves 
extrapolation. Sometimes the references are more approximative 
analogies, or restricted to one element. Normally they are motivated 
by other elements in the structure of the discourse. Cinema is labelled 
by selectivity, viewpoints, which are developed through choices. Even 
the shortest documentary contains a lot of organizing, a point of view 
of fiction. So the essential cinematic strategy contains the idea by 
which one can hide things in a film, in order to gradually reveal them. 
Through this kind of mechanism a series of cinematic shots shape 
into a series of emphasises, throughout the selective and manipulative 
role of the camera. That is why film is not a reproduction of reality, 
because, once a scene has been cut into shots, we are not working an-
ymore with the reproduction of reality; instead, we are working with 
the statements referring to that reality. In a sense film seems "real", 
because it reproduces the way we see things in the world; it has not 
got so much to do with the fact that it reproduces the world exactly, 
but it reproduces the way in which we look at it. Cutting into shots 
sometimes corresponds to selection and manipulation, like when in 
a film one hides themes in order to reveal them, which sometimes 
corresponds to the way in which one normally uncovers reality (one 
sees a thing in a long shot, then walks up to it, and it is in close-up; 
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then one walks around it, and it is like a cut or camera movement). 
In many films this may reproduce normal perception, which in one 
sense is manipulation and in another it is not. Selection can rely on 
natural processes, natural perception, and it can rely on manipulation 
as a trick made by the filmmaker. Most of our thinking goes on in 
the intervening areas between reality and fiction, which can be called 
speculation or hypothesizing; that is an area of uncertainty. 
CONCEPTIONS OF FILM FORM 
Sergei Eisenstein among other Russian theorists was the first to see 
the lull possibilities of the early fragmentations of space and time in 
cinema. The emphasis was on cutting, which depended on showing. 
That is how Eisenstein brought to film an eye as 'painterly' as that 
ot the German expressionists, and Eisenstein-type of editing became 
part of film language generally and featured particularly in the work 
of film theoreticians and documentarists, w ho were of ten the same 
people. Russian theorists devised the useful distinction between ana-
lytic and synthetic editing. In analytic editing clearly single, continu-
ous space is dissected into several shots. In synthetic editing several 
spaces are assembled into one. Synthetic editing disguises an initial 
separateness to create an apparent continuity. The practices are less 
symmetrical than the terms. Analytic editing may or may not disguise 
the original space. Synthetic editing does that always. The opposite of 
analytic editing is intercutting. Synthetic editing is the first hint that 
the distinction between one space and several spaces can be far f rom 
clear. How does then the spectator decide whether successive shots 
have remained within the same scene? She must decide whe ther the 
space, direction, action, objects, and general character of the shots 
look roughly compatible. She must reckon not only with actual posi-
tions but also with general trajectories of movement, and with spatial 
extrapolations like the probable continuation beyond the f rame, the 
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directions of people's looks, and so on. Thus on-screen space al-
ways suggests off-screen space but without defining it. The spectator 
works through probability or improbability of continuation. Since 
off-screen space remains undefined, space here can only mean a kind 
of zone or general area. That 's why it is a feature of general descrip-
tion. 
In Bunuel's Un chien andalou (1928) a girl looks out of a window, and 
sees a fallen cyclist in the street below. She rushes out of the door 
down some stairs, emerges f rom the street door, and embraces the 
cyclist. In one sense there is a sequence of several scenes consisting 
of a room, a staircase, and a street. But in terms of physical and visual 
continuity it looks like a one scene, because the girl can see from the 
room into the street. Although the stairwell is visually separated, her 
physical movements are also in one uninterrupted line. This film is 
full of spatial tricks, and these kinds of equivalents are completely 
routine-like in many films. The principle in here extends through 
chains of sequences. It brings out the question, how far apart must 
two people be. So, that the same space (the line ot pursuit) feels like 
two separate shots. For example, most chases in films are so ambigu-
ous that they can be handled either as a sequence or as a scene. If we 
inter-cut between two cars shown separately, it suggests a sequence, 
because they will pass through the same spaces but at separate times. 
A high distant viewpoint might show both cars in the same shot, in 
which case it is a scene. If the director combines inter-cutting together 
with such long shots, the combination would be called either a scene 
or a sequence though the general sense of a movement might favour 
'sequence' over the more static connotations of a 'scene'. This would 
suggest that the scene-sequence —distinction involves not merely the 
relationship between different objects but their relationship with the 
camera. In this case, the scene and sequence are not categories of the 
diegesis but a function of exposition, and of ten a decision of style in 
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most of the cases. Theorists have assumed that since film is so real-
istic and visual, spatial relationships must be self-evident, so that it is 
immediately obvious whether a shot belongs in the same space as its 
predecessor, or somewhere else. Anyway, there are many cases where 
a shot carries no indication of whether it is another part of this scene 
or the first part of another scene.315 Film is certainly a visual-physical 
medium in which space-time continuity is always conspicuous but 
not self-evident. Hence the conveyance of rough relative positions is 
so crucial and pervasive that it extends beyond the realm of cutting, 
and routinely makes calls upon the internal content and form of the 
shot. 
A shot in a film is a series of images, a series of frames, but it is also 
a serial image, a new kind of pictorial entity, and even if there are no 
camera movements in a shot, on the level of the image there are many 
kinds of movements, which allow the shot to be covered. A move-
ment (objectional or camera movement) does not undermine the 
image, but develops it. What the graphic qualities lose in the sense 
of economy, they will regain through tempo, rhythmic, choreography 
and orchestration.314 
In Béla Balázs's view, then, a knowledge and understanding of film 
is vital to improving its aesthetic quality. The collective and com-
mercial nature of film-making means that it is impossible for a lone 
cinematic genius working in isolation to advance his or her art, as a 
writer, painter or composer might do. Theorists have assumed that 
since film is so realistic and visual, spatial relationships must be self-
evident, so that it's immediately obvious whether a shot belongs in 
the same space as its predecessor, or somewhere else. There are many 
cases where shot carries no indication of whether it's another part of 
a scene or the first part of another one. One might argue that space 
consists, not of areas, but of directions, which sometimes criss-cross. 
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For as the camera moves around a scene, it may show the same area 
from different angles dissolving it within different configurations. 
Film is a visual, and physical medium in which space-time continu-
ity is always conspicuous. On cognitive level, Balázs's account of the 
phenomenon of ' identif ication' might seem to bring him closer to the 
critics who regard the viewing of film as passive consumption, since 
it could appear that 'identification', as he describes it, involves a loss 
of critical distance. But Balázs does not look askance at this process; 
he sees it, rather, as an effect that demonstrates the artistic newness 
of film. This is his summary of 'identification'. The loss of distance 
that is an element of 'identification' can be related to another aspect 
of Balázs's theory of the effect of film. It is not only that film cre-
ates the complex interpretative competence that is necessary if film 
itself is to be understood; film also results in an enhanced perception 
of reality. Loss of distance is a key aspect of this enhancement, as is 
evident from Balázs's elaboration of the combined effects of the first 
and second formal principles of film that he has identified: the varia-
tion of distance, particularly insofar as it permits the 'close-up'; and 
the division of scenes into shots. 
The close-up of the human face makes possible the 'silent solilo-
quy', in which the face speaks, whether the character is alone or with 
others, mute or in conversation: ' the close-up can lift a character 
out of the heart of the greatest crowd and show how solitary it is 
in reality and what it feels in this crowded solitude', and the film, 
especially the sound film, can separate the words of a character talk-
ing to others f rom the mute play of features by means of which, in 
the middle of such a conversation, we are made to overhear a mute 
soliloquy and realize the difference between this soliloquy and the 
audible conversation. Film, through the close-up, can make possible 
' the "polyphonic" play of features ... the appearance on the same face 
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of contradictory expressions' so that 'a variety of feelings, passions 
and thoughts are synthesized in the play of the features as an adequate 
expression of the multiplicity of the human soul.315 This reveals to the 
audience 'a strange new dimension', 'a new world' , the world of mi-
crophysiognomy which could not otherwise be seen with the naked 
eye or in everyday life. 
Balázs further explored the relationship between changing set-up 
and identification, drawing on his notion of the 'visual anthropo-
morphism' of film, and using the humanist metaphor of the face, or 
'physiognomy', of objects and appearances: our anthropomorphous 
world-vision makes us see a human physiognomy in every phenom-
enon' . His concern was also with the relationship between the 'ob-
jective' and the 'subjective' in film. 
"Montage is the association of ideas rendered visual; it gives the single 
shots their ultimate meaning ... because the spectator presupposes 
that in the sequence of pictures that pass before his eyes there is an 
intentional predetermination and interpretation. This consciousness, 
this confidence that we are seeing the work of a creative intention 
and purpose, not a number of pictures thrown and stuck together 
by chance, is a psychological precondition of film-watching and we 
always expect, presuppose and search for meaning in every film we 
see. This is a basic, irresistible intellectual requirement of the specta-
tor and it operates even if by some reason or other the film seen is 
really merely a chance collection of pictures stuck together without 
rhyme or reason. Seeking a meaning is a fundamental function of hu-
man consciousness and nothing is more difficult than to accept with 
complete passivity meaningless, purely accidental phenomena. Our 
mechanism of idea association and our imagination will always tend 
to put some meaning into such a meaningless conglomeration, even 
though perhaps only in play."316 
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It is interesting to link this psychological model with Balázs's ear-
lier observations on the way in which film changes human sensibility. 
Balázs's affirmation, in the above extract, that sleeking a meaning is 
a fundamental function of human consciousness, casts into doubt 
his earlier assertion that new human faculties have emerged as a re-
sult of the birth of film; rather, it could be said that these faculties 
are not so much new as an example of a general function of human 
consciousness engaging with a new medium. It is also significant that 
Balázs came close to auteur theory by conflating the desire for mean-
ing with the idea of an author, or at least 'a creative intention'. But 
to 'expect, presuppose and search for meaning' in a film, or in any 
other phenomenon, does not entail the belief in the existence of an 
intention or an author: indeed, Balázs's pointed that our mechanism 
of idea association and our imagination will read meaning even into 
a meaningless conglomeration reinforced the point that meaning can 
emerge without an actual or posited author. 
Montage, or editing, can be used to produce a number of important 
effects. For example, to convey the sense that time has elapsed be-
tween two scenes, it can interpolate another scene in another place. 
In his discussion of this kind of interpolation, Balázs proposed a most 
interesting link between time effect and space effect ... the farther 
away the site of the inserted scene is f rom the site of the scenes be-
tween which it is inserted, the more t ime we will feel to have elapsed. 
The interpolated scene technique is difficult to avoid and renders 
it necessary to make several threads of action run parallel to one 
another. As well as conveying a sense of time and interweaving sev-
eral strands of image and narrative, montage also creates associations 
of ideas, either by suggesting indirectly ' the inner sequence of the 
spectators' idea-associations' or by actually showing the pictures, 
which follow each other in the mind and lead from one thought to 
the next' . The flashback is an example of the latter approach. This 
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may be used in a relatively simple way, in which the transition from 
fictional present to fictional past is strongly marked, but in which 
the representation of the past itself takes a straightforward narrative 
form. On the other hand, it may aim to reproduce the psychological 
process of remembering the past. 
INSIDE THE AUDIOVISUAL WORLD 
The synthetic and analytic methods of perceiving are two ways of in-
terpretat ion."7 As the names indicate, the observer who adopts the 
synthetic method tends to see the perceptual field as an integrated 
whole, whereas the observer who adopts the analytic method breaks 
up the field into its constituent parts or details, studying each one 
separately and perhaps overlooking the effect of the whole.318 In the 
synthetic method visual illusions appear more compulsively; appar-
ent movement and causality are readily seen; size, shape, and colour 
constancy are high. The analytic method is more appropriate when 
small details must be attended to and certain qualities isolated f rom 
the whole, for instance, in judging the brightness or colour of a sur-
face independently of its other qualities, or those of the remainder 
of the field. Furthermore, it must be utilized in making judgements 
of perspective size."'' Julian Hochberg thinks that the explanation 
of why inconsistencies of pictured space can go unnoticed may in 
part be that the inconsistent regions of the picture are not normally 
compared to each other directly, and any object is usually examined 
by a succession of multiple glimpses, and the various regions that are 
looked at each fall in turn on the same place in the eye.320 That is 
why the separate parts of the figure all have to be brought at different 
times to the central part of the retina, thefovea, if they are to be seen 
in full clarity of detail. 
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According to the psychologist way of perception the meaning of the 
stimulus is to function as an interface between two kinds ot texts, 
the one being the object itself and the second being the spectator's 
mind, which alone contains the meaning, which it associates with 
the text's otherwise empty signifiers. So the picture is merely form 
signifying nothing, but awaiting a mind to contribute the connection 
between signifiers and signifieds.321 That is why the meaning in cin-
ema's visual perception is constructed in the mind, because the em-
phasis on the active and constructive operations of the mind will in 
gestalt psychological thinking go far beyond the notion of "the pro-
duction of meaning" by a "text".522 In spite of retinal variations and 
environmental influences, the mind's image of the object is constant, 
because conception transforms perceptual forms. It is a question of 
constancy of vision, as J. M. Wilding puts it: "The maintenance of 
a stable world despite changes in the view due to our movements is 
called position constancy."325 
If visual perception only seems to have a truly astronomical "spell-
ing" and "vocabulary", it is because it has neither. It remembers not 
so much specific forms, as processes of construction. Durgnat thinks 
"in real visual perception, we have taught ourselves to see that a table 
is rectangular even though, as we walk around it, its images on our 
retina can only be a constantly changing series of quadrilaterals.524 
That is why it is obvious why "elasticity" is the essence of visual per-
ception and structuration, even at the expense of confusion. Visual 
elasticity resembles analogy in that it may be very precise or very 
rough. So much so that it can only work in an intimate alliance with 
other principles.525 
And if a single image is rich in its complications, then the multiplici-
ties according to it are based on the points for our attention through 
perception. As our gaze, and independently ot it our thoughts move 
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over an image, they discover a variety of centre points.526 The image 
and its associations may tempt, tease and lure or provoke us although 
the artist might have anticipated the manoeuvres of our attention, but 
pictorial reading of an image or pictorial appreciation of an image 
gives us further encouragement to look for the graphics. This gives us 
a new way of looking through the configuration of pictorial elements 
in an image, because the eye rarely fixes on a certain point for very 
long. The essence of the process is more like some kind of patrolling 
327 over an image. 
Visual perception related to cognitive understanding of Peter Green-
away's audiovisual world is extremely important. Visual perception 
is not just recognition, but more or less it is perception and under-
standing of spatial structures, and understanding of different objects 
and parts and their relations in visual field through visual thinking. 
The function of the rules and conventions of pictorial composition 
is to encourage maximally efficient internal relationships as related 
to context, content, and purpose. Related to Greenaway, much of 
interesting discourse involves some shift of alteration to conventions, 
and special purposes may require that normal procedures be bent, 
twisted, reversed, or broken, for example, a filmmaker like Greena-
way may think that it is important to draw the spectator 's attention 
to facts and features of the frame, not only as a condition of picto-
rial representation, but as a contradiction of the represented items 
placed in cognitively. 
This guidance of pictorial glances might then reverse normal view-
ing procedures, and bring in new tensions concerning the cognitive 
meaning of spatial, and temporal dimensions of films. In Greena-
way's narration, the meanings of the screen will come and change 
their form quite suddenly. Partly it is because of the camerawork, 
partly because of the compositions, the changing effects inside the 
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shots. According to this kind of planning, may the enrolled image 
of the same camera position have a new meaning in the middle of 
the same shot, when the attention-point will be focused again. The 
object (a person or something else) that comes into the frame will be 
combined with the possible camera movement (for example, track-
ing backwards) and some new thing emerging rapidly, which creates 
a kind of dramatically influenced mood, stops the whole scene for 
a while and then continues to developed the shot into new areas of 
meaning. 
Greenaway seems to trust into partial perception and space-control-
led duration of the shot, according to which different sections than 
these kinds of systems, which require more initial attention, domi-
nate the visions and spatial areas in our brains. As Thomas Elsaesser 
puts it: "A static, closed universe, jerked into mechanical life by rules, 
games and witticisms: this side of the coin is almost too easy to fault, 
as if the director were in advance disarming the critics by playing 
even more openly his customary hand. But Greenaway always keeps a 
powerful motive up his sleeve to propel his figures into narrative: that 
of the contract and the conspiracy, antithetical and warring principles 
in one's dealings with the world."528 
In Greenaway's The Draughtsman's Contract (Great Britain, 1982) the 
prime interests are the landscape, the ideas involved in the sheer in-
terplay of plot, the symmetry, and those concerns characteristic of 
the whole sub-text of gardening; also the games that can be played 
with the dialogue, its content and the forms it takes. The film is set 
in Wiltshire in 1694 and is about a landscape artist and Scottish Ro-
man Catholic called Mr. Neville (played by Anthony Higgins) who 
makes living drawing prospects of country houses for the landed gen-
try. Greenaway uses strong visual associations with one of his earlier 
films Vertical Features Remake. Both are concerned with the draughts-
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man seeking out particular characteristics of a landscape and pursu-
ing them in an almost minimalist way. One constantly repeated shot 
is of a landscape seen through Neville's drawing aid, a rectangular 
wooden frame. This frame-within-the-frame device calls attention 
to the framing inherent in all filming, painting and photography. It is 
also a distancing mechanism. 
According to John A Walker: "Composition is obviously crucial to 
the topographical views Neville specialises in and a comparable atten-
tion to composition is paid by the director and the cameraman. The 
geometrical system of perspective underpins both the acts of draw-
ing and filming. Geometry is also present in the lavout of the formal 
gardens of the house. Frequently, shots are so composed that the 
elements within them are symmetrical. This kind of ordering reflects 
the love of pattern typical of the period, but also the logical systems 
associated with so much modern art."329 
Greenaway's film works as an invitation to consider the problems of 
pictorial representation by watching someone drawing a real land-
scape, by comparing image and reality, and by reflecting on the rep-
resentation of both via the medium of film. The Draughtsman's Contract 
is structured to keep going back to the same landscapes at different 
times of the day, to see how the light has made shapes, forms, ver-
ticals, how they've changed and what new significance they have at 
dif ferent times of the dav. 
J 
James Corner has pointed out that a landscape space is a highly situ-
ated phenomenon, literally bound into geographical places and to-
pographies.330 That is why the spatial interrelationships of the cul-
tural and natural patterns that constitute a particular landscape mean 
that places are interwoven as a densely contextual and cumulative 
weave. Places, like things, conjure up a wealth of images and ideas, 
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and Corner relates this to Heidegger's thinking according to which, 
spacing also implies a conceptual ability to ' think across' space.331 
As Heidegger has shown, thinking can 'persist through' distance and 
time to any thing or place.3 32 When one moves through landscape 
space, that person is going 'somewhere' , he or she has a destination, 
and, in a phenomenological sense, part of the individual is already 
there through his or her thinking about the destination. The experi-
ence of landscape space is never simply and alone an aesthetic one 
but a highly situated network of relationships and associations. 
James Corner defines: "Meaning, as embodied in the landscape, is 
also experienced temporally. There is duration of experience, a seri-
alistic and unfolding flow of befors and afters. Just as a landscape can-
not spatially be reduced to a single point of view, it cannot be frozen 
as a single moment in time. The geography of a place becomes known 
to us through an accumulation of fragments, detours and incidents 
that sediment meaning, 'adding up ' over time."333 In The Draughtman's 
Contract the draughtman's perspective frame is explicitly compared to 
camera: the film camera frames and repeats the views, in a series of 
shots poised between subjectivity and objectivity. 
Alan Woods thinks that objectivity is mocked throughout the film, 
as the script explores the paradoxes and naturalised conventions in-
volved in representing 'what is really there'.334 The drawings claim 
a photographic objectivity, but the camera is demonstrating the 
power of cinema as superior not just in realism but also in artifice. 
Any secure contrasts between realism and artifice break down. The 
spectator's perspective is a perspective of witnessed space, which is 
contrasted in the film with a perspective of narrative, or allegorical 
space. Both perspectives are present in cinema, ionised, mingled and 
schematised by Greenaway.335 
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A thousand years ago, Sei Shőnagon, lady-in-waiting to the Imperial 
Court during the Heian dynasty, kept a diary of her thoughts, feelings, 
and experiences — Makura no söshi / the Pillow Book. In Greenaway's Pil-
low Book (1996) the director tells the story of Nagiko, who grows up 
in the city of Kyoto, the daughter of a writer and calligrapher. On her 
every birthday, while her aunt reads out loud from the Pillow Book, her 
father writes (paints) an ancient creation myth on the child's face and 
nape. The Pillow Book is widely held to be not only a consummately 
craf ted work of prose, but also one of the most important historical 
documents of the mid-Heian period. 
Today it survives only in fragmentary form, a montage of impres-
sions, character sketches, anecdotes and acute observations on na-
ture, objects and the everyday life of the court. It is the 164 lists 
that Sei Shőnagon composed within The Pillow Book that are of most 
interest; lists such as "Things that arouse a fond memory of the past", 
"Elegant things", "Rare things", "Distressing things" or "Things that 
quicken the heart". Indeed, there are explicit and implicit references 
to Sei Shönagon's lists. 
We might therefore regard Sei Shönagon's book as providing a lit-
erary counterpart to Greenaway's film, and regard Greenaway as 
reaching back into the distant memory of Japanese culture to dis-
cover the model for his own visual exploration of the everyday life 
of contemporary Japanese culture. The Pillow Book serves Greenaway 
as an example of an alternative mode of representing history and a 
model for organising his filmic impressions. Not only does it provide 
a method, it refers to Sei Shönagon's lists as providing a useful cri-
terion of selection but also we sense the reflections about the disen-
franchisement from political influence that gave rise to such writings, 
as Sei Shönagon's echoes the sensibility of the filmmaker, weary of 
the "intransigence" of history to the cause of social and political jus-
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tice. Hence, the commentary 's description of the prose stylists of the 
Heian period might also, in certain respects, be applicable to Greena-
vvay's own contemplation of the signs of everyday existence: 
Cognitively speaking, in Pillow Book the overall visual metaphor is the 
oriental hieroglyph as a template for a cinema practice. The history 
of Japanese calligraphy is also the history of Japanese painting. In this 
sense, image and text are one. The text is read through the image, 
and the image is seen in the text. With the Japanese hieroglyph pre-
dominantly in mind as a model the subject of such a film would most 
naturally be Japanese. In the Pillow Book there are visual language de-
vices familiar f rom television like insert irames, overlay frames, col-
our-coded frames, and multiple use of image and text. All these have 
been major characteristics of all forms of visual advertising. This film 
engages in this multiple languages using a content that is sympathetic 
and relevant to such treatment. The form and the content are work-
ing very close together. 
The narrative demands a mixture of tenses, and the insert frames 
and multiple screens can embrace images of the past, present and 
future, not sequentially as is traditional, but all at once, arranging 
them in significant patterns of scale, priority, importance and colour, 
not necessarily in clear demarcated blocks but overlaid or interlaced 
to make equivalents to how we perceive time and tense. The frame 
priorities are arranged to accommodate irony, humour and criticism. 
This is all arranged on one viewing plane. It is a reach-out towards 
the freedoms and language that Cubism and Joyce and Eliot gave to 
Modernism. 
Using other possibilities of the complex frame construction, referen-
tial visual quotes are made of East and West, of the old and the new, in 
particular the dominant Western tradition of the Renaissance view-
196 
COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS A N D CINEMATIC MODELLING 
ing-frame and that of the largely unframed Oriental picture space. 
The film borrows the device of the calligraphic chop-signatures (the 
personalised stamp-marks that identified a particular calligraphic art-
ist), for making imprimaturs of other kinds. These it uses to negotiate 
conflicting Western left-to-right and Eastern right-to-left readings. 
The Western reading indicates positive action, spelling confusion to 
any reading of Japanese text and image combinations, while the East-
ern reading seems unbalanced to a Western sensibility, uncorrectable 
in a mirror and even morallv confusing. 
FRAMED IMAGES 
Noel Burch sees that "our contention that all the elements in any giv-
en film image are perceived as equal in importance runs counter to 
a fondly cherished notion of nineteenth-century art critics later em-
braced by a number of twentieth-century photographers: the belief 
that the eye explores a framed image according to a fixed itinerary, 
focusing first on a supposed 'centre of compositional focus' (gener-
ally determined by the t ime-honoured 'golden rectangle'), then trav-
elling through the composition along a path supposedly determined 
by the disposition of its dominant lines."33b Burch thinks that this 
kind of conception is outdated because the modern eye sees things 
differendy.337 There are elements in a film image that call attention 
to themselves more strongly than others, but at the same time the 
spectator is also aware of the compositional whole because looking is 
a mental process. That is why the artist cannot direct our attention as 
closely as certain traditional analyses, based on compositional level, 
are firmly to believe in, but as Durgnat has pointed out, "powerful 
structures can exist without a one-way, linear order".3 3 8 
Cognitively one often sees things as a whole and after that one dips 
into details, which become centre points, but at the same time one 
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looks at the relations, which also become centre points. For example, 
when one looks at a map, a distance between two places, one is not 
looking at a point, but instead a distance between two points, so at 
the same time when we are talking about centre points, we are also 
talking about zones, lines, distances and fuzzy circles. When one sees 
a triangle, one can see it as a shape, as an outline, and one can look at 
the three lines or one can look at the three angles, so it is a question 
of the extreme flexibility of the centration points which constantly 
overlap with each other. In looking at a triangle, one can centre on 
the top apex, and then another apex and another apex; next one can 
centre on the space between the lines, and one can think of the three 
lines as one shape; then one can think of each line on its own, each 
angle on its own. 
One has actually found already over ten centration points without 
moving one's eyes because they are really tension points, some of 
which are as big as the whole triangle, some of which are as small as 
a given angle. While our visual attention moves across an image, its 
major configurations and relationships will keep recurring and reor-
ganizing. Our visual attention moves across an image as if we were 
redirecting a more or less real scene, at least to the extent that an 
image can be a real object and a depiction of something. 
When talking about the varieties of visual coherence, Leo Braudy 
has suggested that a representational art always re-creates the world 
around us as a new form of visual organization."9 And movies, be-
cause they exist in time, expand the shaping possibilities available to 
painting and sculpture. And since their methods are in part so sub-
liminal, movies can constitute a generally available method of creat-
ing visual coherence, the effect of which we can see around us every 
day in paintings, photographs, comic strips, sculpture, life-style, and 
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even the "scenes" our eyes pick up when we walk down the street, 
across a field, or into a room.540 
The main structural similarity between the eye and the camera is that 
both have lenses, and that isn't very significant, since everything in 
their perspective systems is entirely different. The camera captures 
on film a superficial and momentary impression of a scene, with an 
all over evenness which is as un-analytical as it is impartial, and with 
a fixity which renders it incapable of interrogation, correction and 
re-vision. In comparison, human vision, or rather human attention, 
entails the operations of the mind's eye; that is to say, it works like a 
rough-and-ready but versatile and self-correcting computer, which 
can summate and integrate a variety of glances, and for which 'I see' 
means 'I understand' since it functions by feedback between seeing 
and knowing, between seeing-as and interrogation.341 
The visual world around us is rarely at rest: and if it is then we are not, 
because our eyes move so that the image on the retina is constantly 
unstable. And when objects do pass us, they change their fo rm con-
stantly; even the most static objects are in a visual movement when 
we approach them or move our heads. When we are moving through 
visual spaces, the exact definitions are usually less important than 
some kind of rough perception and spatial location. In visual and pic-
torial perception there's a powerful element of analogue approxima-
tion:' It looks roughly like one, so it probably is one. ' For analogy is 
elastic (just as similarity is a matter of degree) and selective (it operates 
even when limited to certain aspects."342 
VISUALISING MEMORIES 
Visual and cognitive perception is not only the gathering of informa-
tion or activating the mind and its representations. It is also some 
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kind of foreboding of future perceptions, as cognitive psychology has 
demonstrated. Visual experience of art is of ten kinetic, and dynamic, 
and deals with psychological and imaginative forces. In a psychologi-
cal framework image-based visual and cognitive discourse functions 
on many emotional, and other levels. The spectator uses a wide set 
of dispositions to make sense of the various levels of image-based 
discourse.343 Perceptual and cognitive inductions differ f rom logical 
inferences, because inferences are thought operations that add some-
thing to the given visual facts by interpreting them. Instead, percep-
tual inductions might be based on previously acquired knowledge of 
the world. If film would depict reality itself, its running time would 
be identical with the action t ime of the illusion. There are pressures 
in this direction, but insofar as a fragment of an action can suggest 
the whole, the general sense of time elastics swiftly. Rapid cutting 
and use of montage may quicken pace and sharpen time, and slow 
cutting can lengthen it, but the content of the narrative can even 
reverse this. Talking about visual perception and montage reflects 
strongly through the film art of Péter Forgács. Forgács started his 
series of films dedicated to the history of Hungary with the film The 
Bartos Family (1988). Forgács has since then assembled these Private 
Hungary documentary series f rom a collection ot home movie stock 
dating back to the 1930s and up to the present.344 On cognitive level 
Forgács's films offer an interesting and demanding way of combin-
ing the tradition of the montage film, archive film, and the so-called 
found footage film. 
Especially Forgács seems to revive the tradition of family film while 
examining the Central European history, and evoking the pathos of 
individuals living their everyday lives against the of ten tragic back-
ground of historically events. There is an ontological dimension in 
the work of Forgács, since his films reflect the work and nature of 
memory, the construction of history, and they create phenomenolog-
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ical reflections on the medium itself. The films have a psychological 
tendency, because they are comprised of intimate diaries, letters, and 
autobiographies. At the same time, they reflect experimental tradi-
tions, and the history of documentary film. Most of his films are col-
laborations with the minimalist composer Tibor Szemző, who creates 
a special sound-space behind the Forgács imagery. 
Usually in a Forgács film, there are at least two levels of narration, the 
macro and micro levels. The macro level offers a documentary view 
in the history of Europe. In this level Forgács uses archive material 
f rom the thirties on, and on micro level, Forgács provides the specta-
tor with an inside look into the family lives of certain individuals dur-
ing those times. For example, in Angelos' Film (1999), the narrative 
goes forwards with the combination of images, sounds, and texts. On 
micro level it tells about the life of a Greek Angelos Papanastassiou 
utilizing lot of home movie stuff photographed by the man himself. 
The pictorial material includes also still photos and maps. The texts 
are used to locate the shown material, and name the people, and 
places and times behind their stories. 
The soundtrack consists of the voices of narrators, music and dif-
ferent sound effects related to the happenings inside the narrative. 
Especially voice-over narration is frequently used, in Angelos' Film this 
is done through the protagonist's own voice or through narra tor ' s 
voice. Also music and other background voices do influence the nar-
rative, and they help the spectator to interpret the given material, 
and the connections between the parts and the whole of the narrative 
structure. The film depicts war and death, but also life and birth. It 
tells about shocking terror and cruelty, but also about happiness and 
hope. There are many symbolic levels in this and other films. Usually, 
the single images and scenes symbolize something larger. 
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The Danube Exodus (1998) is a film, where Forgács uses footage shot 
by riverboat Captain Nándor Andrásovits to follow his voyages up and 
down Danube, through Bulgarian and Romanian territory, transport-
ing Hungarian Jews to the Black Sea for passage to Palestine, and 
then returning with German farmers, driven out ol Bessarabia by 
the Soviet army for eventual relocation in occupied Poland. In the 
film these happenings and voyages are chronicled in illustrative ways. 
The depicts the special passages in European history, the intercon-
nected stories into a fascinating experience by showing lot ol intimate 
connections under fear and destruction. The narration goes on with 
voices of commentary, and the feelings are of ten made stronger with 
special sound effects connected with the happenings. The relation-
ship with the image and sound is of ten counter-pointed. Szemzö's 
music reveals the real nature of the film material, and of ten provokes 
the spectator to interpret things in a certain way. Music can even 
change the content of the images, and through that it can lead the 
spectator to build up certain meanings. 
Cognitively, a process of focusing the gaze occurs in Forgács's oeuvre. 
We might normally arrange to overlook a shot's edges, even when 
our protagonist walks off it, abruptly disappearing, or are laterally 
bisected at the neck (in close-ups) or waist (in mid-shots). If we 
mentally abstract the shot f rom its own edges, we connect each shot 
with the next, although they are visibly separate entities, and not 
simultaneously visible. In Forgács's films montage depends on this 
mental overriding of the film's form. The perceptual movements like 
eye movements and re-focusing of the attention, or more elusively 
mental, like movements of attention, are physiological. As co-ordina-
tions ol mental and physical operations, they involve physical ten-
sions, which aesthetic theory has treated in terms of tension, rhythm, 
balance, and all the other elements of pictorial composition and its 
many significations. 
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This is special tor cognitive understanding of Forgács's films. Images 
seem to provoke these factors in which real life viewing does not. 
This is partly through the picture's tight unity, partly through the 
relative restriction of the eye movements, partly through contradic-
tions between the pattern and the implied scene, and partly insofar 
as looking at images uncouples perceptual processes f rom most being 
there reflexes, leaving them available instead for more sensitive signifi-
cance. Forgács's documentary material is shot in real-life situations, 
w hich is reflected in these images, and it brings in new levels of tes-
timony into the narrative. 
Although montage by Forgács deals in successive, separate shots, not 
one continuing shot it involves exactly the same visual mechanisms 
and elements. But whereas the single, continuing shot is an image with 
sub-configurations, the sequences are configurations, some of whose 
sub-configurations are images. In a sense, the eye has less freedom, 
since the succession and duration of each image is controlled, and 
presumably eye movements cease or diminish, at least if the editing 
is fast enough. On cognitive level the mind has more freedom, since 
the on-going configuration never presents itself as a fixed whole. It is 
a deduction f rom the multiplicity of images and held together only in 
the memory. In a film shot the form disappears as fast as it appears. 
The structure is space in time but like the single image, it combines 
looseness in some respects with integration in others. Integration 
means that shots have a pictorial relationship with one another. For 
example, the juxtapositi6n of two strong compositions can create a 
shock, a collision, and a sensation of optical clash, or contradiction, 
and a kind of kinetic dynamic. The montage by Forgács brings in new 
associations, and cognitive understanding of art and film. Many nar-
rative levels are mixed and brought together. 
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This might mean looseness in that sense, that the eye can prioritise 
the change of shot, and concentrate instead upon elements that link 
two shots. Thus one can recognize a second shape as the same thing 
from another angle, and prioritise the continuity. The juxtaposition 
of shots is only a prelude to the semantic interaction between shots. 
Editing practice is dominated by the dialectics of contrast and con-
tinuity, difference and similarity. The spectator's mind must handle 
all this very fast, usually relating two shots and overlooking the cut. 
Frequently the spectator does to the cut what he does to the edge: he 
overlooks it, since it is more important to focus on the information 
within each shot. But there are cases, when the clash, the "interval" 
between the shots, becomes conspicuous. 
Forgács's films mix macro- and micro levels of narration, and there-
fore try to repair the web of time. The problem of representing his-
tory for Forgács is bound up with finding a new way to write history, 
one that acknowledges, rather than occludes. Forgács searches the 
processes of constructing history; a form ot history that finds a place 
for history's indeterminacies, in terms of both the limits of represen-
tation and the problems that beset our understanding of the tempo-
ral. Another way for Forgács involves an attempt to convey something 
of history's polyphony and, through the mutability of signification 
and the refusal of closure, to represent story as a living presence, 
bring the images and sounds of the past into living again. 
We might say that, for example, Forgács's Free Fall (1996) is a dem-
onstration of such a model of history What memory chooses to re-
member is a central theme in Forgác's films. Memory is the bridge 
between space and time. There are many moments in Forgács's films, 
which are described, as being among those memories whose only 
function is to leave behind nothing but memories. Forgács thinks 
through his images and sounds that the different concepts of t ime is 
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the great question of the century. According to this belief we live in a 
world of intensely tiny units of time. The real world and our image of 
the world no longer coincide. Szernsö's music is eerily effective, and 
Forgács turns salvaged images into a vivid glimpse of the lost world. 
The spontaneous gestures, improvised scenes, and concrete situa-
tions were not designed as indicators of broad historical forces but as 
animated mementos ot personal history.345 
Forgács's modes of presentation within the film represent a critical 
engagement with the question of representation itself. A more flex-
ible approach to the characterisations within Forgács's would there-
fore be to see these characters as positions within the film, which 
are mobilised to a variety ot structural, as well as autobiographical 
ends. They represent alternate approaches to representation, alter-
nate strategies and aesthetics to the question of the representation of 
memory which are deployed in the course of the films, and which at 
various moments Forgács himself has deployed. 
Forgács insists on there being no simple equivalence between the 
photographic images that record an event and events themselves, 
undermining any notion of an immanent relation between the two. 
The photographic image as a trace of an event acquires a materiality 
that substitutes itself for the contingency of the passing momen t it 
depicts. The photographic image renders a precise moment in time. 
Complicating this still turther, any at tempt to preserve a simple op -
position between events and the images used to depict them has to 
take into account the presence of technologies such as film or pho-
tography at those events, t his presence represents an intervention 
one that inflects and shapes the experiences and events it seeks to 
record. In this sense, by embracing cultural simultaneity in an ulti-
mate eclecticism of images across time and space, Forgács responds 
to the major social and cultural changes. 
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The rich repertoire of shooting and editing techniques in Forgács's 
films are employed to gain the spectator's complicity, by disarming 
and penetrating the subject f rom every possible angle. In documenta-
ry film, various kinds of direct and indirect address have been added 
to the expository techniques. For Forgács, it is an ethical imperative 
of representation that it declares its means, rather than present film 
as a transitive instrument of reality. In this respect, Forgács's criti-
cal use of self-reflexivity as a technique of raising self- consciousness 
should be differentiated from the more conservative and modish uses 
of self-reflexivity in much contemporary postmodernism. Devices 
for keeping the framing operations of the cinematic medium at the 
forefront of our consciousness comprise, on the one hand, strategies 
of interruption which draw the viewer's attention to the processes 
of construction, such as altering the speed of the film, freezing an 
image, substituting photographs for moving footage, or "tampering" 
with the image - for instance, "arbitrarily" altering the colour tones 
of images and sequences. This self-reflexivity extends even to discuss-
ing openly the processes of composition. 
The classical unities of time and place are constantly interrupted as 
Forgács's films traverse different places and different times, bringing 
them into a dialectical relationship with each other. At times, the ka-
leidoscopic nature of a Forgács film may convey a sense of randomness 
and even disorientation for the spectator, who searches in vain for the 
familiar footholds of the conventions of traditional narrative cinema. 
Forgács insists that his audience dispense with these structures and 
adapt to a different way of reading. The viewer has to respond to 
shifting modes of signification, and interpret the film according to 
both diachronic and synchronic modes of reading, constantly refer-
ring to what has gone before and reappraising its significance. Hence, 
to come to terms with the film's found footage requires one to fol-
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low the film's many-sided narrative, to attend closely to the style of 
presentation, which is inextricable from its content.346 
Cognitively an essential feature of the originality and challenging na-
ture of Free Füll is the form in which it unfolds its themes. Themes 
emerge both sequentially and cyclically, discreetly arising out of sub-
tle correspondences and repetitions that the edits establish in the 
course of the film. Forgács consciously and consistently undermines 
any clear hierarchical structure of the film's elements, replacing this 
with a more democratic form of shifting moments, in which each 
moment ot the film acquires a relative equality. This pertains even to 
the presentation of key imagery within the film. Although, as the film 
progresses, certain recurring images become of particular impor-
tance in the elaboration of the film's themes, and there is no attempt 
immediately to impose the larger significance of this imagery within 
the film upon the viewer's consciousness. 
On cognitive level, many of the most poignant images appear and 
disappear f rom the screen in a matter of seconds, whilst other less 
plangent moments may prevail for a longer duration. Only through 
an acute attentiveness to the associations that arise out of the juxta-
positions of commentary and images and the reoccurrences of cer-
tain structural units of the film does the viewer begin to decipher the 
significance of particular passages and their bearing on the film as a 
whole. The momentum of the film thus centres on the juxtaposi-
tions of images and the suggestive relationships of continuity and dis-
continuity, which these establish with the soundtrack and commen-
tary. Forgács's editing is exceptionally intricate, establishing subtle 
and complex relations between the diverse components of his found 
footage films. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Cognitive science is committed to the reasonable view that the mind 
is a representational system, that is, an intentional system that trans-
forms, processes, stores, and retrieves information about the world. 
The arts are cognitive and a matter of active thinking. The symbol sys-
tem approach to cognition identifies the different arts as each being 
a different symbol system, and thinking in the arts as processing, or 
conducting operations on, the symbols of one of these systems. This 
establishes the arts as cognitive. It also establishes them as unique 
because each art medium is a different symbol system, and therefore 
thinking within each symbol system is a unique kind of thinking. 
Cognitive science is based on a non-behaviouristic, psychological 
framework of research. To understand visual phenomena, behaviour, 
or language, we need to understand the mechanisms and structures 
by which these activities are processed by the human mind and brain. 
Aspects of cognitive research and thinking have their roots in Ge-
stalt psychology and phenomenology. Cognitive science has several 
philosophical implications. Cognitive science - and not only that 
subdivision of cognitive science that concerns itself with film theory 
- is a set of concepts and methods that is opposed to psychoanalysis, 
behaviourist psychology, post-structuralism and deconstruction. It 
shares more common ground with Gestalt psychology, phenomenol-
ogy and structural linguistics. The essentiality of mental processes is 
typical for cognitive approach. Top-down and bot tom-up processes 
are used by many constructive theories. Gestalt psychology is inter-
ested in perceptual organization, which means how we unite things 
and elements into patterns or objects. Cognitive science is not only 
interested in the content of mental representations, but also in where 
this content comes from, because for a mental entity or state to be 
a representation, it must not only have content, but also it must be 
significant. 
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In cognitive approach the theoretical foundation lies in schema theo-
ry. Schemes are expectations or anticipations through which the past 
influences the future. This whole perceptual process is a perceptual 
cycle. Schemes are complex types of cognitive structures representing 
both generic social experiences and cultural knowledge. They contain 
the common and characteristic features of similar phenomena, for 
example similar objects, events, situations or discourses, and they 
exist in the minds of individual subjects as psychic structure, but they 
are also linked to the historical, social, and cultural realities. Relat-
ing this to media content, one can say that daily life experiences are 
behind the schemes, and they reflect historical, social, and cultural 
circumstances. 
Perception is an active and constructive process. Perception does not 
come straight f rom sensory information but is more likely a com-
bination of the interaction between sensory information, internal 
hypotheses, expectations, and knowledge. The different theories, 
and scientific approaches to perception have open up horizons in 
this field. A broader view of perception can see these different ap-
proaches as complements of each other, and help us with a bet ter 
understanding of the whole process. The perceptual laws and other 
gestalt psychological principles can help and guide us how to organ-
ize perceptions into unified patterns and objects. Different percep-
tions are consequences of different schemes that will change during 
lifetime, and in the perception ot art this seems that the same work 
of art looks different while to be watched during different periods of 
life. Perception consists of forming visual concepts, and mental rep-
resentations, and making an image is like producing representational 
concepts 011 the basis of visual concepts. These concepts and repre-
sentations are structures consisting of essential and special features. 
Perception is not only the gathering of information or activating the 
mind and its representations, but it is also foreboding of future per-
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ceptions, because visual experience is dynamic, and deals with psy-
chological forces. 
The perception of images requires some kind of thinking, compari-
son, knowledge, experience, and attention. Through experience an 
observer works toward solution that is highly appropriate, and this 
process leads into interpretation. Partly the process is unconscious, 
and that is why an observer sees through image perception the target, 
and does not consciously think all of his or her choices. When ob-
serving an image, one single and special feature can already activate 
representations of the mind, and lead to the recognition of objects. 
So, the testing of different hypotheses is not every time necessary. 
On the other hand, the perception ot images is also connected with 
the understanding of spatial structures and relations, and this kind of 
understanding requires visual thinking. The historical, philosophical 
approach to aesthetic deals with what aestheticians have said, styles 
in aesthetic dialogues, and schools of aesthetic thought. It offers a 
structured approach, closely resembling the content structure and 
teaching methodologies found in general education. 
This kind of educational and philosophical perspective is compatible 
with academic rationalism, because it is an intellectualised approach 
to aesthetics. Aesthetics is a unique form of perception and experi-
ence, and the proponents of this approach usually believe that art 
can provide intense experiences that entail perception of visual and 
tactile qualities integral to the object being viewed. There are real 
differences in aesthetics concerning the works of art. Some ot them 
are better than others, and this means something different than that 
a given person simply likes some works of art better than others. A 
central conception of cognitive art education is transfer, an ability to 
apply one's learning in new situations. Theoretical problems that de-
velop form assumptions of transfer have been discussed widely 
212 
CONCLUSIONS 
Art is the product of social, and cognitive factors. It is a situation 
where individuals gain, and apply different strategies towards art 
through schemes, replacements, forms, and experiences. Schemes 
are developed through social interaction. Works of art are related to 
a variety of contexts, including the world they represent, the artist 
who made them, the audience, and the art world and various aspects 
of the culture in which they were produced. The major philosophies 
of art consider these relations crucial for interpretation, and as asset 
of concentric circles, each containing what the previous one thought 
relevant and adding something new to it. For contemporary theories 
of art, the question of what is valuable about art is quite separate f rom 
the question how one identifies something as a work of art. Theories 
of art as a foundation for interpretation provide insights and they 
entail more work on the part of teacher and student alike. Teachers 
will have to present works of art in a more studied context, knowing 
something about the history of art, the art world, and art theories 
which will better enable them to explain the artist's intentions, theo-
ries of art the work rejects or internalises, technique and style. Stu-
dents will also have to develop grounding in art history, theory and 
knowledge about the different contexts (cultural, historical) of the 
work. The artwork does not simply offer a 'reflection of reality', but 
first and foremost it offers a type of engagement: it projects a state of 
being with the world in which the ineffable finds itself controlled. 
The act of seeing necessarily involves associated thoughts, which may 
briefly replace visual attention. The eyes make many exploratory 
movements, saccadic glances, which are prompted largely by expec-
tations associated with the preceding glances, or by attraction f rom 
conspicuous feature within larger zones. Even in peripheral areas of 
vision movements swiftly pre-empt attention tor obvious bio-func-
tional reasons. Visual and cognitive perception is not only the gather-
ing of information or activating the mind and its representations. It is 
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also some kind of foreboding of future perceptions, as cognitive psy-
chology has demonstrated. Visual experience of art is of ten kinetic, 
and dynamic, and deals with psychological and imaginative forces. 
In film movement draws the eye, and its vectors and trajectories usu-
ally override the static (visible) elements of the composition. The 
contradiction between the pictorial scene and the frame is relegated 
to a very low-priority awareness, and instead one concentrates on the 
scene, where the interesting and fruitful information lies. Although 
the composition of the picture guides our eye, few of the eye's move-
ments reproduce the picture's compositional lines. Nonetheless, the 
composition looms large in our apprehension, as one keeps encoun-
tering its structure. One can never see every possible configuration, 
or every detail, because our seeing is always selective, and though 
sometimes one can stay content with the obvious, and pre-coded 
form, one is also guided by important inputs f rom non-visual content 
and context. 
In cinematic narration editing depends on knowledge, and impli-
cation. The art of editing is the art of anticipating the spectator 's 
expectations and questions, and at a pace to which he or she can 
readily adapt. In cinematic narration shots contribute to the logic of 
implication. Logic of ten implies causality, or some otherwise nec-
essary relationship with determining prescriptions and inexorable 
consequences, as distinct f rom looser relationships, influences and 
tendencies. Usefully it stresses the positivism of the process, the idea 
that mental constructions are forceful and strong enough to form a 
structure on which film form (including editing) can rely. 
On cognitive level, the problem, for example, of representing his-
tory for is bound up with finding another way to write history, one 
that acknowledges the processes of constructing history; a form of 
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history that finds a place for history's indeterminacies, in terms of 
both the limits of representation and the problems that beset our un-
derstanding of the temporal. Modes of presentation within the film 
represent a critical engagement with the question of representation 
itself. The human mind sets out from several aspects of a task-in-situ-
ation simultaneously, and what it offers as a solution to these multiple 
requirements is the product of convergence f rom every feature of 
content, context, function, and goal including desire, wish-fulfilment 
and fear. 
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GLOSSARY OF CRITICAL TERMS347 
ANGLE The positioning of a motion-picture camera so as to view a 
given scene. A camera may be placed straight on to a scene; or it may 
be placed at a side angle, high angle or low angle. Many of the early 
cinematographers failed to recognize the aesthetic values of camera 
angles. The tendency was to place the camera in a single straight-on, 
wide angle view of a scene. This was particularly t rue for filming of 
action on sets. Early sets tended to be theatrical and flat and, there-
fore, were limited in the dimensionality that would have allowed an-
gle shooting. To "angle" the camera in the early years of filmmaking 
meant to risk overshooting the flat theatrical settings. The angle of a 
shot is regarded to have both compositional and psychological values. 
It also aids in diminishing the "flatness" or two-dimensionality ol a 
scene by placing scenic elements into an oblique relationship to one 
another. By so doing, the angle provides a varied perspective of the 
scene. 
AUTEUR THEORY A theory that says there is a person primarily 
responsible for the entire style and treatment ot the content of the 
film. Generally used in reference to a director with a recognizable 
style and thematic preoccupation. The theory also covers other pro-
duction personnel (writers, performers, cinematographers, editors) 
who are seen as the major force behind a given film. More particular-
ly, film auteurs function within the boundaries of studio production 
systems and are distinguishable from film artists, who have nearly to-
tal control over all aspects of production. The auteur theory was first 
discussed by Francois Truffaut in an article, " l i n e certaine tendance 
du cinéma francais," written in 1954 for the French film magazine 
Cahiers du Cinéma. Andrew Sarris, an American critic for The Village 
Voice, is given credit for bringing Truffaut's ideas on auteur criticism 
to the United States. 
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AVANT-GARDE A movement toward innovation in the arts in 
the-1920s, encompassing such approaches as cubism, surrealism and 
dadaism, and including experimentation in filmmaking. Avant-garde 
is often applied in contemporary criticism to any film, which em-
ploys new, original techniques and experimental approaches in ex-
pressing ideas on film. The first avant-garde filmmakers produced 
two general types of films: those which employed techniques com-
monly associated with the Dada and surrealist movements in literature 
and art, and those which were non-narrative and abstract in quality. 
The impetus behind the first film avant-garde movement grew out of 
a revolt against cinema realism. The filmmakers embraced surreal-
ism because of its "belief in the higher reality of certain hitherto ne-
glected forms of association, in the omnipotence of the dream, in the 
disinterested play ot thought," as stated by surrealism^ s spokesman, 
Andre Breton. The surrealist movement also provided filmmakers 
with opportunities for the parody of painting, sex, psychology, con-
temporary politics, and the motion picture itself. The surrealists 
seized upon and photographed a variety of material phenomena and 
arranged these "word pictures" in disparate, illogical ways to effect 
subjective, dreamlike meanings. They did not want their images to 
have a mimetic life, but a spiritual life - to become images sprung 
free from material existence. Man Ray's films Emak Bakia (1927) and 
L'Etoile de Mer (1928) and Luis Bunuel's and Salvador Dali's Un Chien 
Andalou (1928) are representative of these surrealist impulses. Surre-
alism by no means dominated the film avant-garde, either in practice 
or in theory Within the movement there was a group of filmmakers 
who were advocates of cinéma pur, "pure cinema": artists who wanted 
to return the medium to its elemental origins. One of them was René 
Clair, who wrote in 1921: "Let us return to the birth of cinema: 'The 
cinematograph', says the dictionary, 'is a machine designed to project 
animated pictures on a screen.' The Art that comes from such an in-
s t rument must be an art of vision and movement. The cinema purists 
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- Clair, Viking Eggeling, Fernand Leger, Hans Richter, among others 
- were interested in the rhythm, movement and cadence of objects 
and images within a film - the building of an internal energy through 
which vision and movement would become both the form and the 
meaning of the film. The film titles of the cinema purists suggest the 
musical-like emphasis on animated pictures: Rhytmus 21, Le Ballet Mé-
canique, Symphony Diagonale, The March of the Machines, Berlin: The Sym-
phony of a City. The pure-cinema interests were not limited to rhytmi-
cal abstractions alone, but also manifested themselves in the fiction 
film: in Jean Renoir 's adaptation from 1926 of Emile Zola's Nana, a 
film where the original plot is incidental and Renoir abstractly treats 
Zola's story; in Carl Th. Dreyer 's The Passion ojJoan of Arc (1928), 
where the ordered use of extreme close-ups produces a spiritual re-
sponse to the face; and in Jean Cocteau's Blood oj a Poet (1930), a film 
made up almost entirely of visual transformations which take place in 
the mind of the poet. 
BEHAVIOURISM A form of psychology that analyses human be-
haviour in terms of stimulus-response mechanisms and that discounts 
the importance, or even existence, of consciousness and will. It has 
proved a highly provocative approach, and can easily be caricatured 
as an at tempt to see all human life in terms of the dog that salivates 
every time a bell rings because it has been conditioned to associate 
the ringing of a bell with the arrival of food. Behaviourism, however, 
is capable of rather more sophisticated formulations than this, and 
remains of interest to film theorists trying to understand the rela-
tionships between films and their spectators. 
BLOCKING The preparatory working out of the mise-en-scéne, the 
visual composition of the scenes of a film. It involves planning and 
rehearsing the positions and movements of the actors, costume, sets, 
scenery, lighting and the position and set-up of cameras and other 
equipment. 
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CINEMATIC A critical t e rm expressing an awareness of that which 
is peculiar and unique to the film medium. "Cinematic" generally 
encompasses the full range of techniques available in cinema. When 
applied to a specific film, the term is used to indicate that the film-
maker has employed the editing and visual devices, themes, or struc-
tural approaches which are especially appropriate to the medium. 
"Cinematic" can also be defined historically by examining the in-
novations of early film artists who sought to break the new medium 
away f rom the artistic traditions of the legitimate theater. These in-
novations - peculiar to the film medium - included the use of camera 
angles, realistic decor in dramatic setting, mobile camera, naturalistic 
acting, optical techniques (dissolves, fades, superimpositions, irises), 
and especially the advantages of cinema editing which allowed (1) 
variety in the scope of shots, (2) rhythmical control of dramatic ac-
tion, and (3) the ability to move freely in time and space through 
editing. "Cinematic" has also been used to describe certain kinds 
of story material which seem especially suited to the film medium. 
The chase, for example, is regarded as a narrative element which is 
peculiarly cinematic. The te rm has also been used in literary criticism 
to describe fictional methods which suggest certain affinities with the 
cinema. Likenesses have been drawn between film techniques and 
the fictional methods of such writers as James Joyce, Marcel Proust, 
Virginia Woolf, John Dos Passos, William Faulkner, Gustave Flaubert, 
and many others. Primarily the cinematic analog)' has been used be-
cause of these authors' temporal (time) arrangement of their mate-
rial. 
CLOSE-UP A shot in which the image of the subject or its most 
important part fills most of the frame. A close-up shot of a person 
usually includes the head and part of the shoulders. The close-up 
has been recognized as a device for (1) directing audience attention, 
(2) establishing identification with and immediacy for screen charac-
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ters, (3) isolating detail in a scene, (4) creating visual variety in film 
scenes, and (5) providing dramatic emphasis. Emotions, feelings, and 
nuances can be suggested by the close-up merely magnifying and iso-
lating an individual in an intensely dramatic moment . Similarly, the 
close-up view of an object - e.g., a hand or a gun -bestows and conveys 
dramatic significance which might be lost in longer scenic shots. The 
duration or length of time that a close-up remains on the screen also 
has importance as dramatic material. By sustaining close-up shots of 
a character's face, it is possible for the filmmaker to suggest thoughts 
and feelings. The French critic Andre Bazin observed that if an object 
or person is left on the screen long enough it will begin to lay bare its 
own reality. This unique perceptual possibility that exists through the 
close-up is a source of expressive power for the filmmaker as in Carl 
Th. Dreyer 's The Passion of Joan of Arc (1928). 
CODE The rules or forms that can be observed to allow a message 
to be understood, to signify. Codes are the rules operating on the 
means of expression (and, thus, are distinct f rom the means of ex-
pression). For example, Christian Metz treated cinema and cinematic 
text as fields of signification in which a heterogeneity of codes, some 
specific to the cinema and others not, interacted with one another in 
ways that were specific, systematic and determinate at certain speci-
fied levels of cinematic discourse (individual films, particular genres) 
and hence at certain specified levels of analysis. Among specifically 
cinematic codes he distinguished codes of editing and framing, of 
lighting, of colour versus black and white, of the articulation of sound 
and movement, of composition, and so on. Non-cinematic codes in-
cluded costume, gesture, dialogue, characterisation and facial expres-
sion. A further distinction was made between cinematic codes and 
cinematic sub-codes, where the former organise elements potentially 
or actually common to all films, say lighting, and the latter refer to 
specific choices made within a particular code, say, that of low-key 
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in preference to high-key lighting. Codes, therefore, do not conflict, 
whereas sub-codes do, it being a matter of one choice rather than an-
other. Different codes and their sub-codes are in syntagmatic relation 
of combination; sub-codes f rom the same code are in a paradigmatic 
relation of substitution. For example, Umber to Eco contended that, 
far from inhabiting a domain below the level of codic organisation, 
images owe their very existence to the workings of cultural codes, of 
which no fewer than ten are potentially operative in the communica-
tion of the image: codes of perception, codes of transmission, codes 
of recognition, tonal codes, iconic codes, iconographic codes, codes 
of taste and sensibility, rhetorical codes, stylistic codes and codes of 
the unconscious. 
COGNITIVE FILM THEORY A sub-division or spin-off f rom cog-
nitive science that explores the similarities and differences between 
the processing information that takes place in viewing a film and the 
processing of information that occurs in the non-cinematic environ-
ment. A film can be regarded as a simulation of a (possible) real-life 
situation that engages the viewer's intellect, emotions and body, and 
that involve a complex negotiation between fiction and reality Key 
cognitive film theorists include Joseph D. Anderson, David Bordwell, 
Edward Branigan and Noel Carroll in the USA; Murray Smith in the 
LIK; Gregory Currie in Australia; the Dutch film theorist Ed Tan; and 
the Danish film theorist Torben Grodal. It is significant, and disturb-
ing, that all of these theorists are male. Although there is no a priori 
reason why women should not become leading exponents of cogni-
tive film theory, it is notable that such theory can, in some instances, 
take on a crass, stereotypically male, what-nonsense-you're-talking 
tone. While cognitive film theory is generally seen as opposed to 
psychoanalysis and to semiotics, a number of European film theorists 
have attempted to create an approach that combines cognitive film 
theory and semiotics in a 'cognitive semiotics' of film. These include 
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Francesco Casetti, Christian Metz in his The Impersonal Enunciation 
(1995), Roger Odin, Michel Colin and Dominique Chateau. See 
Warren Buckland, The Cognitive Semiotics of Film, (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000). 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE A discipline that is concerned to explore 
and identify the ways in which the human mind comes to know - to 
cognise - the world through the senses, the mind and the emotions. 
It draws on biology, psychology and computer science in order to 
generate models of how human animals process information in or-
der to survive and adapt in the environments in which they live. In 
contrast to psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, cognitive science 
tends to be holistic, to see the senses, the mind and the emotions as 
forming a psychosomatic whole rather than as riven by conflict and in 
thrall to desire and illusion. It also tends to be ecological, to explore 
the interaction between human beings, other living organisms, and 
their environment. 
COMPOSITION The distribution, balance, and general relationship 
of masses and degrees of light and shade, line and color within a pic-
ture area. The impact of these elements in a film shot depends upon 
certain psychological and learned facets of visual perception. Lighter 
objects attract the eye more readily than darker objects; therefore, 
light can be used as a means of achieving compositional emphasis. 
Mass, volume, and movement also have importance for emphasis 
in frame composition. A single figure separated f rom a crowd will 
usually stand out as significant. Similarly, a moving actor will draw 
attention away f rom static figures. Because of the kinetic nature of 
the cinema, composition is rarely static, and, hence, emphasis and 
psychological impact through composition are constantly in a state of 
flux. A straight-on view of a scene in which actors and objects have 
been harmoniously arranged so as to fill with equal "weight" all ar-
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eas of the screen frame is said to be formally balanced. In a deathbed 
scene., formal composition can be achieved by photographing the 
scene from a straight-on view taken at the foot of the bed. The place-
ment of a nurse on one side of the bed and a doctor on the other 
side adds further formality to the scene which would have been lost 
if both the nurse and the doctor had been placed on the same side 
of the bed, or if a sharp side angle had been chosen for the camera's 
positioning. The "balanced" arrangement of characters and objects 
and the straight-on photography causes the scene to appear "at rest." 
Whereas formal composition connotes harmony and an at-rest feel-
ing in a scene, a slanted, or Dutch angle, shot produces a sense of 
unrest. 
DECONSTRUCTION (sometimes called 'deconstructionism' or 
'deconstructivism'): An approach to philosophical and cultural anal-
ysis primarily associated with the French thinker Jacques Derrida. 
Deconstruction has three main targets: the idea of a fixed, single 
meaning, the idea of essence (for example, the view that there is an 
essential human nature), and the idea of presence (for instance, the 
idea that Shakespeare speaks to us in his sonnets). The characteristic 
deconstructive procedure is to examine a text very carefully in order 
to bring out the ways in which its ostensible or intended meaning 
is subverted by other meanings that can be discerned in that text, 
meanings that are of ten unnoticed, ignored, or relegated to subsidi-
ary or marginal status. It aims to demonstrate that even the most 
apparently literal text is inevitably invaded by metaphors that desta-
bilise it and lead it into contradiction. The same subversive processes 
undermine any appeal to essences and presences. A deconstructive 
approach to film would thus reject auteur theory - the idea that the 
presence of an author-director can be discerned through the marks 
of his style in a film - and reality theory - the view, associated with 
Bazin and Kracauer, that sees film first of all in terms of its relation 
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to reality. Deconstruction would aim to show how any film calls into 
question its ostensible meanings, its reality-status and its essentialist 
propositions, and would attend to elements of the film that had hith-
erto been little discussed or explicitly set aside as unimportant. 
DISCOURSE The kind of language employed in particular areas of 
cultural and social activity - for example, in medicine, law, and sexual-
ity. Each discourse has its specialised vocabulary, structure and body 
of imagery. In the highly influential perspective of Michel Foucault 
(1926-84), discourses are never simply reflections of reality; rather, 
they serve to construct the reality that they purpor t to analyses and 
to produce a knowledge of that 'reality' that furthers the interests of 
power and surveillance. For example, discourses of sexuality serve 
to produce particular categories of behaviour such as homosexuality, 
and to control sexuality (which does not necessarily mean repressing 
it). Foucault's ideas have been highly influential in the fields of femi-
nism and of gay, gender and postcolonial studies, all areas in which 
discourses - about women, about homosexuality, about the 'native' 
and the 'Orient ' - can be analysed in terms of the way in which they 
construct purported realities and serve the interests of power. 
E M B E D D E D SERIES, E M B E D D I N G SERIES Terms used by 
Torben Grodal in his Moving Pictures. An embedding series is a domi-
nant narrative sequence within which another narrative sequence -
an embedded series - is implied and made at least partly explicit. For 
example, in a detective thriller that centred around solving a murder, 
the embedding series would be the narrative sequence of the detec-
tive's quest to solve the murder, while the embedded series would be 
what the detective was trying to reconstruct and make explicit - the 
sequence of events that led up to the murder and the murderer ' s sub-
sequent attempts to escape detection. Not all ot the implicit details of 
an embedded series will necessarily be made explicit, however. There 
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is a famous anecdote that Howard Hawks, while directing the film 
adaptation (1946) of Raymond Chandler's Philip Marlowe novel The 
Big Sleep (1939), 'once cabled Chandler during the shoot to ask who 
was supposed to have killed General Sternwood's chauffeur during 
the original story. Chandler sent back a wire saying " N O IDEA".' 
(Tom Hiney, Raymond Chandler.- A Biography (London: Vintage, 1998), 
p. 163) The murder of Sternwood's chauffeur was an event in the 
embedded series of The Big Sleep, but even the author of the original 
novel could not make it explicit. 
ENACTION, ENACTIVE Terms employed by Torben Grodal in 
his Moving Pictures to indicate a physical and mental preparation for 
an active response to perceptual, associative and emotional stimuli. 
'Me viewer of a film does not usually translate this preparation into 
action, though this may happen sometimes - as with the audiences 
who rioted in response to the excitations provided by The Blackboard 
Jungle (1955), which used the song 'Rock Around the Clock' on its 
soundtrack, and the film Rock Around the Clock (1956) itself. Even so, 
the viewer cannot actually enter and act in the world represented on 
the screen. Nonetheless, as Grodal says, 'cognitive and "subliminal" 
motor stimulations of motor schemata exist as underlying, but sup-
pressed and projected, patterns in the viewing situation ... In mo-
ments of peak tension during an action-suspense fiction, diis muscu-
lar pattern will surface as a barely suppressed muscular tension in the 
viewer aiming at release in physical action.' (Grodal (1997), 48) 
EPISTEMOLOGY The branch of philosophy concerned with the 
grounds and nature of knowledge and with the methods of arriving at 
knowledge. It addresses such questions as: What does it mean to say 
that we know something? What is the difference between knowledge 
and belief. Are there different kinds of knowledge - for example, the 
knowledge that we acquire through experience and the knowledge 
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that we acquire through a supposedly scientific statement ( 'The earth 
goes round the sun')? In relation to film theory, epistemology can 
be applied in two main ways. It can be used to evaluate the claims to 
knowledge made by film theories themselves, so that, for example, a 
theory of film that draws heavily on psychoanalysis may be challenged 
by questioning the status of psychoanalysis as a fo rm of knowledge 
and pointing to its speculative, untestable nature. Epistemology can 
also be used to consider the kinds of knowledge that the viewer ac-
quires f rom film - is it primarily knowledge of reality, for example, as 
Bazin and Kracauer might suggest, or knowledge of signifying prac-
tices, as a formalist or post-structuralist approach might emphasise? 
In what ways does the knowledge that the viewer might feel s/he is 
acquiring from a film relate to her knowledge that the film is an illu-
sion? This is a fascinating field that merits lurther exploration. 
FUNCTIONALISM The view that cultural practices are to be un-
derstood in terms of the functions that they serve in maintaining the 
existence of a society or a group within a society. In this perspective, 
even apparently non-functional practices - artistic or cinematic prac-
tices, for example are seen as performing social functions, even if the 
way in which they do so is not obvious. Hollywood film can be seen, 
for example, as functioning to maintain the existence of the USA by 
reinforcing its dominant ideology (even when it may appear to chal-
lenge that ideology). When Eisenstein proposes an 'intellectual cinema 
of unprecedented form and social functionalism', he wants films that 
will function to contribute to the revolutionary transformation of 
society in a socialist direction. The coupling o f ' f o r m ' with ' function' 
alludes to a highly influential idea in twentieth-century architecture, 
summed up in Louis Sullivan's maxim that ' form follows function' 
- that the functions that a building is to serve should determine its 
architectural design. A controversial idea within architecture itself, it 
is interesting to consider how it might be applied to film. 
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GAZE A way of looking at other people that turns them into objects 
of sensuous and possibly sadistic contemplation. The te rm has been 
especially influential in the kind of feminist film criticism that derives 
from Laura Mulvey. In this perspective, woman, in a patriarchal or-
der, is the object of the male gaze, and mainstream narrative film reinforces 
this order by displaying women as objects for that gaze. The idea ot 
the gaze is closely connected with the idea of covert erotic observa-
tion voyeurism - and with what Freud called Schaulust (usually trans-
lated as 'scopophilia'), the pleasure in looking that is a displaced form 
of the desire to look fully and frankly at the genitals. 
GESTALT A branch of psychological theory that argues that the 
human mind and senses work by perceiving pat terned wholes rather 
than by assembling items of data. Gestalt psychology is interested, 
for example, in what it calls the Aha!' experience - the moment at 
which what has hitherto seemed a random assembly of data is per-
ceived and understood as a patterned whole (as when, in watching a 
detective film, the viewer suddenly grasps the whole solution of the 
mystery). Gestalt psychology was influential in early fihn theory - in 
the work of Hugo Miinsterberg and Rudolf Arnheim, for instance, 
which drew analogies between the patterning operations of the mind 
and the patterning techniques of cinema - but it proved difficult to 
reconcile with psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and deconstruc-
tion, all of which rejected the notion of the whole. Recently, however, 
it has enjoyed some revival in cognitive film theory. 
HERMENEUTICS Derived from the ancient Greek word hermeneus 
(an interpreter), hermeneutics means the theory and practice of in-
terpretation- of grasping and explicating the meaning of a text, a cul-
tural practice, or indeed any phenomenon. When a critic provides an 
interpretation of a film, s/he is engaging in hermeneutics, even if s/he 
does not consciously use any specific hermeneutic theory. Originally 
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the te rm was concerned with the correct interpretation of the Bi-
ble and worked on the assumption that a correct interpretation was 
possible. Much literary and film criticism has worked on the same 
assumption and has sought to arrive at the correct interpretation ot 
a poem or movie. Deconstruction and post-structuralism, however, 
challenge this assumption, arguing that meaning is always contradic-
tory, self-subverting and shifting, and that therefore correct interpre-
tation can never be arrived at; the interpreter can offer only a provi-
sional and transient construction of the meaning of a text. Modern 
hermeneutics is divided between the view that correct interpretation 
remains more or less possible and the view that it is never possible. 
Any film theory, or indeed any film criticism, incorporates an implicit 
or explicit hermeneutics - a view of whether correct interpretation is 
possible and of how interpretation is conducted. 
LANGUAGE, LANGUAGE SYSTEM Unwieldy English equiva-
lents of the French terms langage and langue, respectively. Cinema is 
called language, because it is a means of communication, but it is not 
a language system because it doesn't follow the rules of written or 
spoken language. Ferdinand de Saussure asked how language works, 
and the essence of the explanation he gave was that meaning exists 
only within a system. In contrast to the naive view that language ac-
quires its meaning by reference to a world ot things anterior to, or 
independent of, signification, Saussure argued that meaning derives 
solely from the system within which particular utterances are articu-
lated. The system, known as langue, and actual or potential utterances, 
parole, may be compared to the rule system of chess and to the set of 
moves that may be actually or potentially played. Langue defines both 
what are permissible or impermissible utterances and what their sig-
nificance is. In explicating the functioning of language as a system de 
Saussure distinguished between the signifier and the signified, which 
together comprise the linguistic sign. The signifier is the actual sound 
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(or if written, the appearance) of the word; the signified is the con-
cept or meaning attached to it. The essential point is, as de Saussure 
put it, "in language there are only differences." This so-called 'dia-
critical' theory ol meaning was to prove the single most influental 
idea operative within film semiotics. Another approach was taken by 
C.S. Peirce. The Peircean sign points in two directions: on the one 
hand towards the person to whom it is addressed and in whose mind 
it creates an idea or secondary sign, called the interpretant, and on 
the other towards that which it stands for, called the object. A sign 
thus mediates between the object and the interpretant. Peirce writes: 
"My language is the sum total ot myselt; for the man is the thought." 
Peirce's ideas have been taken into film culture by Peter Wollen, Kaja 
Silverman, Gilles Deleuze and Teresa de Lauretis. Jacques Lacan's 
thinking on language had two aspects which were crucial for film 
theory. The first of these was a Nietzschean conception of language 
as constitutive: ' the world of words... creates the world of things', 
'things only signify within the symbolic order ' , 'nothing makes sense 
until you put a sign on it.' According to Nietzsche, language coerces 
us into thinking in particular ways through categories that remain 
largely unconscious. Language, as he famously expressed it, secretes a 
mythology. By substituting 'ideology' for 'mythology one gets exactly 
what film theorists took up from Lacan's reading of de Saussure; that 
film is a language appearing to render the real transparently but ac-
tually secreting an ideology. The task therefore was to create a new 
language. The second aspect was LacaWs conception of meaning as 
produced in the exchange between the subject and a set of signifi-
ers. Here Lacan modified de Saussure's idea of the linguistic sign by 
giving primacy' to the signifier and by introducing a bar between the 
signifier and the signified, implying that there is a continual sliding 
of signifieds under signifiers as these enter into new relationships. 
Christian Metz thought that cinema is a language without a langue, 
where langue is understood in a de Saussurean sense as 'a system of 
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signs intended for intercommunication. ' The concept of langue was 
inapplicable to cinema for three basic reasons: firstly cinema is not 
available for inter-communication; next the filmic image is quite un-
like the de Saussurean sign, and, moreover, as well as resemblance 
there is a material link between the image and its object, making it 
index as well as icon, and therefore motivated. The cinema dupli-
cated rather than articulated reality. And the third reason was that it 
lacks the double articulation that, according to Andre Martinet and 
other linguisticians, is the hallmark of natural language. If cinema 
is not langue, it is nonetheless language, at least ' to the extent that 
it orders signifying elements within ordered arrangements different 
f rom those of spoken idioms - and to the extent that these elements 
are not traced on the perceptual configuration of reality itself (which 
does not tell stories), thinks Metz. Cinema transforms the world into 
discourse, and is not therefore simple duplication. But the semiotics 
of cinema cannot work at the level of the image, since each image is 
unique, novel and analogous to reality, with its meaning produced not 
by its place within a system but by what it duplicates, think Robert 
Lapsley and Michael Westlake. 
METALANGUAGE A language in which we talk about language it-
self, or about the language of a particular field of intellectual inquiry -
for example, a metalanguage of film theory would discuss the terms, 
structures, imagery and other relevant features of the language in 
which theoretical propositions about film are presented. 
METAPHOR A term describing the use of imagery by which an 
analogy can be drawn between one object and an abstract idea so 
that the two are imaginatively linked. The initial idea is reinforced by 
its association with a concrete object. Metaphorical associations are 
possible in cinema through the montage of attraction. As W C . Fields 
in The Dentist (1932) applies his drill to a patient's mouth, an insert 
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cut is made to a construction worker 's pneumatic gun tearing at the 
side of a steel beam. A satirical metaphor is effected. Metaphors in 
cinema may be of a more extended type than that used in The Dentist. 
In Battleship Potemkin (1925) the battleship serves as a metaphor for 
the entire Russian state under the Czarist regime. Art by its very 
nature is, as Coleridge called it, esemplastic - that is metaphorical. The 
principal forms by which metaphors are generated are:( l) explicit 
comparison (epiphor), (2) identity asserted, (3) identity implied by 
substitution, (4) juxtaposition (diaphor), (5) metonymy (associated 
idea substituted), (6) synecdoche (part replaces whole), (7) objective 
correlative, (8) distortion (hyperbole, caricature), (9) rule disrup-
tion, (10) chiming (parallelism). 
MISE-EN-SCÉNE This literally means 'putting in the scene', and 
is a te rm that can be used of both film and theatre. It refers to all 
of the elements that contribute to the visual composition of a par-
ticular scene on the stage or shot in a film - the position of actors, 
their actions, their costume, the set, the scenery. Mise-en-scéne can 
be analysed as an aspect of the style of a particular auteur-director, 
as an element ot montage or cutting, or as a component of film that 
is in tension with montage because it invites the director and viewer 
to linger on particular shots and scenes rather than to cut to other 
shots and scenes. Eisenstein proposed the te rm and concept mise-
en-cadre, 'putting in the frame', as 'a leap f rom the mise-en-scene', 'a 
second-stage mise-en-scéne, when the mise-en-scéne ojchanging camera 
positions is superimposed upon the broken lines of the mise-en-scéne's 
displacement in space'. But this term does not seem to have caught 
on. 
NARRATION Spoken description or analysis of action. Noel Car-
roll thinks that narration is a form of representation insofar as a nar-
rative describes, and in that sense represents, a sequence of events. 
231 
GLOSSARY OF CRITICAL TERMS 
And, of course, film, in its most salient use in our culture, is nar-
rative. 'Classic realism' generally involves at least the use of narra-
tion in co-ordination with what are thought of as visual codes ot 
verisimilitude. Typically, a narrative film confronts its audience with 
a. flow of images or views which are of ten fragmentary as well as spa-
tially discontinuous. Shots are compounded with shots taken f rom 
different camera positions. These views are built up into actions and 
events, scenes and sequences which, in turn, are worked into whole 
stories. The question of cinematic narration is the question of the 
small-scale narrative coherence of films; the question ot the ways in 
which events, scenes, and sequences are constructed from shots and 
alternating views. Verbal language plays an obvious role in this proc-
ess. But though one would not dare to say that the role of dialogue, 
intertitles, and commentary in cinematic narration requires no theo-
retical investigation, an account of the visual elements in cinematic 
narration seems perhaps more pressing since it is easy, at least specu-
latively, to imagine that the shifting views of typical films could result 
in confusion rather than coherence. 
PACING The creation of a sense of tempo and rhythm in a film - so 
that it seems, for example, fast or slow, abrupt or fluid - by the fre-
quency and manner of cutting. For instance, a long take, in which the 
camera dwells on a particular scene for some time, is likely to create 
a slower tempo than a succession ot short takes that move from one 
scene to another. A jump cut, in which a middle section of a scene 
is eliminated by cutting the film or stopping the camera, produces an 
abrupt, jerky rhythm. 
PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE A term used by Torben Grodal in his 
Moving Pictures. It means the way in which certain elements ot a film 
will become salient - that is, will stand out more than others - and 
will make a powerful impact upon the perceiver. For Grodal, salience 
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is ' the ability of a given fiction to evoke strong experiences and to at-
tract close attention'. (Grodal (1997), 34) 
PHENOMENOLOGY The philosophical explanation of the modes 
in which human beings apprehend phenomena, the things of this 
world. Originated in the earlier twentieth century by the German 
philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), it had a considerable 
influence on mid-twentieth-century European and North American 
thought, for example in the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-84)) 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-61), and in the literary criticism 
of Georges Poulet (1902-91)and J. Hillis Miller (bom 1928) in his 
pre-deconstructive phase In literary and film theory and criticism, a 
phenomenological approach can be author or auteur-centred, aiming 
to infer, f rom the totality of a writer or director 's work, the primary 
ways in which he apprehends the phenomena of the world; or it can 
be reception-centred, concentrating on he ways in which readers or 
viewers apprehend literary works or films. Both André Bazin and 
Siegfried Kracauer can be seen as phenomenological to some extent 
in their approach, trying to account for the peculiar sense of pres-
ence that film can give the spectator. Phenomenology was displaced 
for a t ime by structuralism, post-structuralism and deconstruction; 
these three approaches tended to ignore the phenomenological di-
mension or regarded it as an illusion. But phenomenology remains of 
considerable interest, and has some links with cognitive film theory, 
although its vocabulary tends to be less (quasi-)scientific and more 
philosophical, experiential and existential. 
POST-STRUCTURALISM This approach takes up the structural-
ist idea that cultural practices are to be seen in terms of structures 
and systems rather than in terms of human agency; but it rejects the 
structuralist quest to identify enduring, universal structures. Devel-
oping Saussure's notion that the relationship between signifier and 
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signified is arbitrary, it sees meaning as unstable, constant only in 
that it is always mobile, subverting any attempt to identify a fixed, 
underlying system. In a post-structuralist perspective, the belief in 
fixed meaning is due partly to the desire to maintain the imaginary 
unity of self that the infant first achieves in the 'mirror stage' de-
scribed by Lacan, and partly to the wish to ratify existing distributions 
of power by repressing the possibility of change. Post-structuralism 
often has a strong political edge, pointing out that what is held to be 
self-evident common sense is a fragile and questionable ideological 
production that serves to preserve existing power arrangements. A 
post-structuralist analysis of a cultural text, such as a film, would 
examine the ways in which its attempts to present particular mean-
ings were undermined by moments of ambiguity. In many respects, 
Post-structuralism is close to deconstruction. 
SATURATION A t e rm used by Torben Grodal in his Moving Pictures 
to indicate a state in which the input/output processing by the viewer 
of a visual fiction is blocked so that the translation of responses into 
potential action - into 'a motor attitude' - is suspended. The viewer 
is thus left saturated, or flooded, by sensations, emotions and images 
without being able to imagine how s/he might discharge them. Con-
sider a film in which a character loved by the film's protagonist dies: 
there can be no remedy for this, and the viewer, through an empathic 
identification with the protagonist, is flooded with sensations, emo-
tions and memories that cannot be translated, even in imagination, 
into action. It may be possible, however, to mitigate the saturation by 
some action such as taking revenge, in which case saturation would 
be succeeded by a mood of tensity, which is a state of arousal that 
aims at the eventual achievement of a goal that will reduce the arousal 
- as when, in The Big Heat (1953), the detective, Bannion, seeks those 
responsible for his wife's murder. 
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SEMIOTICS The 'science', or at least study, of signs, originally pro-
posed by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) . Semiot-
ics analyses the way in which signs, understood in Saussure's t e rm 
as combinations of signifiers and signifieds, construct meanings in 
particular cultural and historical situations. A seminal semiotic text 
is Roland Barthes's Mythologies (1957), which analyses a range of signs 
- on magazine covers and in advertising, for example - and examines 
the way in which they purvey myths in which socially constructed 
meanings are turned into supposedly 'natural' ones. For instance, 
a photograph, on the cover of Paris-Match, of a young black soldier 
saluting the French flag, conveys the notion that France's colonial 
subjects are 'naturally' loyal to the imperial power. Semiotics has 
been influential in a range of fields, such as feminism, cultural stud-
ies, literary studies, and film studies. In film studies, it has been used 
to analyse the way in which meaning is constructed through mise-en-
scéne, montage and narrative structure. 
SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED A definition and distinction developed by 
Ferdinand de Saussure that has been crucial to the development of 
semiotics and post-structuralism. In Saussure's view, the sign con-
sists of a signifier - a sound or visual mark - and a signified - the 
mental concept with which a specific signifier has become associated 
in a particular language. The relationship between signifier and signi-
fied is arbitrary - that is, there is no necessary connection between a 
particular sound/visual mark and a particular mental concept, so that 
the same sound or visual mark can have different meanings in differ-
ent languages, or even within the same language. The signified, the 
mental concept, should not be confused with the particular object to 
which a sign may refer; such an object is known as a referent. 
STRUCTURALISM An approach to the analysis of that aims to 
identify the underlying structures that shape and inform cultural 
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practices. Its primary model is that of language: all cultural prac-
tices, like language, have a grammar, a syntax and a vocabulary that 
determine how meaning is produced. Structuralism is especially 
concerned with binary oppositions - good/bad, black/white, man/ 
woman - and with their permutations through homologies - ways in 
which one structure parallels another - and variations. Structural-
ism tends towards the synchronic and the universal - towards seeing 
underlying structures as persisting beneath the apparent differences 
brought about by time and change, or by cultural variation - and 
it challenges the importance of human agency. 'Human beings' are 
seen more as products of structures than as producers of structures. 
Structuralism is thus sceptical of the idea of the author - or the auteur 
- as the origin and guiding presence of cultural texts. In a structur-
alist perspective, films are not primarily seen as the products of an 
auteur-director; the aim is to identify the implicit structures that give 
them meaning, structures that do not depend upon the particular in-
terests of a director. Structuralism has come under attack from both 
post-structuralism and deconstruction, which claim that its idea of 
underlying structures is too fixed and rigid and fails to acknowledge 
the instability of the sign. 
TENSITY A te rm used by Torben Grodal in his Moving Pictures to 
refer to the mood of the viewer of a visual fiction who desires the 
achievement of a particular goal in order to reduce his arousal. The 
viewer of a detective thriller, for example, will be aroused by the de-
sire to solve the mystery and want the detective, eventually, to achieve 
the goal of finding the solution. Tensity can be contrasted with the 
mood of saturation, in which a particular goal - for example, the res-
toration of a dead person to life seems impossible to achieve. 
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